

POL
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BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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Authority: VND 950503
By: MN NARA Date: 10/15/05



Pel 31 Biafra-Nigerian
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 388

PAGE 01 PARIS 14944 301839Z

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ACTION SS:70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00, 1071 W

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R 301745Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7552
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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S E C R E T PARIS 14944

LIMDIS

SUBJ: NIGERIA/BIAFRA: BRUBECK TALKS IN PARIS (V); ACHILLEFOULD

1. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEPUTY AYMAR ACHILLE-FOULD (PROTECT SOURCE) PROVIDED BRUBECK, POLCOUNSELOR AND EMBOFF WITH MOST BALANCED VIEW OF NIGERIA/BIAFRA SITUATION HEARD IN PARIS DURING MEETING EVENING SEPT 29. ACHILLE-FOULD, HIGHLY ARTICULATE MEMBER ASSEMBLY'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND SUPPORTER OF POMPIDOU (WITH WHOM HE HAS CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP), HAS BEEN LONELY VOICE IN OPPOSITION TO GOF POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA AND HEADED PARLIAMENTARY DELGATION TO LAGOS AT END LAST YEAR.

2. ACCORDING ACHILLE-FOULD, GOF POLICY IN THIS AREA WAS LARGEMLY CREATION OF JACQUES FOCCART, WHO SOLD IT TO DEGAULLE. PRINCIPAL JUSTIFICATION ADVANCED BY FOCCART WAS DESIRABILITY OF REDUCING BRITISH INFLUENCE AS EXERCISED THROUGH STRONG AND POPULOUS NIGERIAN AND THEREBY PROPORTIONATELY INCREASING INFLUENCE OF FRANCE AND FRANCO- PHONE WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

3. UNDER POMPIDOU, ACHILLE-FOULD FEELS, THERE IS ALREADY SOME CHANGE EVIDENT IN THE THINKING ABOUT THIS QUESTION THOUGH NO CHANGE HAS YET APPEARED IN THE ACTUAL POLICY.

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By MN NARA Date 04/5/05



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FOCCART'S INFLUENCE, WHICH WAS BASED TO LARGE EXTENT ON HIS CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DEGAULLE, NOW CONSIDERABLY LESSENED, AND PERSONAL ANIMOSITY BETWEEN FOCCART AND FONMIN MAURICE SCHUMANN WILL FURTHER ERODE FOCCART'S POSITION. RESULT WILL BE GRADUAL INCREASE IN ROLE OF QUAI, WHICH HAD ALMOST NO SAY ON AFRICAN QUESTIONS DURING DEGAULLE ERA.
IN THIS CONNECTION, ACHILLE-FOULD SAID THAT DURING PRIVATE MEETING HE HAD WITH SCHUMANN JUST BEFORE LATTER'S DEPARTURE FROM UNGA, HE HAD FOUND SCHUMANN MORE FLEXIBLE IN HIS THINKING ON NIGERIAN QUESTION. THIS, HE SAID, COULD BE IMPORTANT FACTOR LEADING TO EVENTUAL CHANGE IN POLICY.

4. ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN NIGERIA/BIAFRA PRESENTED BY ACHILLE-FOULD VERY CLOSE TO THAT OF USG. HE ATTRIBUTED PRO-BIAFRAN TENOR OF FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION PRINCIPALLY TO VIGOROUS, WELL-FINANCED BIAFRAN PROPAGANDA EFFORTS, NOTABLY WORK OF MARKPRESS, AS CONTRASTED TO GENERALLY POOR FMG INFORMATION ACTIVITIES. HE AGREED GOF POLICY ON THIS ISSUE HAD SOME EMOTIONAL CONTENT IN ADDITION COLD CALCULATION OF POLITICAL ADVANTAGE, BUT FELT THIS WAS MORE TRUE OF PUBLIC OPINION THAN OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS.

5. ACHILLE-FOULD WILL BE IN NEW YORK LATER THIS AUTUMN AS MEMBER FRENCH UN DELEGATION AND, AT BRUBECK'S SUGGESTION HOPES ALSO VISIT WASHINGTON AT THAT TIME. ACHILLE-FOULD STRESSED THAT HIS COMMENTS ON INTERNAL WORKINGS GOF ARE HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND REQUESTS THEY BE CLOSELY HELD.

6. COMMENT: BRUBECK FOUND CONVERSATION WITH ACHILLE-FOULD HIGHLY ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE THAT COOPERATION WITH GOF ON POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT OF NIGERIA/BIAFRA CONFLICT PERHAPS NOT ENTIRELY FORECLOSED BY HARD LINE PUT FORWARD BY QUAI AND BY PRO-BIAFRAN DEPUTIES. TO EXTENT THAT FOCCART INFLUENCE INDEED LESSENED AND, AS ACHILLE-FOULD SUGGEST, FRENCH POLICY INCREASINGLY OPEN TO CHANGE, REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF BIAFRAN SITUATION MAY YET LEAD GOF TO SEEK ACCEPTABLE FORMULA AS ROUTE TO DISENGAGEMENT. AT SUCH POINT, PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORT INVOLVING APPLICATION GOF INFLUENCE ON BIAFRANS WOULD BECOME MUCH BRIGHTER THAN THEY PRESENTLY APPEAR. AS CENTRIST PARLIAMENTARIAN IN THE OPPOSITION DURING DEGAULLE'S TENURE, ACHILLE-FOULD

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EXERCISED VERY LITTLE IF ANY INFLUENCE ON GOV POLICY. HE IS NOW A MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY MAJORITY, HAS BEEN NAMED TO KEY JOB AS RAPPORTEUR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE HANDLING BUDGET OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COOPERATION (YVON BOURGES) AT FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND HAS CAST HIS POLITICAL LOT WITH POMPIDOU. AS FOCCART'S INFLUENCE DECREASES UNDER POMPIDOU, ACHILLE-FOULD'S VIEWS MAY RECEIVE MORE ATTENTION THAN IN PAST. WE THEREFORE FULLY CONCUR WITH BRUBECK ON USEFULNESS OF INVITING ACHILLE-FOULD TO WASHINGTON FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEW WHEN HE ATTENDS UNGA LATER THIS AUTUMN. GP-2
SHRIVER

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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
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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 08651 271457Z

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ACTION AF: 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, ACDA 16, AID 28, SR 01, DRM 03, SCSE 00, SCA 01,
UCF 05, UPW 01, E 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, RSR 01, 171 W

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R 271255Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9205
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
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USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 8651

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUND-UP: SEPT. 27

1. ALL PAPERS REPORT DEPARTURE STATEMENT OF OAU SEC GEN TELLI, SEPT. 26 IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT NIGERIAN CRISIS WOULD BE ENDED "VERY SOON". ALSO REITERATED CALL FOR NON-AFRICAN POWERS TO STOP INTERFERING IN AFRICA'S AFFAIRS. DECLINED TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GOWON BUT SAID HE WAS BEARING MESSAGE FROM GOWON TO HIM.

2. TIMES CARRIES WIRE SERVICE REPORT ON ARIKPO STATEMENT TO PRESS AFTER MEETING WITH SECSTATE IN NY. QUOTED AS SAYING MEETING DEALT EXCLUSIVELY WITH RELIEF MATTERS.

3. TIMES AND POST REPORT COMINFO ENAHORO PRESS STATEMENT IN LONDON SUGGESTING THAT "INTERNATIONAL AIR ARMADA" SHOULD BE

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ORGANIZED TO FLY RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO REBEL ENCLAVE.
ONLY CONDITION IS INSPECTION TO PREVENT ARMS TO REBELL.

4. MANY PICTURES OF SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL MEETING SEPT. 26
BUT NO STATEMENT OR CONCRETE INFO ON DISCUSSIONS.

5. PAPERS INDICATE NO NEW DISTURBANCES IN WESTERN STATE.
CURFEW IN IBADAN CONTINUES IN FORCE. SOME PRISONERS
ALREADY BEING RELEASED ON BAIL ACCORDING TO PRESS. "EXPRESS"
EDITOR REMI ILORI IN SIGNED COLUMN STATES THAT "ONLY PATH OPEN"
TO WESTERN STATE MILGOV IS TO RETIRE. SAYS THAT HE ADMires
MIL GOV FOR MANY THINGS BUT "UNFORTUNATELY, RULING STATE IS NOT
ONE OF THEM. BRIGADIER HAS BUNGLED HIS ASSIGNMENT."
POST EDITORIAL PRAISES GENERAL GOWONS STATEMENT ON
WESTERN CRISIS. DECLARES THAT WHILE FMG CLEARLY HAS
POWER TO INTERVENE IN ADMINISTRATION OF ANY STATE, THIS
STATEMENT SHOWED FMG CONCERNED WITH MAINTENANCE OF PEACE,
LAW AND ORDER RATHER THAN SHOW OF POWER SINCE IT IMPLIED
NEED FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
IN MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER. SAYS THAT STATEMENT ALSO
RECOGNIZED THAT THERE MAY BE GENUINE CAUSE FOR DISSA-
TISFACTION IN WEST, BUT SECURITY OF LIVES AND PROPERTY
OVER RIDES ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. TIMES EDITORIAL
ALSO PRAISES STATEMENT AND ANNOUNCEMENT THAT STEPS WILL BE
TAKEN TO INCREASE CAPABILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
TO DEAL WITH CIVIL DISTURBANCES. FINDS IT "SIGNIFICANT"
THAT WHILE FMG SAID STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN TO MEET LEGITIMATE
GRIEVANCES WHICH ARE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF
AUTHORITIES. "IN PROPER MANNER", METHOD FOR PRESENTING
GRIEVANCES LEFT VAGUE. CALLS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF "OMBUDSMAN"
IN WEST AS HAD BEEN RECOMMENDED BY PREVIOUS
COMMISSION WHICH LOOKED INTO CAUSES OF
DISTURBANCES IN WEST IN LATE 1968. SUGGESTION WAS REJECTED
BY WESTERN STATEMENT GOVERNMENT IN APRIL THIS YEAR AS "UNNECESSARY"
ON GROUNDS THAT CHANNELS FOR PRESENTATION OF
GRIEVANCES WOULD BE "LOCAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES" IN EACH
DISTRICT. TIMES STATES THAT COMMON MAN TENDS TO BE
SUSPECT OF EXISTING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BECAUSE THEY
CONSIDER THEM PARTISAN TO GOVERNMENT AND OMBUDSMAN
WOULDLL THIS VACUUM. POINTING OUT WESTERN MILGOVS
STATEMENT THAT SITUATION AMOUNTS TO REBELLION, OBSERVER
EDITORIAL DECLARES THAT NIGERIA CANNOT ALLOW

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"ANOTHER OJUKWU ORI OJUKWUS TO REAR THEIR HEADS," AND CALLS ON SMC NOT TO "SOFT-PEDAL" SITUATION IN WEST AND TO TAKE MEASURES NECESSARY TO END DISTURBANCES. IN COMMENT ON TRADITIONAL RULER OF IBADAN CALLS MILGOV TO END POLICE AND ARMY RAIDS PREPARATORY TO MEETING HE PLANS TO CALL OF LEADERS FROM AREA TO FIND OUT PEOPLES GRIEVANCES, EXPRESS AND TRIBUNE TAKE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED VIEWS. EXPRESS PRAISES THIS MOVE AND CALLS FOR TAX RAIS "BARBARIC" MEASURE WHICH NO OTHER STATE IN FEDERATION HAS CARRIED OUT AND YET THEY MANAGE TO MEET THEIR BUDGETS. TRIBUNE CALLS ON MILGOV TO IGNORE CALL AND ACCUSES RULER AND OTHERS AT MEETING OF FAILURE TO DENOUNCE "UNEQUIVOCALLY" RIOTS. STATES THAT "URGING SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL CITIZENS TO DESIST FROM RIOTS" WHILE CALLING ON ARMY AND POLICE TO STOP PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IS "HYPOCRITICAL WAY OF ENCOURAGING RIOTERS." SKETCH EDITORIAL ACCUSES DAILY TIMES OF "ATTEMPT TO CONFUSE AND COMPLICATE MATTERS" IN WESTERN STATE BY EXPOLITING SENSITIVE MATTERS, LISTING SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF WHAT IT ALLEGES ARE SLANTED REPORTING BY TIMES.

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ORIGIN/ACTION

AF-5
4-3**AIRGRAM**

SOC 14-7 BIAFRA

DOH 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

FILE DESIGNATION

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NO.

TO : Department of State

SEP 29 2 11 PM 1969

ANALYSTIC BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy LONDON

DATE: SEPTEMBER 27, 1969

SUBJECT : Complaint of Genocide in Nigerian/Biafran War

REF :

With this airgram the Embassy transmits several documents complied by E. Essuman Mensah. Mr. Mensah explains that he was asked to investigate a complaint of genocide made to "an International Committee of Jurists for the Investigation of the Crime of Genocide" which is based in Paris.

In his transmittal letter (dated August 18 but actually handed over in late September) Mr. Mensah states he has been directed by the Secretary General of the committee to forward these documents to the United States Government.

Mr. Mensah's report concludes that the FMG has been guilty of acts of genocide and he bases this conclusion on a sheath of statements which are included with his report.

The Embassy does not know either Mr. Mensah or his committee and has not been able to find anyone at the Foreign Office with knowledge of either. The papers are passed on to the Department for information.

ANNENBERG

mgb

Action Taken:

Date:

Initials:

FORM
10-64 DS-323

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Drafted by:

POL/EX/A: JWWalker:km (W)

Drafting Date:

9/26/69

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL/WJGalloway

Clearances:

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Authority VN1959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/03



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Lagos 8613
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ACTION AF: 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, CIAE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, E 15, COM 08, INT 06, UCF 05,

AID 28, RSR 01, 162 W

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R 261035Z SEP 69

FMI AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9179

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

DIA

CINCSSTRIKE

CONFIDENTIAL LLAGOS 8613

SUBJECT: AIR ATTACK ON OIL INSTALLATION

REF: LAGOS 8397

DIA FOR DIACO; CINCSSTRIKE FOR STRJ2-C

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. SHELL-BP HAS INFORMED UK DEFATT THAT TWO SMALL BIAFRAN AIRCRAFT STRUCK FLOW STATION OF SHELL-BP'S OWEH OIL FIELD, LOCATED 15 MILES EAST OF UGHELLIN IN MIDWESTERN STATE, 24 SEPTEMBER AT 1220 PM. ACCORDING TO REPORT, 24 ROCKETS FIRED BUT ONLY ONE HIT TARGET, CAUSING MINOR DAMAGE WHICH EASILY REPARABLE. SHELL-BP PLEASED WITH EFFECTIVENESS OF PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES WHICH PROBABLY PREVENTED MUCH GREATER DAMAGE. MEASURES INCLUDE CAMOUFLAGE, SANDBAGGING, REINFORCED CONCRETE WALLS AROUND SOME EQUIPMENT AND EXPOSED CONCENTRATION OF DECOY DUMMY PIPING.

2. COMMENT: THIS IS FIFTH KNOWN AIR ATTACK ON OIL INSTALLATIONS, OF WHICH FOUR ON SHELL-BP, ONE ON GULF ALL IN MIDWESTERN STATE. OWEH IS RELATIVELY SMALL OIL FIELD WITH POTENTIAL OF 25,000 BARRELS PER DAY, EVACUATED.

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THROUGH TRANS-NIGER PIPELINE TO BONNY TERMINAL, GP-30
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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01,
SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, AID 28, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 172 W
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R 261640Z SEP 69.
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9198
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AMCONSUL IBADAN UNN
AMCONSUL KADUNA UNN
BT
CONFIDENTIAL LLAGOS 8639

SUBJ: NORWEGIAN ATTITUDES ON NIGERIA

1. ERIKSON, NORWEGIAN CHARGE DETAILED HERE DURING TEMPORARY ABSENCE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR, CALLED ON US FOR BRIEFING ON SITUATION IN WESTERN STATE. IN COURSE SUBSEQUENT

WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION, ERIKSON (WHO ALSO HEAD OF AFRICA DIVISION, NORWEGIAN FORNMINISTRY) TOLD US BASIC NORWEGIAN POSITION ON RELIEF AND OBSERVER FORCES CONTAINED IN NORDIC DECLARATION AT REYKJAVIK.

2. ERIKSON SAID NORWEGIANS FAIRLY WELL QTE OUT FRONT UNQUOTE

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BY INDICATING THEIR WILLINGNESS SUPPLY PERSONNEL FOR (MILITARY) OBSERVER FORCE, SHOULD IT BE NEEDED IF THERE CEASE-FIRE. HE SAID OBSERVERS WOULD BE DRAWN FROM UNITS ALREADY MARKED FOR UN PEACEKEEPING DUTIES.

3. ERIKSON (PROTECT) ALSO SAID HIS GOVT READY SUPPLY PERSONNEL TO FACILITATE ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS, BY ACTING AS NEUTRAL INSPECTORS, VERIFYING MANIFESTS, ETC. HE SAID, QTE SPEAKING PERSONALLY UNQTE, HE THOUGHT THIS COULD INCLUDE NORWEGIANS ON BOARD AIRCRAFT INTO ENCLAVE, IF THAT WERE AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES. (COMMENT. ON THIS POINT ERIKSON GAVE IMPRESSION HE WOULD BE PREPARED MAKE SUCH RECOMMENDATION TO GON IF RELIEF FLIGHT ISSUE REACHED STAGE WHERE SUCH A ROLE THEIR PART BE HELPFUL AND POSSIBLE.)

4. WITH REFERENCE POSSIBLE SIMILAR CANADIAN ASSISTANCE ON RELIEF FLIGHTS, ERIKSON OPINED THAT IT GOOD FOR GON TO QTE HAVE COMPANY UNQTE IN TAKING STEPS TO TRY TO IMPLEMENT RELIEF FLIGHTS, AND POSSIBLY FULFILL OBSERVER ROLE IN IBOLAND AS ENVISAGED IN FMG PEACE PROPOSALS, I.E., TO REASSURE IBO POPULATION FMG WOULD NOT COMMIT QTE GENOCIDE UNQTE OR HOSTILE ACTS TOWARD CIVILIANS. GP=3
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION: AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,
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UCF 05, NIC 01, RSR 01, /136-W

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P R 261040Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9186
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

UNCLAS LAGOS 8614

SUBJECT: GOWON STATEMENT ON UNREST IN WESTERN STATE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY HEAD OF FMG, GOWON, ON SITUATION IN WESTERN STATE, UNNECESSARY WORDS DELETED.
A. HEAD OF FMG AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES HAS NOTED WITH DEEP CONCERN WAVES OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR INVOLVING UNPROVOKED ATTACKS ON INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND SOME LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN WESTERN STATE DURING PAST WEEK. WELFARE OF ORDINARY MAN AND SAFETY OF HIS PERSON AND PROPERTY IS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF ANY GOVERNMENT. IN PURSUANCE OF DUTY TO PROVIDE GOOD AND ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND WESTERN STATE GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO RESOLVE OR MEET LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES OF THE PEOPLE. THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE, HOWEVER, IF SUCH GRIEVANCES ARE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENT IN A PROPER MANNER WITHOUT RESORT TO ACTS OF LAWLESSNESS.
B. HEAD OF FMG AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES HAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO SECURITY FORCES TO INCREASE THEIR SURVEILLANCE AND TO ENSURE SAFETY OF ALL CITIZENS IN AFFECTED AREAS. ALL PERSONS ARE THEREFORE URGED TO COOPERATE WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN THE GENERAL INTEREST.

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Authority NND 959503
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Pal 27 Biafra Nigeria

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RSR 01, /115 W

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R 260023Z SEP 69.
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8843
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 3233

RE: NIGERIA: BIAFRA

BEING SEATED AT SECY'S DINNER LAST NIGHT FOR OAU FONMINS BETWEEN FONMIN USHER OF IVORY COAST (AN OLD PERSONAL FRIEND) AND COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ARIKPO OF NIGERIA, I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO EACH SEPARATELY AND PRIVATELY RE SITUATION IN NIGERIA.

USHER EXPRESSED VIEW THAT, DESPITE APPEARANCE TO CONTRARY, THERE ARE REAL POSSIBILITIES OF MOVING TOWARD SETTLEMENT DURING COMING MONTHS. THOUGHT PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT MIGHT COME AROUND CHRISTMAS TIME AND HOPED FRIENDS OF BOTH SIDES WOULD URGE THEM TO EXTEND FOR SEVERAL WEEKS THE USUAL THREE-DAY CHRISTMAS CEASEFIRE. IN MEANTIME HE HOPED MEDIATION COULD PROCEED MORE ACTIVELY. HE WAS CATEGORICAL IN ASSERTING THAT BIAFRANS ARE NO LONGER SEEKING INDEPENDENCE BUT WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF AUTONOMY WITHIN A NIGERIAN CONFEDERATION. HE RETURNED TO THIS POINT SEVERAL TIMES. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE CONTEMPLATES PLACING AN ITEM ON BIAFRA ON THE UN AGENDA, THOUGH HE ASSUMES THERE WILL BE FREQUENT

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OCCASIONS TO REFER TO PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY ITS HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, IN COURSE OF GA DEBATES.

ARIKPO WAS SOMEWHAT LESS HOPEFUL ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR AN EARLY SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT ULTIMATE SOLUTION LAY IN A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF AUTONOMY FOR IBO REGION, THOUGH THIS COULD CERTAINLY NOT INCLUDE PROVISION FOR A SEPARATE ARMY. ON OTHER HAND HE EXPRESSED STRONG DOUBT THAT PRESENT BIAFRAN LEADERSHIP COULD COME TO A SETTLEMENT ALONG THESE LINES AND THEREFORE WAS CLEAR IN STATING THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGE IN THAT LEADERSHIP BEFORE THERE COULD BE PEACE. HE OF COURSE URGED THAT PROBLEM BE DEALT WITH EXCLUSIVELY IN OAU FRAMEWORK AND NOT BE RAISED IN ANY WAY IN UNIGA. GP-4.
YOST

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, SR 01, ORM 03,
CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSCI 10, P 03,

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P 250930Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9159
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
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AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
EVEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 755

AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USUN NEW YORK 1223

C O N F I D E N T I A L L I L A G O S 8579

SUB: POSSIBLE UN CONSIDERATION OF NIGERIA
REF: STATE 133458 (NOTAL) IV LAGOS 7199 (NOTAL)

Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria

1. RECENT CONTACTS WITH UPPER-MIDDLE LEVELS OF MINEXTAFF (DIVISION HEADS) INDICATE THERE IS CONTINUING CONCERN IN FMG THAT NIGERIAN QUESTION MAY BE RAISED DURING CURRENT UNGA.

2. ACTING HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL DIVISION (UN AFFAIRS) SAID FMG HAD REPORT FROM THE HAGUE THAT DUTCH QTE MIGHT BE CONSIDERING UNGA RAISING THE NIGERIAN QUESTION, BUT THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE LIMITED TO STATEMENTS ON NIGERIAN WAR IN OPENING STATEMENT BY LEADER GON DELEGATION.

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EM WHEN INFORMED OF STATEMENT BY ZAMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN GA, EXTAFF OFFICERS THOUGHT THIS WOULD REPRESENT LIMIT OF EXTENT TO WHICH MATTER WOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE GA.

4. NOTWITHSTANDING ABOVE REACTION, EXTAFF APPEARS EDGY ABOUT POSSIBILITY NUMEROUS STATEMENTS ON CIVIL WAR DURING OPENING DAYS OF SESSION, BUT DO NOT RPT NOT FORESEE FORMAL INSRIPTION OF NIGERIAN ITEM ON AGENDA. THEY ARE HOWEVER SOMEWHAT NERVOUS ABOUT POSSIBILITY INSRIPTION NORTHERN ICAAND ON AGENDA WOULD CREATE PRECEDENT DURING SESSION WHICH COULD LEAD TO MORE FORMAL NOTICE BEING TAKEN OF NIGERIAN PROBLEM.

5. EXTAFF OFFICERS INQUIRED IF ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION AND WERE TOLD WE HAD NOTED UNSYGNS REMARKS AT ADDIS THAT WE HAVE SAID WE SUPPORT OAU EFFORTS SOLVE PROBLEM, AND THERE NO MENTION OF NIGERIA IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S ADDRESS TO GA. GP-3 OLSON.

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Abidjan A- 247
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home town. A further 90 children are reportedly expected in the next few weeks, which would bring the total number of Biafran children in Ivory Coast shelters up to about 910.

In the area of older youth, Ivory Coast took on 29 Biafran students from Congo (K)'s Louvianum University for the summer vacation; an allowance of about \$100 each was granted to Abidjan University for their keep.

2. Adults

The problem of adult Biafran refugees is an increasing one. The Biafran National Union (see Abidjan A-40 of February 10) has recently estimated that there are some 6,000 Biafrans living in Ivory Coast, including 1,000 men, 2,000 women, and 3,000 children under 12. These include Ibos who were in Ivory Coast prior to Biafra's declaration of independence, and others who have come in from other countries since because of Ivory Coast's recognition of Biafra. As the war continues, they are encountering increasing problem of documentation, employment, relief, education, and the like.


3. United Nations Refugee Program

One of the first organizations to become involved with the refugee problem was the local office of the United Nations. The following information was obtained on a confidential basis from Hans EHRENSTRALE (protect), Resident Representative of the United Nations Development fund.

Biafran refugees have been appealing to the United Nations for assistance since April 1968, and the total number who have requested assistance is now about 180. The UN High Commission for Refugees has to date made available to the local UN office a total of \$1,500 for assistance, of which all but \$200 has been spent. Since the High Commission had specified that its funds should be disbursed through a local voluntary or official agency, the local UN office has been trying to find a local channel for the relief, in the meantime disbursing aid itself on an emergency basis. Discussions with the President of the Ivorian Red Cross, Aimé BAROU, with Ivorian Foreign Minister Arsène ASSOUMAN USHER, and with President Houphouet-Boigny, led to no concrete results.

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07,
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AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY
USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 8568

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP SEPTEMBER 24

1. WAR: MOST PAPERS CARRY FMG PRESS RELEASE THAT NIGERIAN AIR FORCE HAS MOUNTED BIG AIR OPERATION WHOSE OBJECTIVE IS QTE TO CARRY OUT ATTRITION MISSIONS ON ULI-IHALA UNQTE. RELEASE ALSO STATED THAT OPERATIONS BEING CARRIED OUT AGAINST NEW REBEL AIR STRIP NEAR UGA.

2. ZIK: EVENING SEPT 23, ZIK MADE PRE-RECORDED TV AND RADIO QTE BROADCAST TO NATION UNQTE. REVIEWED HIS VISIT TO ALL TWELVE STATES POINTING TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND SECURITY ENJOYED BY IBOS IN ALL PARTS OF FEDERATION. CALLED ON ALL IBOS QTE WANDERING IN BUSH UNQTE TO COME OUT AND QTE JOIN ME IN FREEDOM UNQTE. ANNOUNCED HE WOULD LEAVE FOR LONDON SOON TO WIND UP HIS AFFAIRS THERE AND

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THEN RETURN PERMANENTLY TO NIGERIA. SEPT 23 ZIK PAID FIRST VISIT SINCE RETURNING TO NIGERIA TO HOMETOWN OF ONITSHA. ZIK REPORTEDLY GIVEN BIG WELCOME ON ARRIVAL IN ONITSHA BY QTE MORE THAN 3000 IBOS UNQTE NOW RESIDENT IN TOWN, SIX HUNDRED OF WHOM STATED TO BE TRADERS.

3. WESTERN STATE: RIOTS IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS NEAR IBADAN CONTINUE FOR EIGHTH STRAIGHT DAY WITH VILLAGERS AMBUSHES OF POLICE UNITS AT AKUFO AND TWO OTHER VILLAGES AND ENSUING RUNNING BATTLES REPORTED AS LASTING NINE HOURS. IN COURT HEARING OF PERSONS ARRESTED DURING EARLIER RIOT AT MONIYA, POLICE INTRODUCED CONFESSIONS BY TWO OF ACCUSED WHICH STATED THAT VILLAGERS HAD BEEN GIVEN DIRECTIVES NOT TO PAY THEIR TAXES BY TWO IBADAN LAWYERS, RICHARD AKINJIDE AND CHIEF M. AGBAJE (EX-NNDP POLITICIANS, BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN IN DETENTION FOR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN RIOTS EARLIER THIS YEAR). MOST PAPERS REPORT THAT MILGOV BENUE-PLATEAU STATE SAID IN AIRPORT INTERVIEW BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR LAGOS TO ATTEND SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL (SMC) MEETING, THAT CONTINUING RIOTS IN WEST QTE NOTHING SHORT OF REBELLION UNQTE AND URGED STATE AUTHORITIES TO QTE DEAL RUTHLESSLY UNQTE WITH THOSE RESPONSIBLE. ADDED THAT IF STATE GOVERNMENT UNABLE TO COPE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD INTERVENE. SAID THAT UNREST IN WESTERN STATE GAVE REBEL REGIME IN BIAFRA QTE FALSE HOPE UNQTE, BUT EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT THIS CRISIS ONLY TEMPORARY SETBACK WHICH WOULD SOON BE OVERCOME. MILGOV SOUTH-EASTERN STATE QUOTED BY TIMES AS SAYING ON ARRIVAL IN LAGOS FOR SMC MEETING THAT MILGOV WEST HAD QTE DONE HIS BEST TO CONTROL SITUATION UNQTE AND CALLED ON ALL NIGERIANS, PARTICULARLY PRESS NOT TO SAY QTE THINGS CAPABLE OF WORSENING SITUATION UNQTE. PILOT, NEW NIGERIAN, EXPRESS AND SKETCH ALL CARRY EDITORIALS ON WESTERN STATES SITUATION. EXPRESS STATES THAT IT IS QTE VOICE OF PEOPLE UNQTE SINCE IT NEITHER CONTROLLED BY GOVERNMENT OR ANY FOREIGN INTERESTS. DECLARES THAT THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES THAT SPECIAL TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY SUCH AS EXPRESS CALLED FOR SEPT 23, WILL BE SET UP AND APPEALS TO ALL WESTERNERS TO QTE MINCE NO WORDS AND WASTE NO TIME UNQTE IN STATING EXACTLY WHAT THEIR GRIEVANCES ARE. INVITES ALL TO WRITE TO EXPRESS UNTIL SUCH INQUIRY MIGHT BE SET UP. NEW NIGERIAN FLATLY STATES THAT IT OBVIOUS THAT WESTERN STATE ADMINISTRATION NO LONGER IN CONTROL AND THAT NO ONE HAS ANY MORE CONFIDENCE

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IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION TO COPE WITH ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. STATES THAT FMG HAS TWO ALTERNATIVES: QTE ELIMINATE UNQTE RESTIVE PART OF POPULATION OR REMOVE ADMINISTRATION. DECLARES THAT IN NIGERIA IT NOT USUAL FOR PEOPLE IN POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO QTE OWN UP BY RESIGNING...BUT IN THIS INSTANCE IT WOULD BE BEST IF BRIG. ADEBAYOS ADMINISTRATION WERE TO BE REMOVED UNQTE. CALLS ON ADEBAYO TO REQUEST GOWON TO QTE REASSIGN HIM TO OTHER DUTIES UNQTE. PILOT STATES THAT TIME HAS COME TO SPEAK TRUTH. IN 1962 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DISSOLVED WESTERN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY BECAUSE OF FIGHT IN HOUSE AND NOT A SINGLE PERSON WAS KILLED. THEN WHEN RIOTS BROKE OUT AFTER 1964 WESTERN ELECTIONS WITH MANY PEOPLE KILLED, POLICE AND ARMY ATTACKED BY VICTIMS AND MUCH PROPERTY BURNED, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECLINED TO INTERVENE. STATES THAT RIOTS CONTINUED UNTIL FINALLY ENDED BY 1966 COUP OVERTHROWING CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. DECLARES THAT IT IS PILOTS BELIEF THAT IF STATE OF EMERGENCY HAD BEEN DECLARED IN 1964, THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN NO COUP, NO KILLINGS IN THE NORTH AND NO CIVIL WAR TODAY. STATES THAT FOR THESE REASONS, PILOT BELIEVES THAT FMG SHOULD STEP IN IMMEDIATELY IN NOT ONLY WEST BUT IN ANY STATE WHERE RIOTS BREAK OUT TO SUCH EXTENT THAT IT SUGGETS BREAK DOWN OF ORDER. SKETCH EDITORIAL TRACES CAUSE OF RIOTS NOT TO UNWILLINGNESS TO PAY TAXES BUT RATHER TO POLITICIANS AGITATING FOR CREATION OF ANOTHER STATE IN WEST WHO BELIEVE THEY HAVE BACKING OF QTE CERTAIN MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AND POLICE UNQTE AND WHO ARE BENT ON DISCREDITING WHOLE OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION. WARNS SMC THAT IF RIOTERS SUCCEED IN WEST, THEY HAVE QTE MADE DENT UNQTE IN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF WHICH WEST ONLY PART AND WILL GIVE QTE UNFORTUNATE EXAMPLE TO OTHER STATES POTENTIAL ANARCHISTS UNQTE. RECALLS RECENT QTE SUBTLE CAMPAIGN UNQTE FOR RESTORATION OF CIVILIAN RULE AND STATES THAT QTE ALTHOUGH POLITICS BANNED, POLITICIANS, AS SUCH, ARE NOT UNQTE. SAYS IT IS THESE POLITICIANS, NOT FARMERS, WHO FEAR THAT THEY FACE QTE UNCERTAIN FUTURE UNQTE BUT THEY ARE USING FARMERS AS INSTRUMENTS. ASKS WHY, IF POLITICIANS HAVE GENUINE CASE, THEY DONT STATE IT, SINCE WESTERN GOVERNMENT HAS QTE RECORD OF SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION AND PATIENT LISTENING UNQTE.
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TELEGRAM

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ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS Priority

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Amembassy SANTA ISABEL

✓ DEWEY, ARTHUR E

SUBJ: Nigeria--Relief Survey

1. Summary: Especially critical need for data exists in wake public, Congressional frustration over conflicting reports situation in enclave, stalemate relief proposals and impact possible ICRC phaseout from enclave as well as FMG side. In attempt to give more precise figures to dimensions of problem, U/CF planning approx three week survey both sides of lines commencing end Sept. to be conducted by U/CF staff with outside assistance from food,

DRAFTED BY:
U/CF: AEDEWEYDRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT.
9/22/69 23256APPROVED BY:
C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr. (CJ)

CLEARANCES:

White House: Roger Morris (phone) DOD (info): Hamilton AF/SN: GSherry (S)
U: Elliot Richardson (in substance) (S)
AF: Robert Newsom David D. Newsom (phone)
AFR/CWA: Helen Wilson (phone)
PRR/DRC: Stephen R. Tripp CONFIDENTIAL
(Info) Classification

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		medical, logistical specialists. Amb. Ferguson to join for portion visit FMG perimeter, with possible brief visit to enclave as well. 2. Survey should permit not only more precise calculation dimensions of starvation, with probable short and long range trends, but more importantly indicate whether additional techniques exist, short of peace, to augment, effectiveness enhance effectiveness of relief distribution. On FMG side, survey will focus on learning more about fringe areas north, northwest Port Harcourt; salient into Umuahia; interior Enugu-Abakaliki-Afikpo-Okigwi rectangle. Will also attempt visit areas west of Niger R. vic Agbor/Asaba. In Biafran enclave, emphasis will be on perimeter with attempts to find rationale for apparent sharp unevenness food distribution, who is getting food, status		

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distribution system, including transport. Survey could provide basis for possible revised estimate minimum quantities/mix imported food and medicines to meet subsistence requirements.
3. Dewey, U/GF staff will supervise survey and make complete circuit FMG side. Hasten to fill logistics specialist slot on team, with AID Lagos to furnish food specialist(s) for key portions of trip (Adler consulted in Washington and concurs). It is hoped Nan Frederick, AID Washington, can join for all or portion of trip to augment reporting function. Within Biafran enclave, U/GF will reinstate surveillance function on or about Sept. 29 with Dawson/Thomas shuttling from Sao Tome. Ferguson with Dewey and/or Davidson, plus medical specialist, expect to enter enclave later in October. Will attempt add food/nutrition specialist, e.g., Miracle.
also
4. Currently projected schedule FMG side follows: □

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ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS Page 4

- Sept. 28 - Dewey arrives Lagos 1135 AM via PAA 150
- Sept. 30 - Depart for Port Harcourt
- Sept. 30-Oct 3 - Visit Port Harcourt area
- Oct. 3 - Depart overland for Uyo, if not possible overland, fly to Calabar
- Oct. 3-5 - Visit Uyo, Ikot Ekpene areas
- Oct. 5 - Launch from Oron to Calabar
- Alternate, if necessary to fly P.H. to Calabar:
- Oct. 3-5 - Launch from Calabar, visit Uyo, Ikot Ekpene area
- Oct. 5 - Return Calabar; fly back to Lagos
- Oct. 5 or 6. - Depart for Enugu (hopefully on special flight with Amb. Ferguson)
- Oct. 8-11 - Concentrate on Enugu, Abakaliki, Afikpo, Okigwi perimeter, also south toward Umuahia.
- Oct. 11 - Return Lagos via special flight, or proceed overland to Calabar for flight to Lagos, or proceed overland to Lagos, stopping in Agbor/Asaba area
- Oct. 13-19 - Visit Fernando Po through Douala, also 2-3 day visit to enclave via Libreville.
- Oct. 20 - Be back in Geneva for possible

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
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developments there.

in Lagos
5. Letter to be delivered/~~to Amembassy~~ advising of proposed visit. (text in septel) Request you consult with Omo-Bare, laying groundwork for appropriate passes so that team may proceed as soon as possible following Dewey's arrival. Passes should also include authority for still and motion picture photography (FYI justification being enormous value few pictures taken somewhat furtively in past have been in coordination, education, liaison function: of various officers concerned with Nigerian relief; can be especially useful documenting present situation, also provides opportunity tell story of good work being done FMG side in response to concern End FYI for war victims). Please advise if Lagos able to provide photographer, or if this should be included in one of

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team slots.

6. We are aware adverse impact non-availability charter aircraft has on scheduling. Would hope FMG flight might be available for particularly inaccessible stop - - Enugu-- for Ferguson's part of survey. Will discuss here with Arikpo.

7. Would appreciate Embassy/AID comments, suggestions.

END

RICHARDSON

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TO : Department of State RECEIVED
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 INFO : IBADAN, KADUNA, LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS
SEP 26 12 07 PM 1969

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: September 24, 1969

SUBJECT : Conversation on the Nigerian War Between Soviet Ambassador and British High Commissioner

REF :

The British High Commissioner, Sir Leslie Glass (protect), has passed to the Embassy a record of a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, Alexandre I. Romanov, which took place in early August. Romanov brought Sir Leslie a personal letter of good wishes from Lev Mendelevich, the deputy to the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, whom Sir Leslie had known well during his recent assignment in the U.N. Romanov said that on Mendelevich's recommendation, he was talking to Sir Leslie very frankly.

He expressed his opinion that there was "not the slightest chance" of a negotiated settlement of the war at present and that the only possible hope of a solution in the foreseeable future was a military victory for the FMG. He said the Soviets were giving the FMG what it asked for but complained that the FMG was extremely slow in putting in its requests and "pretty muddled" as to what they wanted. He said that he believed that the FMG, in fact, had enough weapons to finish the war, if they would only bring themselves to do so. He said he was not certain what lay behind the indecision; perhaps it was Gowon's wish to wage war and also try to get a peaceful political solution or perhaps it was due to bad command structure and lack of military leaders. Stating his belief that what the FMG really had to do was make Uli airstrip too dangerous to operate, Romanov opined that the FMG should make the Benin airport its forward base and concentrate every plane they had there so that there were always two planes above Uli, dropping bombs, machine-gunning the field or just creating apprehension by their presence. He told Sir Leslie that the "Russian radar" had spotted large numbers of planes arriving at night and he could not understand why the Nigerian Air Force could not do something about them.

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Asked if he did not think much of the trouble lay with the Egyptian pilots, Romanov agreed that the Egyptians were "no good" and said that the Soviets were not prepared to provide pilot themselves. He added that twelve Nigerians had been trained as pilots but eight of them were doing ground or administrative work rather than flying. He also said that he had made all of these points to Gowon himself and that he hoped Sir Leslie would also do the same.

Romanov disclaimed "sinister motives" for Soviet support of the FMG and said that the Soviets believed that a breakup of Nigeria would lead to further divisions in Africa and eventually this would constitute a threat to world peace. He also said that the Chinese idea that the African countries were ready for revolution was nonsense because the African countries did not begin to have the objective circumstances required for a "socialist revolution."

When asked his opinion on how Ojukwu managed to continue the war, Romanov produced the standard reply--the French, Rothschild money (alluding to the supposed sinister influence of world Zionism), the Catholic Church, Portugal and South Africa, plus funds collected by the rebels' effective propaganda machinery. He maintained that Ojukwu had plenty of arms, some of which came up the rivers and creeks, and not by air. Ojukwu would never negotiate because he knew there was no future for him personally, even in a confederation, Romanov insisted.

Romanov then expressed his "special worry" that the French and the United States would "team up" to provide extra aid to the rebels. He said he suspected the United States might change its policies and aid the Biafrans, although he said he had no evidence for this except what he had read or heard in the public media.

Expressing his scorn for "humanitarians," Romanov said that the only way to end the suffering was to finish the war. While stating that he knew the British were furnishing a good quantity of weapons, Romanov called the British refusal to provide aircraft "demagogic hypocrisy."


Sir Leslie's comment on the conversation was that while nothing much new came from the conversation, he felt that Romanov was "clearly fed up with the lack of Federal military success and was worried about world pressures which might develop if the war went on another year." Sir Leslie also said that Romanov had ended the conversation by saying he hoped they could talk more often and in frank terms because the next two to three months were rather critical.

Comment:

As reported in DAO message 0422 September 69, the Soviet-supplied radar located at Port Harcourt is capable of detecting night flights; however, it is not capable of plotting the correct altitude and speed of these flights for interception by the Nigerian Air Force's MIG 17s.

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
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Romanov's statement to Sir Leslie that his "special worry" was that the French and United States Governments might "team up" to aid the Biafrans, is also of particular interest because, according to local sources, this is the current covert propaganda line the Soviets in Nigeria are using with their Nigerian contacts in order to create more suspicion of the United States and attempt to identify us more closely with the widely talked about French military aid for the rebels.

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 392

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ACTION: AF/18

INFO: OCT 01, IO 13, EUR 17, MC 02, AID 28, SRI 01, ORMI 03, SCA 01, SCS 04,

UPW 01, UCFI 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

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CONFIDENTIAL LIBREVILLE 981

SUBJECT: REPORTED DESTRUCTION OF ARMS CARRIER BY FMG

REF: LAGOS 8481 — PPB 9 NIGERIA

I ASKED AMBASSADOR DELAUNEY YESTERDAY ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT FMG CLAIMED TO HAVE DESTROYED DC-6 ARMS CARRIER ON JULY AIRSTRIP NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 18 (REFTEL). DELAUNEY REPLIED THAT THE CLAIM WAS FALSE, THAT AIRCRAFT WHICH FMG CLAIMED TO HAVE KNOCKED OUT WAS ONE ALREADY DEADLINED AT JULY AFTER HAVING BEEN DAMAGED SOME THREE MONTHS AGO. FUNKHouser

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By MNARA Date 10/2/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

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Pol 27 Biafra-
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NO.

TO : Department of State

HANDLING INDICATOR

INFO : Lagos, London, Moscow
Department please pass all AF posts

DATE: September 24, 1969

SUBJECT : Nigeria/Biafra: Figaro Correspondent Looks at the
War from Lagos

REF : Lagos 8459

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

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Genocide

Desjardins opens his article with an examination of the genocide charges levelled by both sides. Genocide, he concludes, "does not presently exist." Both sides have perpetrated atrocities: the Nigerians, he says, can supply a long list of examples of Biafran actions similar to that made available on the Biafran side. Where there have been massacres, he is convinced, they have been ordered by junior officers or non-coms, but the hatred they generate is nonetheless real as an impediment to reconciliation.

Near Port-Harcourt, Desjardins visited an Ibo refugee camp at Gborokiri. Here, as in Biafra, he saw starving children and wretched conditions, but he credits Nigerian authorities with "trying to save them." The Ibos in the camp, he adds, were originally from the Port-Harcourt area. As this has become the non-Ibo capital of Rivers State, the Ibos have become "people without a country" and are fated to live as refugees until the war ends.


Gowon Interview

In approaching his meeting with General Gowon, Desjardins was above all seeking the answer to one question: "How do the Biafrans hold on?" He asked Gowon why the Nigerian troops have stopped advancing. Gowon first said that the Nigerians did not wish to raze their own country; whatever was destroyed by war would have to be rebuilt. This, Desjardins comments, is the "public version," which Gowon followed with the "chancery version," a reminder that Nigeria pays cash for its arms, faces an embargo by some countries, and has not introduced conscription, while Biafra (according to Gowon) gets its arms free.

One of Gowon's officers, Desjardins reports, told him that Biafra survives by buying goods in "liberated areas" under Nigerian control, having left behind special guerilla units for the purpose. Arms are obtained, Desjardins adds, as

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much from intercepted Nigerian supply convoys (especially on the Onitsha-Enugu route) as from outside sources.

Asked what he could offer Ojukwu in negotiation, Gowon replied, "I am prepared to discuss everything. Even the division of our 12 states could be revised--everything, except Nigerian unity. We cannot sacrifice the unity of the Federation to the ambition of a power-hungry man."

Listening to Gowon, Desjardins says, he could not help comparing him to his adversary, Ojukwu: the Biafran, "a sort of black Fidel Castro," who had created a state; Gowon, "with the gentle smile of King Baudouin," who had been put in power to reassure the world and his countrymen, a man "full of good faith and good will" but out of touch with the realities of Nigeria. When the time comes for Gowon to try the "great reconciliation" he seeks, Desjardins believes, those who raised him to power will seek his ouster.


UK and USSR

Desjardins devotes the second part of his article to the UK-USSR rivalry over Nigeria since the start of the civil war. The first Biafran victories, he notes, came in July 1967, just after the UAR had suffered ignominious defeat at the hands of the Israelis. As Biafra came to be compared to Israel in the world press, Nasser (and Boumedienne) offered Gowon fraternal assistance--according to Desjardins, a friendly word in Moscow.

Gowon, though profoundly British-oriented and anti-Soviet, had no alternative to accepting Soviet arms in view of the embargo imposed by Western powers. After Soviet heavy weapons had made possible the successful Nigerian counter-attack of September 1967, Desjardins says, the USSR suffered its first disappointment--Gowon still refused them the warm welcome they sought. At the same time, London and Washington suddenly became supporters of "the federal solution".

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(Indeed, Desjardins claims that the western powers split "the remains of Nigeria" among themselves after the Aburi Conference of January 1967, when they were allegedly convinced that the Federation was coming apart. In this "secret little Yalta," Desjardins says, the UK was to take the North, the US the East, and Germany the West as spheres of influence.)


Thus the UK-USSR power struggle began. The Soviets, Desjardins says, sought to stimulate an opposition movement against Gowon, centered on Awolowo ("a Maoist Yoruba"). And, in addition, they put pressure on Gowon. Last autumn, according to Desjardins, the Soviets held back on badly-needed weapons deliveries in an unsuccessful attempt to force Gowon into nationalizing the oil industry. Three months later, their demand--again refused--was for port facilities. Happily for Lagos, Desjardins continues, the Nigerians took Port Harcourt, with British advisers, and were better able to withstand USSR pressure.

This spring, Desjardins claims, the Soviets tried to mount a coup d'etat in Awolowo's favor, but the attempt was discovered in time. Meanwhile, they had been working on the labor unions, notably through the NTUC. When NTUC leader Oteg Beye was arrested on his return from the World Communist Congress in Moscow, Desjardins reports, his liberation was forced by a Soviet threat to list Ibo Students in the USSR as "Biafrans".

The "Azikiwe operation," according to Desjardins, was a major British counterstroke. With military operations (the solution favored generally by the USSR, Desjardins notes) stalemated, the British emphasis on a "diplomatic solution" gained strength with Azikiwe's "conversion," and the British are back "with their heads held high" on top of the heap in Lagos. (End Unclassified)

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
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Comment: The Desjardins article, as its author notes, is an unusual effort in the French press to report the conflict as seen from the Nigerian side. Despite his rather uncomplimentary portrayal of Gowon and critical comments on the UK role (and, to some extent, that of the U.S.), Desjardins comes across as a man trying hard to be as fair as his pro-Biafran sympathies permit. If nothing else, he puts the "genocide" charge in useful perspective and affirms Gowon's good faith--and, if only by implication, suggests that the expansion of Soviet influence in Nigeria is a real likelihood if the UK role is severely circumscribed.

SHRIVER

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LE FIGARO — JEUDI 18 SEPTEMBRE 1969

EYR

NIGERIA : FACE AU RÉDUIT BIAFRAIS

Un reportage de Thierry DESJARDINS

- **Pas de génocide mais la guerre fratricide atroce**
- **Accusations mutuelles dans les deux camps • La sauvagerie, à peine oubliée, réapparaît souvent dans le combat • Forçant le blocus, les Biafrais se ravitaillent chez l'adversaire • Infiltrations pistes « Ho Chi Minh » et bicyclettes...**

Lagos, 17 septembre. (De notre envoyé spécial)

La guerre du Biafra dure maintenant depuis vingt-sept mois. On a dit qu'elle a fait deux millions de morts. Elle en a certainement fait beaucoup. Elle a aussi totalement ravagé un grand morceau de cette ancienne fédération du Nigeria qui était, on s'en souvient, l'un des espoirs de l'Afrique. Aujourd'hui, après le « Nième » échec de l'Organisation de l'Unité africaine à Addis Abeba, on parle de nouveau de la possibilité de négociations directes.

Pour faire le point de la situation, établi à plusieurs reprises dans *Le Figaro* du côté biafrain, je me suis rendu en face, chez les Nigérians.

Pendant deux semaines, j'ai pu, à peu près librement, circuler aussi bien dans le territoire des fédéraux que dans les régions dites « libérées ». La même où il y a un an ou six mois, j'avais rencontré des responsables biafrais. Le but des fédéraux était évident : me montrer qu'il n'y avait pas de génocide et m'écrire pour constater que la réintégration des anciens cessionnistes dans la famille du « Nigeria uni » était amorcée. Mais dans un pays en guerre, c'est-à-dire qui impose un certain nombre de restrictions aux visiteurs, il est impossible de tout voir.

La même haine

Cependant, pour celui qui revient de Lagos, un certain nombre de constatations s'imposent. En vrac, il est évident que : le génocide dont on a tant parlé n'existe pas pour le moment ; une solution politique entre Biafrais et Nigérians est impossible ; en dépit de l'anéantissement prévisible de leur réduit les Biafrais pourront tenir encore des mois, voire des années ; la bonne foi de certains responsables de la Fédération — en fait Gowon — est indéniable mais n'a d'égalé que la fragilité de leur pouvoir.

La question du génocide est sans doute l'une des plus difficiles à aborder, même si jusqu'à présent elle a été utilisée sans pudeur par les uns ou par les autres. Certes, les combats de cette guerre fratricide, dans cet enfer de la jungle, de la boue, des pluies, de la fièvre, ont été, et sont, particulièrement atroces et barbares.

Les populations ont subi des bombardements, ont été prises dans des combats — mais, dans une telle guerre civile et militaire

se confondent bien souvent — certes des villages ont été « déplacés », des bourgades ont été pillées et les pires exactions ont été commises. Cela on ne l'a peut-être pas toujours dit d'un côté comme de l'autre. Ce genre de conflit est la pire des choses qui puisse arriver à des peuples « en voie de développement » et, il faut le dire, toute la sauvagerie, à peine oubliée, réapparaît bien vite alors, chez ceux à qui on donne des armes et qu'on « lâche » dans les combats. C'est peut-être ici ce qu'il y a de plus grave dans cette guerre du Biafra.

On a parlé des crimes commis par les fédéraux du célèbre et sinistre « Scorpion noir », de la prise d'Enugu ; on a moins parlé des « exactions biafraises », de l'assassinat du roi de Calabar, des exécutions de personnalités de la région de Port-Harcourt qu'après les Biafrais sont arrivés, ont refusé de collaborer, restant fidèles à l'idée de la Fédération. La liste, là aussi, est longue : le Dr Spiff, frère aîné de l'actuel gouverneur de l'Etat des Rivers, le Dr Fiberisima, le Dr Ené, M. Eppelle, père du directeur général de l'Information, le chef Davis-Manual, le chef Entony, M. Trembusco, etc. Les circonstances de ces exécutions sont toujours, là également, particulièrement atroces.

Les fédéraux, eux aussi, parlent de génocide. Dans un mouvement de retraite, les troupes biafraises, sans doute affolées par le débarquement des fédéraux à Port-Harcourt, ont exécuté les 200 habitants du village d'Ojukwu. Les fédéraux, eux aussi, ont, à la disposition des observateurs internationaux, une longue liste d'exemples de ce genre. Bien sûr, l'ordre de ces massacres n'est venu que du niveau d'officiers subalternes ou de sous-officiers ; ce n'est jamais

Ojukwu, pas plus que Gowon, qui ont donné ce genre d'ordre. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'aujourd'hui, la même haine se lit sur certains visages, tout autant d'un côté que l'autre, et ce chez l'homme effrayé qui fuit sur les pistes boueuses aussi bien que chez l'homme politique responsable.

Antony Enahoro est sans doute l'un des plus « farouches » parmi les ministres de Gowon. Il est originaire du Benin. On raconte que, quand les troupes d'Ojukwu ont envahi son village, au début de la guerre, en 1967, elles ont capturé sa mère, puis l'ont amarrée de force au cimetière du village. Elles ont déterré le corps du chef Enahoro, le père d'Anthony Enahoro et l'ont profané devant la vieille femme qui est morte quelques jours plus tard. Enahoro ne l'a pas oublié. On raconte des dizaines de drames comme celui-là.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NID 959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

12.000 Ibos parqués

Gowon, que j'ai très longuement rencontré et qui, lui, croit à la réconciliation, sait le danger que présentent l'esprit de vengeance et la haine. Il est sans aucun doute parfaitement conscient que le génocide serait « possible » et qu'après plus rien ne s'arrêterait, plus rien n'existerait. Si jusqu'à présent ce génocide a pu être évité, c'est parce qu'il y a encore la guerre et que la violence peut être, si ce n'est maîtrisée, du moins dirigée. Les ordres ont certes été stricts, mais ils ont surtout eu le cynisme habile de faire comprendre aux troupes que si les règlements de comptes commençaient avant la fin des combats, ceux-ci se prolongeraient davantage encore. Le gouvernement pensant sans doute qu'à près, il serait en mesure de prendre les dispositions draconiennes qui s'imposeraient.

Aujourd'hui donc, les populations récupérées sont, dans la majorité des cas, traitées convenablement.

A côté de Port-Harcourt, je viens de visiter le village de Ghorokiri : c'est un immense camp de personnes déplacées. Il y a douze mille Ibos et un millier de « mal définis ». Pour la plupart ces pauvres gens, ayant la guerre, vivaient dans cette région même qu'on appelle l'Etat des Rivers et qui, si elle ne fait pas partie de l'Iboland, qui s'étend plus au Nord, a toujours été considérée comme une colonie ibo, étant le débouché maritime de l'Iboland et ayant, de tout temps, été occupée par les Ibos qui y ont d'ailleurs créé la capitale Port-Harcourt.

Au moment de la sécession, ces Ibos expatriés se sont retrouvés Biafrais, tout comme les vrais natifs du lieu, les Rivers, qui (j'étais passé dès août 1967 à Port-Harcourt) collaboraient eux les premiers, dans leur immense majorité, avec Ojukwu. Puis le « Scorpion noir », ses troupes et ses conseillers ont débarqué en 1968. Certains se sont alors plus ou moins repliés vers l'Iboland avec les troupes biafraises. Petit à petit, au gré des retraites d'Ojukwu, ils ont été récupérés. Est-il besoin de dire que dans tout cela, ils ont tout perdu et n'ont rien compris.

Aujourd'hui, ces 12.000 hommes, femmes, vieillards, enfants vivent à 20 ou 30 dans des cabanes ou des huttes en terre ; ils ne sont pas des prisonniers, mais des personnes déplacées dans leur propre pays, avec un Etat. — State — qui n'est pas le leur. Dans leur fuite épandue, beaucoup de leurs compagnons sont morts de faim ou de fatigue ou sous les bombardements. Parmi les enfants, beaucoup sont orphelins et ces gosses ressemblent à ceux que j'ai vus « au face » : le ventre énorme, la peau du visage fripée et les regards des yeux de la mort. Les autorités nigériannes tentent de les sauver. On leur distribue des écouilles de riz qu'ils regardent sans bouger, sans même chasser les mouches qui se posent sur leurs yeux. Il y a plus de quatre millions de personnes déplacées, actuellement, sous l'autorité des Fédéraux.

Malgré les armes des fédéraux...

On en arrive alors à la grande question. Comment les Biafrais tiennent-ils ? J'ai vu l'énorme quantité de matériel russe ou anglais sur les pistes fédérales montées vers le front. J'ai vu tirer les batteries d'artillerie lourde. J'ai vu deux Mig décoller de Port-Harcourt pour aller faire du « strafing ».

J'ai posé à Gowon la question : Pourquoi, depuis des mois, n'avez-vous pratiquement pas avancé ?

Il m'a d'abord donné la version pour le grand public :

— Nous ne voulons pas « martyriser notre propre pays. Nous voulons amener la bande des dirigeants rebelles à « comprendre qu'ils ont perdu. Tout ce que nous détruisons, nous savons que nous avons à le reconstruire, puisque c'est notre propre pays.

Puis il m'a donné la réponse



Enfin, le Biafra tel que le revendique Ojukwu : la tache blanche montre le « réduit » actuel au milieu de la Fédération nigériane.

destinée d'habitude aux chancelleries.

— Il est faux de croire que notre supériorité soit écrasante. Nous n'avons pas procédé à la conscription. Notre armée n'a que 130.000 hommes. En face, ils ont mobilisé de force tous les hommes valides. Nos armes, nous, nous les payons « cash » à tout le monde. Personne ne nous fait de cadeaux. Certains pays nous ont même imposé un embargo nous obligeant ainsi à acheter aux Soviétiques. En face, ils n'ont aucune économie depuis deux ans. Alors qu'on ne nous dise pas que les armes ne sont pas données gratuitement et simplement à Ojukwu.

Un des officiers de Gowon m'a

alors raconté comment on fait les « rebelles » pourraient résister. Pour tenir sous le blocus qui resserrait son état de plus en plus serré, Ojukwu a eu l'idée de céder soudain en plusieurs endroits du terrain et de s'entourer ainsi d'une espèce de ceinture à double usage : d'abord, il avait laissé sur place des troupes qui formaient aujourd'hui une « cinquième colonne » particulièrement efficace sur les carrières immédiates des premières lignes des assiégeants. Ensuite et surtout, c'est grâce à ces zones même qu'aujourd'hui il trouve ses vivres. Venant de libérer ces terrains, les fédéraux avaient fait immédiatement un effort particulier pour recueillir la population, envoyant vivres, médicaments et secours. Les marchés ont tous été rouverts et réapprovisionnés massivement. Mais les hommes d'Ojukwu sont ici, chez eux et, le front ne peut pas être totalement imperméable. Reprenant la technique des combattants vietnamiens, ils ont alors créé tout un réseau de pistes : Ho Chi Minh, et avec parallèle, eux aussi, de vieilles bicyclettes, ils vont acheter dans les zones libérées de quoi faire survivre le Biafra.

Les commerçants n'avaient jamais autant vendu de produits ayant la guerre dans toutes les villes, barrant plus qu'à moitié abandonnées aujourd'hui, qui entourent le réduit. Le marché d'Enugu, où les rues sont déserées, regorge de marchandises. La nuit, des hommes, poussant leurs bicyclettes surchargées, s'enfoncent dans la forêt.

Les Fédéraux le savent, ils ne peuvent rien faire pour empêcher ce qu'ils appellent eux-mêmes pudiquement ce « phénomène d'osmose ». Ou alors ce serait imposer le même blocus aux territoires libérés qu'au réduit, ce qui interdirait tout espoir d'atteindre ceux que la latitude pourraient atteindre. On dit même que certaines armes fédérales disparaissent, elles aussi.

En fait, le front de la guerre est déjà maintenu entouré d'un matelas protecteur de guérilla. Certaines poches des régions libérées sont totalement incontrôlables, ainsi que les routes. L'axe essentiel Onitsha-Enugu permet,

lui aussi, aux Biafrais de se ravitailler en armes. Le nombre de convois militaires qui y sont tombés dans des embuscades ne se compte plus. La majorité de la population des villes libérées d'aujourd'hui a elle aussi disparu. Alors, demain, le réduit peut encore être réduit. La guerre, qu'on l'appelle guerre ou guérilla, peut durer des années.

« J'ai demandé à Gowon ce que, dans une négociation, il offrait d'autre à Ojukwu que la soumission totale. Il m'a répondu : « Je suis prêt à discuter de tout ; le décompte actuel de nos deux Etats peut être remis en question ; tout, sauf l'unité du Nigeria. Nous ne pouvons pas sacrifier l'unité de la Fédération pour l'ambition d'un homme simple et avide de pouvoir. »

Ecouteant longuement Gowon, je n'ai pas pu m'empêcher de le comparer à celui qu'il me disait être, un nouvel Hitler entouré d'une horde de SS assaillies de pouvoir, prêt à détruire le pays de ses propres mains pour assouvir ses désirs. Tous les deux m'ont répondu longtemps dans leur bureau. Ojukwu, l'an dernier, en grande tenue, « Gowon hier, en « battle-dress ». Ojukwu, c'est une espèce de Fidel Castro noir, barbe et cigare compris. Gowon lui, a le sourire gentil du roi Baudouin. Il aime se faire photographier communiant ou en uniforme « de chet » scout nigérien.

Quel qu'soit le sort qui l'attend, Ojukwu a créé un Etat, une armée. Il a débranché l'Afrique entière. Gowon, lui, est là le sait, a été appelé au pouvoir parce qu'il fallait rassurer et qu'il ne peut pas faire peur. Ojukwu, lui, n'a plus d'autre issue que de se battre à Musgrave dernier. Et il le fera.

Gowon est certainement plein de bonne foi et de bonne volonté. Il n'est pas un de ces chefs d'Etat à l'africaine, à la Diori Hamani ou à la Houphouët-Boigny, qui, le soir, dans l'ombre de leur palais, reçoivent en dehors de tout protocole les vieux chefs de village qui leur disent ce qui se passe. Gowon, à Panglaïse, recorde des rapports. Il n'a affirmé que les territoires libérés étaient pacifiques et les Ibos revenaient en masse. Il était de bonne foi, mais il ignorait ce qui se passe dans son pays.

Quant à la bonne volonté de Gowon, il ne fait aucun doute que le jour où elle aurait, enfin, à faire ses preuves en entretenant la « grande réconciliation », ceux qui l'ont hissé sur ce trône tenteront de l'en faire tomber. Car il aura terminé sa mission.

Mais le mot de la fin, je le laisserai à un diplomate de Lagos qui m'a, sans ambiguïté, déclaré : « Cette guerre peut durer des années. D'abord parce qu'aucune négociation ne peut aboutir, les Nigérians ont leurs raisons pour refuser l'éclatement de la Fédération qui provoquerait la fin de la grande économie du pays ; les Biafrais ont leurs raisons d'avoir peur. Ensuite, parce que 150.000 soldats de ce côté, en tout cas, sont ravis. Ils vont jamais pu gagner, leur diamètre de ce qu'ils touchent en ce moment sans parler des pillages. Enfin, parce que le jour où cette guerre arrêtera, il y aura au moins dix-sept hommes politiques prêts à prendre le pouvoir sans compter les militaires et que, donc, la guerre risque de recommencer. »

Thierry Desjardins.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VN1959503
By MUNARA Date 10/5/03

LE FIGARO — VENDREDI 19 SEPTEMBRE 1969

**• Les jeux difficiles de la concurrence anglo-russe
 • "Mig", chars et canons soviétiques pour Lagos
 • Inquiétude britannique apaisée par Gowon • Un coup d'État avorté • Londres marque des points
 • Moscou déçu par «l'Éléphant d'Afrique» • Malgré la guerre, puits de pétrole et pipe-line sont intacts**

Lagos... septembre (De notre envoyé spécial)

La guerre, ce sont des soldats qui se battent, des hommes qui meurent, des populations qui souffrent, mais aussi des intérêts qui se débattent, des politiques qui se dessinent, des fortunes qui se font ou se défont. Quand c'est une guerre civile, alors, tout cela est exacerbé. La guerre du Biafra, qui a certainement battu bien des records d'horreur et de désespoir, est sans doute aujourd'hui l'un des champs de bataille les plus étonnantes à observer, où s'affrontent quelques-uns par personnes interposées, mais bien souvent maintenant à visage découvert, les grandes puissances, les idéologies, les financiers.

Il est un fait désormais indéniable : les Russes n'ont jamais eu de chance en Afrique Noire : le Mali, les Congo, la Guinée

même sont pour les spécialistes de l'Afrique au Kremlin de cuisants souvenirs. On n'a pas oublié à Moscou certaines expulsions de diplomates soviétiques que les frères africains avaient contraints à se déchausser pour gagner les îlyouchine du retour pieds nus, par exemple.

Longtemps, Moscou avait considéré l'éléphant de l'Afrique qu'est le Nigeria comme une terre sans espoir. Chasse gardée de l'Angleterre, sans prolétariat par trop malheureux, l'idéologie marxiste-léniniste avait peu de chance d'y découvrir beaucoup d'adeptes. Les rares leaders nigérians « de gauche » des années 1950 n'avaient ainsi trouvé auprès du grand frère ni l'accueil, ni surtout l'assistance qu'ils étaient en droit d'espérer. La guerre allait changer tout cela.

Quand, en mai 1967, Ojukwu

déclara la sécession, il avait préparé son coup. Depuis des semaines, une grande partie de l'armement de la fédération avait, sous prétexte de manœuvres ou de mises au point, été déplacée comme par hasard vers la région de l'Est. L'Est avait aussi commandé un grand nombre de générateurs, de vivres, de matériels qui avaient quitté Lagos comme si l'Est s'apprêtait à tenir un siège. Le gouvernement fédéral ne s'était aperçu de rien. Et d'ailleurs, tous les postes-clés, du comptable à l'officier supérieur du matériel, étaient tenus par de futurs Biafrais. Au moment de la déclaration de guerre, Lagos était pris à froid. Les réservoirs d'essence presque vides, les arsenaux déserts. Les troupes biafraises entraient sans difficulté dans la région du Middle West et arrivaient à moins de cent kilomètres de Lagos.

Un certain temps, en effet, et on l'a oublié, la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis, persuadés après la fameuse conférence d'Aburi (janvier 1967) qu'on allait vers l'éclatement de la Fédération, avaient joué plus ou moins, la carte biafraise, se partageant déjà les dépourvus du Nigeria en un tout petit Yalta secret qui envisageait comme champ d'influence le Nord aux Anglais, l'Est aux Américains, l'Ouest aux Allemands. La surprenante détermination des Fédéraux, l'arrivée des Russes et certaines exigences d'Ojukwu les firent changer d'avis ainsi sans aucun doute que les trois cent millions de livres sterling d'investissements britanniques dans le pétrole nigérian.

Ce que coûte le conflit

On était au début de 1968 : le conflit russe-anglais allait commencer, tous les coups étaient permis. D'un côté, on avait autour du haut représentant de Sa Gracieuse Majesté : Gowon et quelques civils ; de l'autre, autour de M. Romanov, ambassadeur de toutes les Russies, M. Awolowo, ministre des Finances de Gowon, un Yoruba maoïste et bien souvent délivrant, M. Ya Kande, son lieutenant fidèle, les deux autres lieutenants d'Awolowo, MM. Enahoro et Tarka, ayant changé de camp), un bon nombre de militaires et surtout les syndicalistes.

C'est alors que, les Russes comirent leur première déception, ne trouvant pas auprès de Gowon l'audience à laquelle ils estimaient avoir droit. Il est vrai qu'au même moment — cette étonnante partie d'échecs est un peu compliquée — Londres et Washington, soudain inquiets, redevenaient brusquement partisans de la solution fédérale.

La position de l'U.R.S.S. était donc assez curieuse. Elle avait, grâce au hasard des maladresses occidentales, l'occasion d'aider un chef d'Etat qui lui était hostile et s'en cachait à peine. Alors qu'en Egypte, par exemple, les Russes troquaient leurs « Mig » contre une emprise sur le régime de Nasser, ici, ils essayaient, en contrepartie de leur aide, d'obtenir quelques facilités pour créer une opposition au régime de Gowon. C'est là une des invraisemblances de plus de ce conflit. Et Gowon le sait. Aussi refuse-t-il énergiquement tout cadeau de cet étrange allié.

Il est toujours impossible de chiffrer ce que coûte une guerre. La plupart des experts sont d'accord cependant pour dire que, y compris le manque à gagner, cette guerre coûte à Lagos six millions de livres par mois, soit près de cent milliards de nos anciens francs par an. Or, et tout le monde est d'accord là aussi, tout ce qui est dû aux Russes est payé « cash » par Gowon.

Le poids et le prestige d'un État de 55 millions d'habitants

Les Français ne savent pas toujours l'importance qu'a le Nigeria aux yeux des Africains. La Fédération a environ 55 millions d'habitants, la Côte-d'Ivoire en a moins de quatre millions, le Sénégal trois millions et demi.

Le prestige de Lagos est énorme aussi bien à l'Organisation de l'Unité africaine que parmi les Africains de l'ONU. Les émirs de Sokoto et de Kaduna sont des chefs religieux importants pour les musulmans noirs ; les trente millions de Haoussas du nord du pays, cousins très proches des Peuhls du Sénégal et du Mali, sont un peu les protecteurs de tous les riverains du sud du Sahara. Quant aux Nigérians du Sud, n'était la question des langues, ils pourraient bien souvent jouer un rôle attractif sur toutes les populations de la côte ; il suffit de voir la sympathie qu'ont pour eux les Camerounais de langue anglaise.

Les premières victoires biafrais

sont de juillet 1967, c'est-à-dire au lendemain de la défaite égyptienne. C'était l'époque où Nasser avait besoin de tout, le monde et où, devant l'incompréhension occidentale, sa diplomatie se tournait vers l'Afrique noire. On allait discuter à l'ONU. Du Moyen-Orient ; le Nigeria était capable d'entrainer un certain nombre de voix africaines dans des votes importants. Très rapidement d'ailleurs, on allait comparer et quelquefois à juste titre, les deux conflits : le grand contre le petit, les Ibos avaient été appelsés les juifs de l'Afrique, le Biafra était agressif, soutenu par l'Occident impérialiste.

Il n'en fallait pas plus pour que Nasser, accompagné d'ailleurs de Boumediène, offre à son frère Gowon toute son assistance, c'est-à-dire de parler en sa faveur à Moscou. Gowon n'avait pas le choix. Très abîmé, nettement anti-Moscou, sans qu'il comprenne pour quel, le monde entier presque re-

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 Authority NND 959503
 By MNARA Date 10/5/03

Le Nigeria est un pays riche. Avant la guerre, il avait 87 millions de livres de réserves. Aujourd'hui, il lui en reste une quarantaine de millions (sept millions en or, 35 en devises convertibles). Et il n'a pas encore fait usage de son droit de tirage sur le F.M.I. alors qu'il pourrait y tirer trente-cinq autres millions de livres. Quant à son économie, pour un pays déchiré par une guerre, elle reste étonnamment prospère : le cacao et l'arachide ont, l'année dernière, rapporté 80 millions de livres nigérianes (la livre nigériane n'a pas, elle, dû être dévaluée comme sa grande aînée). Le pétrole, de janvier à mai 69, a rapporté 56 millions de livres. Voilà qui a permis à Gowon de me dire :

« Nous n'avons avec Moscou que des rapports commerciaux. Nous achetons, nous payons, il nous livre et cela ne va pas plus loin... Mais comme chacun sait, Moscou est d'un commerce difficile.

Gowon doit se battre pied à pied pour obtenir qu'on lui vende ses armes. Le Kremlin, à l'automne dernier, alors que Gowon était à court de munitions pour lancer un assaut qu'il pensait final, lui avait fait comprendre qu'une nationalisation des pétroles anglo-américains faciliterait bien les choses. Il a répondu non, ajoutant qu'il ne jouera pas les Mossadegh. Trois mois plus tard, des émissaires sont revenus à la charge. On a parlé cette fois d'une base maritime mise à la disposition de la flotte russe. Même refus. Moscou se serait alors montré menaçant. Mais pour la plus grande chance de Lagos, le revirement complet de Londres était consommé. En juin 68, Port-Harcourt avait été repris et cette victoire était plus anglaise que soviétique. Le fameux « Scorpion Noir », le colonel Adekuine qui, au dernier moment, avait remplacé Mohamed Moritala, l'ennemi juré des Anglais, s'il avait des armes soviétiques, avait surtout des conseils, si ce n'est des conseillers britanniques. Gowon et Enahoro avaient donc de quoi répondre au chantage soviétique.

La rivalité des « durs » et des diplomates

C'est alors que, au printemps de cette année, on aurait découvert les préparatifs d'un coup d'Etat. Moscou aurait démontré à certains « durs » du Nord notamment, que Gowon, chrétien, qu'ils avaient eux-mêmes mis en place, n'arrivant pas à se mettre d'accord sur l'un d'entre eux, jouait — pris en main par les Anglais impérialistes — la carte de la mo-

deration et de la diplomatie. Moscou avait son candidat : Awolowo qui avait déjà tenté un coup d'Etat voici quelques années.

Mais, cette fois encore, l'affaire fut découverte. Awolowo n'était pas assez compromis et trop utile pour qu'on s'en sépare. Gowon fut sage et attendit son heure, se

refusant en même temps à participer ainsi à une nouvelle périple du duel russo-anglais. Cette heure ne se fit pas attendre.

Parallèlement à son action dans l'armée, auprès des jeunes officiers que le prestige de Sandhurst excite maintenant et dans les meilleures politiques, toujours un peu mouvantes, la diplomatie soviétique a fait un grand effort auprès des syndicats. Il y a au Nigeria deux syndicats importants : le U.L.C., dont le principal dirigeant, Alhaji Haruna Adepolo, a fait un peu de prison à la suite d'une scandaleuse affaire de subventions de la C.I.A. et le N.T.U.C., qui, lui, reçoit ses fonds de Moscou, publie un journal assez lu, « Advance », dont l'imprimeur lui a été offerte par les Soviétiques, etc.

Le dirigeant numéro 1 du N.T.U.C. est un certain Oteg Beye. A la dernière conférence des P.C. à Moscou, c'est lui qui représentait le P.C. nigérian. Il était parti de Lagos sans visa, les partis politiques sont interdits au Nigeria. Il n'était certainement pas étranger au complot : Gowon le fit jeter en prison dès son retour.

La victoire de Port-Harcourt

M. Romanov intervint. M. Illyichev, vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères soviétique, qui était en visite à Kinshasa, fit le détour par Lagos pour tenter d'obtenir sa libération. Tout fut inutile. Moscou, alors, pour sauver « son homme », en fut réduit à faire savoir que les étudiants nigérians d'étudiants avec la nationalité de « Biafra ». En même temps, une délégation officielle du Biafra, était reçue à Moscou... M. Oteg Beye fut libéré.

Pendant ce temps, les Anglais, que la victoire de Port Harcourt et ces démêlés avec Moscou avaient remis à l'honneur, réussissaient leur coup de maître. En simplifiant beaucoup les choses, on peut dire que les Soviétiques sont favorables à la solution militaire et les Britanniques favorables à la recherche d'une solution diplomatique.

L'opération Azikiwe est une opération anglaise. C'est le dernier succès des fédéraux depuis que le front n'a pas bougé, c'est à dire depuis des mois. On en connaît l'histoire : « Zik », ancien président de la fédération et l'un

des pères de l'unité du Nigeria, fut, en 1967, l'un des auteurs de la sécession. C'est lui qui écrivit l'hymne national biafrain. Il y a deux semaines, il transhissa Ojukwu qu'il avait toujours d'ailleurs souverainement détesté, n'admettant pas, lui, à tel président de la fédération, les ordres de ce colonel.

L'Angleterre est revenue tête haute...

Azikiwe est revenu en enfant prodigue à Lagos. Il a reconnu les erreurs des Biafrais. Il a laissé entendre que d'autres membres de l'entourage de Ojukwu allaient le suivre, qu'il allait faire une tournée mondiale pour dire combien Gowon avait raison, etc. Peu dupe de l'action d'un « Zik », quelque peu déprécié à tous les sens du terme, Gowon ne pouvait cependant qu'être reconnaissant à Londres pour ce « triomphe diplomatique » qui fait quelque peu oublier la stagnation militaire actuelle.

Aujourd'hui donc, Moscou semble avoir manqué son entrée au Nigeria, alors que l'Angleterre est revenue la tête haute.


La Shell-BP (75 % d'intérêts anglais) continue d'expédier par le pipe-line de Bonny 350 000 barils de pétrole par jour, soit vingt millions de tonnes par an, c'est à dire la moitié de la production pétrolière de toute l'Algérie. Je viens de visiter les installations de la Shell-BP. A Port Harcourt, seuls les bureaux ont été incendiés par les Biafrais. Mais ni le pipeline, ni aucun puits n'ont été touchés. La raffinerie de Port Harcourt qui, elle, a subi des dommages, appartient à la Nigerian Petroleum Refining Company. Certains se demandent si cet étonnant respect des intérêts anglais par les Biafrais qui sont encore, en certains points, à moins de cinq kilomètres du pipeline,

n'explique pas dans une certaine mesure les possibilités qu'a Ojukwu à se fournir en armes. Mais c'est là une autre histoire qui, en tous les cas, est formellement démentie, et par le Biafra et par la Shell-BP. Donc, aujourd'hui, les Anglais sont gagnants grâce au « petit Gowon » et les Russes perdants. Mais rien n'est terminé et quand les Haoussas du Nord voudront reprendre leur bien, c'est-à-dire le pouvoir, tout pourra changer. Les Anglais le savent, les Russes l'attendent.

Thierry Desjardins.

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(6) POL 7 BIAFRA
XR ~~POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA~~
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 KINGST 02457 240048Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, ARA 12, EUR 17, CIAE 00, DOHE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USTIA 12, IO 13, AID 28,
PC 04, SR 01, ORM 03, E 15, UCF 05, RSR 01/181 W

074433

R 232105Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4756
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE: KINGSTON: 2457

SUBJECT: BIAFRAN OFFICIALS

REF: STATE 158407

pol 7 Biafra
pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

1. FOLLOWING BIAFRAN "GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES" RECENTLY VISITED JAMAICA AND MADE "INFORMAL" CALLS ON GOJ OFFICIALS:
A. PROF. KALU EZERA, "SPECIAL ASSISTANT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS"

B. OKELHUKUN, IKEJIANI, M. D.

C. FELIX OZOKA, "SENIOR OFFICIAL"

NO SIGNIFICANT PUBLICITY GIVEN VISIT. SEVERAL GOJ OFFICIALS FROM LAGOS HAVE ALSO VISITED JAMAICA RECENTLY.

2. GOJ RECOGNIZES LAGOS GOVERNMENT, BUT JAMAICANS GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO BIAFRAN CAUSE. A NUMBER OF JAMAICANS HAVE WORKED IN EASTERN NIGERIA DURING PAST FIFTY YEARS. SOME JAMAICANS MOSTLY NURSES HAVE MARRIED BIAFRANS WHILE IN ENGLAND AND LATER MOVED TO EASTERN NIGERIA WHERE SOME THIRTY JAMAICANS STILL BELIEVED RESIDING, ALTHOUGH A FEW HAVE BEEN EVACUATED AND REPATRIATED TO JAMAICA.

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03



POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria
XR POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 492

PAGE 01 MONROV 04306 231905Z

91
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28, SCS 04, SCA 01, E 15, DOT 12,
ACDA 16, SR 01, ORM 03, TRSY 11, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07
L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01

/193 W

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R 231734Z SEP 69
FM: AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 7683
INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS
USMISSION: GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONROVIA 4306

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL LIBERIAN CONTRIBUTION TO NIGERIAN RELIEF
POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria
REF: STATE 123842
XR POL 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

ACCORDING LIBERIAN AGEI SEPTEMBER 23 GOI HAS MADE ADDITIONAL
CONTRIBUTION OF \$10,000 TO ICRC FOR NIGERIAN RELIEF. MONEY
DESCRIBED AS "BALANCE" COLLECTED FROM PUBLIC FOR NIGERIAN
RELIEF LAST YEAR. PREVIOUS DONATION WAS FOR \$25,000.
HOWISON

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

Dec 29 1969
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CONFIDENTIAL 374

PAGE 01 LAGOS 08523 241905Z

44
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, E 15, INT 06, COM 08, UCF 05, UPW 01,
SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07,
LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 0
/185 W

R 231500Z SEPI 69
FM: AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 9129
INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON

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CONFIDENTIAL ALL LAGOS 8523

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

SUBJECT: BIAFRAN ATTACKS ON OIL INDUSTRY

REFB: STATE 160964 Pol 27 Biafra, Nigeria

1. PACE REPORTS ABOUT OIL INDUSTRY CONTAINED IN REFTEL DO NOT TALLY WITH OUR INFORMATION. WHILE NEITHER COMPANY NOR GOVERNMENT RELEASING CURRENT SHELL-BP PRODUCTION FIGURES, OUR BEST INFO IS THAT TOTAL NATIONAL PRODUCTION NOW RUNNING AROUND 500,000 BARRELS PER DAY. GULF REVEALS THAT IT SET NEW ONE-DAY RECORD LAST WEEK WITH 241,000 BARRELS. TOTAL PRODUCTION AT THIS TIME WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN AROUND 700,000 BPD IF MILITARY SITUATION TODAY WERE SAME AS SIX MONTHS AGO.

2. DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT BIAFRANS HAVE PROBED TO WITHIN TWO MILES OF PORT HAROURT. VISITORS TO PH CONTINUE REPORT NO REPEAT NO MILITARY ACTIVITY IN ENVIRONS. SHELL-BP NOT REPEAT NOT EVACUATING WORKERS FROM PORT HAROURT. WE HEAR REPORTS SOME EXPATRIATE EMPLOYEES UNHAPPY WITH PORT HAROURT BUT DUE MAINLY TO DULLNESS OF THE PLACE, DIFFICULTY MOVING ABOUT AT NIGHT CAUSED BY FEDERAL ROADBLOCKS, ET CETERA. GP=4 OLSON

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

Action: AmEmbassy, LAGOS

Info:
INFO: AmEmbassy, LONDON
PARIS
US MISSION GENEVA
AmConsul, IBADAN
KADUNA

STATE _____

REF: State 160964

Subject: Nigerian Press Summary: September 22, 1969

Please make the following correction: In para 6, name should read
Chief Obafemi Awolowo instead of Samuel A. Akintola.

END

RICHARDSON

Drafted by:

AF/P:JHicks:djw 9/23/69

Tel. Ext.

22044

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AF/P - W. Clinton Powell

Clearance:


AF/SN - Mr. Sherry

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR DEF 9 NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 438

PAGE 01 KADUNA 00921 231851Z (1)

89
ACTION AF:18

INFO OCT 01, RSR 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, UCF 05, IO 13,

ACDA 16, SR 01, ORM 03, EUR 17, 166 W

071941

R 231436Z SEP 69
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1324
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL IBADAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KADUNA 0921

SUBJECT: FIRST DIVISION REAR COMMANDER

FIRST DIVISION REAR COMMANDER, LT. COL. T. Y. DANJUMA, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED TO KADUNA FROM APPARENTLY ROUTINE CONSULTATIONS IN LAGOS, MENTIONED FOLLOWING AT PARTY LAST EVENING.

1. HE IS CONCERNED THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY AROUND GOWON AT THE PRESENT TIME WHO ARE DELAYING THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE WAR, I.E. TOTAL MILITARY VICTORY. DANJUMA GRIMLY SAID: "YOU CANNOT HAVE A WAR WITHOUT KILLING PEOPLE." THEN HE PAUSED FOR QUITE A WHILE AND SAID WITH SOME EMOTION, "WE MUST DO OUR DUTY."

2. DANJUMA BELIEVES THE PRESENT STRATEGY OF STRIKING FOR ULI IS BASICALLY UNSOUND. THE CASUALTIES WILL BE HEAVY AND THE REBELS OBVIOUSLY HAVE PREPARED OTHER AIR-STRIPS. HE PREFERS A GENERAL ADVANCE USING STRAIGHT-FORWARD TACTICS DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY'S FIELD FORCES. HE SEES NO ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT OCCUPATION OF ALL THE REBEL TERRITORY.

(3) 3. DANJUMA AGAIN CONFIRMED THAT HE WILL BE GOING TO THE FRONT IN DECEMBER (KADUNA 862). IN REPLY TO QUESTION WHETHER HE WOULD BE GIVEN SUFFICIENT MEANS

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PAGE 02 KADUNA 00921 231851Z

TO ACHIEVE VICTORY QUICKLY, HE SAID, "I DOUBT IT."

DUBOSE

(CONFIDENTIAL)

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Authority NND959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Origin
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy, LAGOS

INFO: AmEmbassy, LONDON
PARIS
US MISSION GENEVA
AmConsul, IBADAN
KADUNA

STATE _____

SUBJECT: Nigerian Press Summary: September 22, 1969

1. The Washington Post characterized Ibadan in an article Sept. 22 as a city living "under an uneasy curfew" after a week of pitched gun battles between well organized rioters and police. Correspondent Jim Hoagland wrote in the Ibadan date-lined piece that villages around the city are in turmoil, scores of persons have been reportedly killed and the rioting has shaken all of Nigeria, erupting as the FMG tries to prepare a major new offensive against Biafra.
2. "A major part of Biafra's secessionist gamble has been the hope that if it could hold out long enough against the larger federal forces, old political feuds in the west would explode again and tear the federal apart," the article said.
3. Most observers attribute the riots to the fragmented and traditionally violent politics of the Yoruba, it continued.
4. "But the riots are certain to have an impact on the federal war effort."

Some security forces bound for duty in the eastern war area have already


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Clearances: AF/SN - Mr. Sherry

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Origin

ACTION: Page 2 of Telegram to LAGOS

Info:

been diverted to Ibadan. And the riots do appear to contain an element of weariness with the pace of the civil war, now in its third year."

5. The correspondent asserted that the most recent trouble had been simmering for about 18 months, and that since July it has become obvious the once-labeled "tax riots" are numerous, well organized and rioters are heavily armed. He described some of the riots incidents of early July and more recently, including the attack on the main prison of Ibadan.

6. Hoagland outlined a brief history of Yoruba warfare, and said some observer believe the second military coup of 1966 in which Samuel A. Akintola and some of his proteges gained power may be the key to the current riots. These observers, Hoagland concluded, point out that anybody organizing trouble in Ibadan has a fertile ground. He cited the discontent among people of Ibadan with the military government, discontent with local officials who abuse their position and discontent with some aspects of the war as the "real and imaginary grievances" to support their contention.

7. In another article Sept. 22, the New York Times said Biafran officials have claimed further successes in recent days in their military effort to

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
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Info:

cripple the Nigerian oil industry -- a campaign viewed as the "most promising aspect" of the civil war.

8. Eric Pace said in the article, date-lined from Owerri:

"Prolongation of war, now its third year, has deepened the hatred of Biafrans for their Nigerian enemies. By striking at Nigerian-controlled oil installations with their army and tiny air force, they hope to sap the Nigerian economy and goad foreign oil firms with Nigerian ~~interest~~ interests into pressing for peace."

9. "The Biafran Government says that its advances and attacks have cut Nigerian oil production to less than 300,000 barrels a day, less than a third of what it says the Nigerian Government had hoped for."

10. Attacks from the air are made by Swedish-made Minicon planes, now piloted exclusively by Biafrans, and ground advances have been facilitated by newly acquired stocks of arms, the article said.

11. "Well-placed ~~in~~ independent observers here and in Europe report that much of the equipment is being furnished through the neighboring West African country of Gabon."

12. "Biafran officers report privately that France is providing pistols -- for officers -- rifles, light and heavy machine guns and other equipment."

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
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Origin: ACTION: Page 4 of Telegram to LAGOS

Info:

They also said some Biafran military men have been trained in Gabon in the use of the weapons. They say also that at least one French military adviser is now at work in Biafra.

13. "Brig. E.U. Okon, a former army commander who is now permanent secretary of the Biafran Ministry of Information, said in an interview that more than 40 percent of the arms now being used by Biafran troops had been captured from Nigerian forces."

14. The article stated that Biafrans say they have probed to within two miles of Port Harcourt. Pace quoted the Biafran army that foreign employees of Shell Oil and British Petroleum had been evacuating Port Harcourt in large numbers, and that foreign oil executives were having trouble hiring and keeping local employees there.

END

RICHARDSON

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
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Ref 27 Biafra - Nigeria

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 IBADAN 00289 231124Z

11
ACTION SS:70

INFO OCT 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, DODE 00, CIAE 00, USIE 00, 1071 W
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PI 221650Z SEP 69
FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 910
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL KADUNA

S E I C R E T IBADAN 289

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: AFFECT ON FMG LEADERSHIP OF SITUATION IN WESTERN NIGERIA

REF: STATE 160127 NO 49/70

1. THOUGH THERE IS WAR-WEARINESS IN WESTERN STATE AND CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTION OF CIVIL WAR, WE KNOW OF NO ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO, OR PRESSURE-GROUP ON, FMG HERE. OLD NNDO/NCNC POLITICIANS, E.G. AKINJUDE, ADISA TEND TO BE HAWKS AND FAVORABLE TO CONTINUED MILITARY RULE IN LAGOS, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE THEY FAVOR STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHICH THEY BELIEVE WILL DIVIDE WEST INTO TWO STATES AND CUT AWOLOWO DOWN TO SIZE. SOME CRITICISM OF GOWON FOR LACK OF FORCEFUL LEADERSHIP, BUT NO SYMPATHY FOR HIS REPLACEMENT BY OFFICERS REPRESENTING OLD HAUSA-FULANI LEADERSHIP. AGI ON OTHER HAND MORE CRITICAL OF MILITARY AND DESIROUS OF EARLY RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE BUT CONSIDERS GOWON BEST AVAILABLE MILITARY RULER FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT. HOWEVER, WEST SO BESET BY INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND INSTABILITY THAT IT PROBABLY NOT MAJOR INFLUENCE ON FMG ONE WAY OR OTHER.

2. INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE CONDITIONS IN WESTERN STATE OBVIOUSLY POSE PROBLEMS FOR FMG, TYING DOWN CONSIDERABLE GARRISON FORCE AND REQUIRING POLICE REINFORCEMENTS FROM LAGOS. THEY ALSO CREATE UNFAVORABLE IMAGE OF NIGERIA IN OUTSIDE WORLD AND HAND "BIAFRA" ANOTHER PROPAGANDA THEME. ON OTHER HAND, WITH SUCH UNSTABLE BASE, AWOLOWO IS PRESUMABLY LESS OF THREAT TO CURRENT FMG LEADERSHIP. THUS, FOR FMG, WEST'S INSTABILITY HAS SILVER LINING.

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PAGE 02 IBADAN 00289 231124Z

EM: WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT YORUBA ARMY OFFICERS HAVE ORGANIZED THEMSELVES INTO COHERENT GROUP IN NIGERIAN ARMY. ADEBAYO'S PRES-
TIGE IS TOO LOW FOR HIM TO DO SO AND NO HINT OF ANY SUCH ACTIVITY
BY ADEKUNLE. SO THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY THREAT TO FMG FROM
YORUBA OFFICERS. REPORTS HERE ARE THAT ADEKUNLE NOW MAINLY
OCCUPIED IN ENJOYING HIS NEW FOUND WEALTH. IN ANY CASE, HIS
POPULARITY HERE HAS WANED AND OUR YORUBA BUSINESSMAN SOURCE DID
NOT THINK HE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO IBADAN PEOPLE AS
REPLACEMENT FOR ADEBAYO. NOR HAVE WE ANY INDICATION THAT ADEKUNLE
INTERESTED IN POLITICAL POWER, I.E. THAT HE MIGHT WANT WESTERN
STATE GOVERNORSHIP TO DEVELOP BASE FOR SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL
CAREER. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY OTHER POSSIBLE MILITARY
GOVERNOR FOR WESTERN STATE WHO WOULD BE A THREAT TO FMG.

4. IN SUM, WHILE WESTERN STATE IS PROBLEM, DRAIN AND EMBARRASS-
MENT FOR FMG, IT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY SIGNIFICANT PRESENT OR
IMMINENT THREAT TO CURRENT FMG LEADERSHIP. GR-1.
STRONG

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
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(2) POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria
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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 05142 221201Z

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, NIC 01, AID 28,
IO 13, SR 01, ORMI 03, RSR 01, 151 W

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R 221115Z SEPT 69
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4242
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 5742

SUBJ: NEW REPORT OF BIAFRAN-SOVIET CONTACTS

REF: LONDON 2063 AND 21201 MOSCOW 1314

1. THOUGH WE ASSUME PREVIOUS STORIES OF SOVIET-BIAFRAN CONTACTS (SEE REFS) ARE CONSIDERED RATHER SUSPECT, WE OFFER NEW REPORT WHICH SEEMS TO DESERVE ATTENTION BECAUSE OF ITS EXPLICIT DETAIL AND TRACEABLE SOURCE.

2. FIRST SECRETARY OF GHANAIAN EMBASSY HERE, B. O. ANTWI, (PROTECT), TOLD US SEPT 18 BIAFRAN DELEGATION "RECENTLY" VISITED MOSCOW AND WAS ACCORDED HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET RECEPTION. HIS INFORMANT IS GHANAIAN CITIZEN, AN EMPLOYEE OF "INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATION" AND OLD ACQUAINTANCE WHOM ANTWI "ACCIDENTALLY" RAN INTO HERE. GHANAIAN CLAIMS TO HAVE ACTED AS INTERMEDIARY FOR BIAFRANS.

3. STORY RUNS AS FOLLOWS: GHANAIAN FRIEND SYMPATHIZES WITH BIAFRAN CAUSE AND WAS ASKED BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO PREPARE REPORT ON BIAFRAN SITUATION WHEN HE VISITED MOSCOW AT TIME OF ICC LAST JUNE. HE FLEW TO PARIS AND MET WITH MEMBERS OF UNOFFICIAL BIAFRAN "EMBASSY" THERE. BIAFRAN "EMBASSY" HELPED WITH REPORT AND ASSIGNMENT TWO BIAFRANS, A MAN AND A WOMAN, TO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 05142 221201Z

TAKE IT TO MOSCOW. TANZANIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS INSTRUMENTAL IN SECURING SOVIET VISAS FOR BIAFRANS.

4. WITH BIAFRANS IN TOW, GHANAIAN RETURNED "RECENTLY". HE ARRANGED THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR BIAFRANS TO CALL ON "PRESIDENT" (PRESUMABLY PODGORNY), WHO LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY AND PROMISED TO STUDY THE PRESENTATION. (COMMENT: A CALL ON PODGORNY SEEMS BOTH INAPPROPRIATE AND IMPROBABLE.) CHANAIAN SAID HE DID NOT ACCOMPANY BIAFRANS ON THIS CALL, BUT WAS PRESENT WHEN THEY MET WITH FONMIN OFFICIALS.

5. ANTWI "FAIRLY CERTAIN" SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SUPPLYING ARMS COVERTLY TO BIAFRA AND FEELS THAT VISIT OF BIAFRAN OFFICIALS TO MOSCOW FURTHER EVIDENCE OF SOVIET DOUBLE-DEALING. ANTWI BELIEVES SOVIETS WANT TO KEEP CONFLICT GOING LONG ENOUGH FOR THEM TO CONSOLIDATE NEWLY WON INFLUENCE IN NIGERIA. SOVIETS WILLING QUIETLY TO RUN GUNS TO BIAFRANS TO KEEP THEM FIGHTING, FEARING EARLY PEACE WOULD MEAN QUICK RESTORATION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE.

6. COMMENT: UNFORTUNATELY WE DO NOT KNOW ANTWI WELL AND CANNOT JUDGE HIS RELIABILITY. HE SEEMS TO BE WELL-INFORMED PROFESSIONAL. HE ADMITS TO SOME PRIVATE SYMPATHIES FOR BIAFRAN CAUSE, HOWEVER, WHICH SUGGESTS POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT BE TRYING HIS HAND AT BLACK PROPAGANDA, SOWING DISCORD BETWEEN SOVIETS AND FEDERAL NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, FRENCH EMB. FIRST SECRETARY HERE! SEVERAL DAYS AGO VOLUNTEERED REPORT THAT BIAFRAN DELEGATION HAD BEEN IN TOWN. GPF-3
KLOSSON

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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*Pol 27 Biafra -
Nigeria*

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PAGE 01 LONDON 07638 221832Z

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ACTION AF: 18

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DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01,
PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, /151 W

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R 221700Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3026.

C O N F I D E N T I A L L O N D O N 7638

1. DURING CALL OTHER SUBJECT, FONOFF (WILSON) SAID TWO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AS YET UNVERIFIED IN NIGERIA COULD, IF TRUE, INDICATE TERMINATION MILITARY STALEMATE. HE CITED LAGOS BASED PRESS REPORT THAT FMG MIGS HAD SHOT DOWN A DC-6 AT ULI AIRPORT. REPORT SAID PLANE EXPLODED AND REMANTS WERE SEEN OVER LARGE AREA FOLLOWING MORNING BY OBSERVER AIRCRAFT. SECOND DEVELOPMENT WAS ALSO UNVERIFIED REPORT OF GREATLY INCREASED BIAFRAN DEFECTIONS AMOUNTING TO, IN ONE INSTANCE, AN ENTIRE COMPANY.

2. COMMENT: AS WILSON NOTED, ONE SWALLOW DOES NOT MEAN SPRING; AND TWO UNVERIFIED PRESS REPORTS DO NOT MEAN VICTORY BUT IF SUBSTANTIATED, FMG CONTROL OF ULI AND LARGE SCALE BIAFRAN DEFECTIONS WOULD BE MAJOR GAIN FOR FMG.
ANNENBERG

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FORM 10-64 DS-323

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
Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL/WJGalloway

Clearances:

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0520



COMMITTEE
FOR
**PEACE IN
NIGERIA**

313/5 Caledonian Road
London N1 01-607 0465

8th September 1969

Rq.

Chairman: Lord Brockway

Rt. Hon. Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London, S.W.1.

Dear Harold,

I enclose a copy of the letter I have received from General Ojukwu. You will see that he not only endorses the proposals which James Griffiths and I made, but for the first time indicates in detail the steps which he is prepared to accept to bring the war to an end. In view of your statement that General Ojukwu has declined unconditional negotiations, I think his repudiation of this is important.

He proposes immediate action by negotiations through representatives of States friendly to both sides, to be followed by discussions by officials of the two sides in preparation for negotiations between the Heads of State. His only qualification is that he cannot leave Biafra without a ceasefire or a truce. But following the previous discussions this should surely be possible and might well be accompanied by an embargo on arms supplies.

You will note that in his endorsement of the proposals made by James Griffiths and myself he accepts the presence of an international peacekeeping force.

I think it is understandable that General Ojukwu should not be ready to leave Biafra in the present circumstances, and I very much hope that the discussions now taking place at the Conference of the O.A.U., following the plea by U Thant, may lead to both a renewal of relief to the starving in Biafra and to the opening of the door to negotiations.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Foreign Secretary and also to U Thant and the Chairman of the O.A.U. Conference.

LORD BROCKWAY

0521

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Authority NND 959503
By MM NARA Date 10/5/05

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE
IN NIGERIA

313/5 Caledonian Road
London, N.1
01-607-0465

8th September 1969

Copy Letter from General Ojukwu.

18th August 1969

Lord F. Brockway
House of Commons
Westminster, London

X My dear Lord Brockway,

I recently held discussions with Mrs. Anne Kerr, Labour Member of Parliament, who visited us. I was not only full of admiration for Mr. Kerr's courage, but also appreciative of the encouragement you had given to her to undertake the trip. Mrs. Kerr referred to some misconception in Britain about our peace posture, and I thought I should take this opportunity to clarify the position.

As you may well recall, the Biafran Government agreed to the four-stage peace formula submitted on your last visit by your Lordship and your distinguished colleague, Mr. James Griffiths. This would have involved an unconditional cessation of hostilities; a cooling-off period; an international peace keeping force; and the resumption of negotiations. These humane and sensible proposals were, of course, rejected by Lagos.

I wish to emphasise that the Biafran Government's position on unconditional negotiation still stands. For such negotiations to succeed, Biafra is willing to accept the following stage-by-stage approach:

- a) States friendly to both Biafra and Nigeria should first meet to clear and establish common grounds. This would avoid initial direct confrontation which, in the present state of bitterness and distrust between both sides, will only lead to acrimony;
- b) Representatives of both Biafra and Nigeria should then meet; and finally
- c) A meeting of the principals, who hold ultimate authority and are therefore in a position to fully commit their side. For this, I am afraid I would have to insist on a cessation of hostilities or a truce, as I cannot leave Biafra whilst the hostilities are still on. I would be willing to forego this if it is agreed to hold the meeting in Biafra.

You may observe from this that it is not true that we have made a cessation of hostilities a pre-condition for any negotiation. It is my belief, however, that this will create an atmosphere conducive to meaningful talks, and demonstrate the parties preference for a negotiated settlement.

I hope you will find this useful and that it will assist you in your efforts to re-establish peace between Biafra and Nigeria. Meanwhile, I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

X
Yours very sincerely,
C. ODUMEGWU OJUKWU.

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Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

R 191120Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2949:
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS:

049869

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 7534

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: UK REVIEW OF NIGERIAN AERIAL CAPACITY

REF: LONDON 7439- Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
or Pol 27-14 Biafra - Nigeria

1. FONOFF (TEBBITI) GAVE ORAL SUMUP RECENTLY COMPLETED BRITISH REVIEW OF NIGERIAN AIR STRENGTH YESTERDAY. HE STRESSED THIS REVIEW HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN OUTSIDE NORMAL CHANNELS AND THAT NIGERIANS SHOULD NOT FIND OUT WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED.

2. REVIEW MADE BY TWO RAF OFFICERS IN MUFTI. THEIR CONCLUSIONS: WERE THAT AIR FORCE IS OPERATING AS WELL AS POSSIBLE BUT SINCE GROUND OFFICERS HAVE FIRST CALL FOR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT, IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR NAF CARRY OUT SUSTAINED AERIAL CAMPAIGN ANYWHERE. REPORT ADDS POTENTIAL WILL BE INCREASED GREATLY BY THE ADDITION TWO NEW JETS CURRENTLY BEING OUTFITTED.

3. TEBBIT SAYS BRITS CONSIDERING EQUIPPING NAF WITH RADIO BEACONS WHICH WOULD ALLOW AIRFORCE RECOGNIZE AND LOCATE ITS OWN AIR CRAFT WITH MINIMUM DIFFICULTY. TEBBIT POINTED OUT THIS EQUIPMENT WITHIN LIMITATION NON-HOSTILE WEAPONY DEFINITION.

4. GAINED IMPRESSION WRITTEN REPORT MAY NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US FOR SOME TIME.
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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28, ORM 03, SR 01, ACDA 16,

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UNCLAS: LAGOS 8459:

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP SEPTEMBER 19

1. TRIBUNE PICKS UP REPORT OF SIERRA LEONE PM STEVENS STATEMENT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT MIGHT RECOGNIZE REBELS IN ORDER TO QTE BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON NIGERIA TO GOTO NEGOTIATING TABLE UNQTE. IN ACCOMPANYING EDITORIAL, TRIBUNE CALLS STEVENS QTE PRESUMPTUOUS UNQTE AND ASKS WHAT RIGHT HE HAS TO DICTATE TO NIGERIA ABOUT CIVIL WAR. DECLARES THAT IF STEVENS HAD BEEN READING HIS PAPERS HE WOULD KNOW GOWON ALREADY PROPOSED, AND REBELS ACCEPTED, PEACE TALKS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND IF THIS GENUINE OBJECTIVE OF HIS STATEMENT, IT WAS UNNECESSARY. THEN CALLS ON FMG TO

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QTE CALL HIS BLUFF UNQUOTE AND INFORM STEVENS TO RECOGNIZE OJUKWU IF HE WANTS BECAUSE WHILE IT MIGHT GIVE REBELS QTE TEMPORARY SENSE OF DIPLOMATIC ACHIEVEMENT UNQUOTE, IT WILL NOT INCREASE REBEL MILITARY STRENGTH OR DECREASE FEDERAL FIRE-POWER AND THEREFORE QTE WILL MAKE NO DIFFERENCE TO OBVIOUS FACT THAT REBELLION WILL BE CRUSHED EVENTUALLY UNQUOTE. NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL STATES THAT STEVENS THREAT WOULD BE CAUSE FOR LAUGHTER IF IT WERE NOT FOR FACT THAT IT MAY ENCOURAGE OJUKWU TO HOLD OUT HOPING THAT IF ENOUGH AFRICAN POWERS BACK HIM, ONE OR MORE GREAT POWERS WILL INTERVENE AND QTE GIVEN PROPENSITY OF GREAT POWERS TO MEDDLE. CALCULATION MAY NOT BE FAR-FETCHED UNQUOTE. ALSO POINTS OUT THAT FMG HAS AGREED TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS QTE DESPITE INTERNAL UNPOPULARITY UNQUOTE OF THIS OFFER AND SUGGEST STEVENS SHOULD COME TO NIGERIA HIMSELF TO SEE HOW THINGS ARE BEFORE TAKING ANY DECISIONS. DECALRES THAT RECOGNITION OR THREAT OF RECOGNITION WILL NOT INFLUENCE FMG TO HIS WAY OF THINKING BUT ADMITS THAT FMG MUST BE UNEASY LEST TOO MANY COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE REBELS OPINING THAT BEST WAY TO PREVENT THIS IS TO REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO QTE EXTINGUISH FLAME OF REBELLION UNQUOTE. PILOT, TIMES AND POST ALL REPORT STATEMENT BY VISITING GAMBIAN PM JAWARA THAT RECOGNITION OF REBELS BY SIERRA LEONE WOULD BE QTE SERIOUS BLOW UNQUOTE TO LONG ASSOCIATION OF THE FOUR FORMER BRITISH WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND WOULD NOT HELP AFRICAN UNITY. JAWARA ALSO STATED QTE WE WOULD NEVER BE HAPPY TO SEE NIGERIA DISINTEGRATE UNQUOTE. JAWARA DEPARTED MORNING SEPT 19.

2. TIMES, POST AND TRIBUNE REPORT GENERAL GOWONS INTERVIEW PUBLISHED SEPT 18 IN LE FIGARO IN PARIS. REPORTEDLY STRESSED THAT HE PREPARED TO TALK AND NEGOTIATE WITH OJUKWU ABOUT ANYTHING EXCEPT NIGERIAN UNITY, STATING QTE HE CANNOT SACRIFICE UNITY OF FEDERATION TO AMBITION OF MAN WHO SIMPLY AVID FOR POWER UNQUOTE. EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE TWO REASONS FOR HALT IN OFFENSIVE AGAINST REBELS - FIRST NIGERIANS DID NOT WANT TO QTE CRUSH OUR OWN COUNTRY, WE WANT TO MAKE REBELS UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE LOST UNQUOTE AND SECONDLY HE SAID BELIEF THAT NIGERIA HELD OVERWHELMING MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER QTE OJUKWUS 130,000 TROOPS UNQUOTE WAS WRONG BECAUSE NO ONE GAVE WEAPONS TO NIGERIA BUT OJUKWUS FORCES WERE GIVEN GREAT MANY WEAPONS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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3. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAS ISSUED STATEMENT CONDEMNING BBC REPORT FROM REBEL RADIO THAT REBEL AIRCRAFT BOMBED SAPELE, DESTROYING POWER STATION AND FOOD CANNING FACTORY. STATEMENT POINTED OUT THERE IS NEITHER POWER STATION OR CANNING FACTORY IN SAPELE AND DECLARED THIS REPORT ONLY ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF QTE IGNORABLE ROLE UNQUOTE BBC HAS PLAYED SINCE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR BY BROADCASTING FALSE REBEL CLAIMS.

4. IN TV INTERVIEW AZIKIWE SUGGESTED PROVISION BE MADE FOR MIXED CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CABINET IN FUTURE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION WITH FINAL POWER RESTING IN ELECTED PARLIAMENT. STATED THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD SERVE AS GOOD TRANSITION FROM PRESENT MILITARY RULE SINCE IT WOULD COMBINE STABILITY OF MILITARY WITH FLEXIBILITY OF CIVILIANS AND GIVE MILITARY SOME KNOWLEDGE OF WORKING OF GOVERNMENT OF POLITICANS FROM FLOOR OF PARLIAMENT WHERE ORDERS NOT GIVEN AS IN MILITARY BARRACKS. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION, HE STATED THAT HE DID NOT SUPPORT QTE TROIKA UNQUOTE FORM OF GOVERNMENT SUCH AS GHANA HAS AT PRESENT FOR NIGERIA. ON HIS OWN PLANS, AZIKIWE SAID HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO LONDON SOON FOR REUNION WITH HIS WIFE AND TO FINISH BOOK HE WAS WORKING ON BEFORE RETURNING TO SETTLE PERMANENTLY IN NIGERIA. RESTATED THAT HE WOULD NOT ENTER PARTISAN POLITICS AGAIN AND WANTED TO RETIRE AND ACT AS FATHER TO ALL. TIMES ALSO REPORTS THAT ZIKI SAID IN CONNECTION WITH HIS VIEW THAT NIGERIA SHOULD HAVE STRONG FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AFTER WAR, QTE MORE STATES THE BETTER, THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BALANCE THEIR BUDGETS AND WOULD THUS RELY ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE.

5. ONLY REPORT OF PRESIDENT NIXONS UNGA SPEECH, WIRE SERVICE REPORT HEADLINED QTE NIXON IGNORES AFRICAN CRISIS UNQUOTE AND BEGINS WITH STATEMENT THAT HE ALSO QTE OMITTED ANY TRIBUTE TO UNGAS FIRST AFRICAN WOMAN PRESIDENT UNQUOTE.

6. EXPRESS HAS SIGNED ARTICLE IN PLACE OF USUAL EDITORIAL CALLING FOR FMG TO DISPEL FEARS OF REBEL LEADERSHIP ABOUT THEIR FUTURE IF THEY WERE TO SURRENDER, BY ISSUING DECLARATION OF TOTAL AMNESTY FOR OOUKWU AND THE OTHER LEADERS OF THE REBELLION. STATES OOUKWU NOT SOLELY TO BLAME FOR TRAGEDIES WHICH HAVE OVERTAKEN NIGERIA IN PAST

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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THREE YEARS BECAUSE CORRUPTION OF MANY OLD POLITICIANS
AND CIVIL SERVANTS WERE START OF NIGERIA'S TROUBLES.
OLSON

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Authority NID 959503
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FORM 10-64 DS-323

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AIRGRAM

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POL 27 BIAFRA -
NIGERIA

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AMEMBASSY BRANCH

Kontler

R/S/R

FROM : Amembassy DAR ES SALAAM DATE: September 18, 1969

SUBJECT : Nyerere on the Nigeria-Biafra Conflict

REF :

At the recent Organization of African Unity Summit Conference President Nyerere circulated a pamphlet dated September 4, 1969 which sets forth his current thinking on the Nigerian-Biafran problem. This pamphlet served as the background for his efforts at Addis Ababa to bring together Generals Gowon and Ojukwu for serious face to face talks, and provoked a sharp and personal attack upon Nyerere by the Nigerian delegation. This airgram forwards a copy of the pamphlet clipped from the Dar es Salaam Standard and offers a brief analysis of its contents. In essence, Nyerere remains convinced that bringing a halt to the killing should be the first objective, and he also continues to place great emphasis on the capacity of interested Northern Hemisphere nations to influence events in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa if they wish.

Enclosure:

"Nyerere Outlines Nigeria-Biafra Crisis" dated September 4, 1969 by Julius K. Nyerere

1969 SEP 22 AM 9 52
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
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Dar es Salaam A-208

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
The largest part of Nyerere's pamphlet is devoted to a case by case examination of a number of analogies which have been drawn to the Biafran secession, and whose relevance he attempts to refute or deny. First the analogy of Gibraltar with Biafra is reviewed, and Nyerere points out that in this instance the British Government is advancing the views of the local population, and is supporting the principle of self-determination, as its primary justification for retaining possession of the Rock. Next the American Civil War is touched on rather briefly, with Nyerere contending that "Had there been a Lincoln in Nigeria, he would have fought the prejudices.... which made secession.... justifiable." Turning to the Katanga episode, during which Tanzania supported the central government against the break-away province, Nyerere acknowledges the parallels with Biafra. He draws particular attention to the fact that in both instances, the former colonial power and "the vested economic interests" were and are on the same side. In his opinion, however, the major and vital difference between the two is that Gen. Ojukwu is not the "stooge" of these vested interests, and that the Ibo are fighting only for their own survival.

As concerns the "Internal Domino Theory," which stresses that if the Ibo are allowed to secede then the Hausa and the Yoruba will leave as well, thus destroying Nigeria, Nyerere is not alarmed. He points out that Nigeria's frontiers were drawn by the British for administrative purposes, with little regard to the historical realities of this part of Africa. He dismisses the "African Domino Theory," which raises the alarm that if Nigeria is broken into a number of independent pieces, "no other African country will be safe." The President observes that "sometimes, indeed very often, the spectre of tribalism is raised by the enemies of Africa against Africa. The Hausas, the Ibos and the Yorubas are not Nations in the legal sense, but they are not Tribes either."

Nyerere then launches into a brief discourse on his own primary concerns in the Nigerian war. Drawing attention to what he calls "the true lesson for Africa," he says that "where.... in any African state.... there is a dominant group.... it must wield its power.... on behalf of all the elements which go to form that country. In particular, it (the dominant group) should be very solicitous of the interests of the minorities." He criticizes the earlier

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

Dar es Salaam A- 208

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
Federal Government for its "failure to meet the legitimate interests of the Easterners." Voicing his overriding concern with ending the killing, he pleads that "the break-up of Nigeria.... is less terrible than that cruel war. It is estimated that possibly more people have died in this war in the last two years than in Vietnam in the last ten years." He is opposed in principle to the objective of total surrender, which he believes "...cannot lead to any kind of friendship, or even toleration."

The President also stresses his belief that the war would not have continued for this length of time without the active support of Britain and the Soviet Union. While urging the Organization of African Unity to come to grips with the problem, he is convinced that "those who are saying the OAU can solve this problem are being fooled, or are conveniently fooling themselves. Britain is the vital force in this conflict; more important even than Federal Nigeria. Without Britain's military and.... diplomatic support, the Nigerians would have no hope of winning." He refers again to "the Western Powers" as "the only ones who have real power in Africa."

COMMENT: In our view, Nyerere's pamphlet is an eloquent restatement of the reasoning which has lead Tanzania to support the Biafran cause, but it is not entirely convincing. Several of the analogies which he seeks to refute do seem relevant, and Nyerere does not make the case that they are not. His explanation of why Tanzania supported the Leopoldville Government against Katanga, but not the Lagos Government against Biafra, is unsatisfactory. Too much emphasis seems to be placed on determining which side the former colonial power, and "the vested economic interests" are on, and then rather arbitrarily coming up in defense of the other party. There is a preoccupation, perhaps almost an obsession, with the political, economic, military and diplomatic power of Western nations, and their potential to call the tune in Africa. We can better appreciate Nyerere's humanitarian desire to halt the continuing bloodshed in Nigeria. He is much more concerned with this tragic loss of human life than with the contending principles of political theory. He also continues to show the courage to criticize his fellow Africans when he believes they are mistaken, despite the possible consequent loss of prestige he may suffer outside Tanzania. In particular, his condemnation of Africans for their apparent willingness to look the other way from Nigeria while, if the killing were being done by

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whites in Southern Africa the whole continent would be up in arms, is both commendable in itself and also helpful to United States long term interests in Africa.


Asides: The text as printed in the attached version from the Standard is the full text as circulated in Addis Ababa with the exception of one major excision of several sentences. The original draft was composed by the President's Personal Assistant, Miss Joan Wicken, who, according to reliable reports, is opposed personally to the Tanzanian stand in favor of Biafra. Miss Wicken made an error in the printed document circulated at the OAU, the purport of which was to indicate that the Ibos had taken certain actions of a conciliatory nature before they had declared their independence, when in fact the actions had taken place after the declaration. An embassy officer has seen a copy of the original document with the excisions underlined.

The Spanish Charge, whose sole mission in Dar es Salaam is to obtain continuing Tanzanian support for Spain on Gibraltar, was deeply disturbed by the comparison between the Gibraltar and Biafra cases in the paper. It is the first public revelation of a changing Nyerere attitude in favor of self-determination on the Rock which was provided to the British High Commissioner some six months ago by Nyerere himself.

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4 THE STANDARD, Thursday, September 11, 1969.

NYERERE OUTLINES NIGERIA-BIAFRA CRISIS

In arguments about the Nigeria/Biafra conflict, there has been a great deal of talk about the principles of national integrity and of self-determination; many analogies have been drawn with other conflicts in the world, and particularly in Africa; and finally, there has been a considerable amount of discussion about the role of the O.A.U. and other international organizations in relation to the present conflict. It is my purpose to discuss some of these problems and to examine the lessons which are, and which I believe should be, drawn from the analogies.

Let me look first at the analogies and their relevance to the principles which are under discussion.

Gibraltar.

The British give three reasons for their opposition to the demand for the incorporation of Gibraltar into the Spanish State. First is the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 (to which the Gibraltarians were not a party); second is the opposition of the Gibraltarians; and third is the dictatorship in Spain.

It is the second reason which Britain mostly uses to justify her position, and indeed it is the more important one. For if the Gibraltarians wished, they could say: "To hell with the Treaty of Utrecht: we were not party to it anyway". If, after that, the territory were incorporated, Britain would not be able to do anything about it, unless she was to come out openly in favour of imperialism. Yet I believe that Britain is simply using the fact of the Gibraltarians' opposition to incorporation, just as she is using the legalities of the Treaty. When Britain feels that it is in her interests to come to terms with Spain, I doubt that either the Treaty or the Gibraltarians' feelings will prevail—indeed this doubt is buttressed by the fact that Britain will not accept the "integration with Britain" policy. But this is not the point I want to argue. My point is that two quite separate arguments are used by Britain in this dispute: one, an imperialist Treaty between several powers, including Britain and Spain; and two, the feelings of a group of people who were the object of that Treaty.

In the political climate of the modern world, the opposition of the Gibraltarians is the more important matter for winning world support for Britain's case. But the Treaty argument also has an importance.

Look now at the analogy with the Nigeria/Biafra issue. Britain appears to be arguing that she is helping Nigeria to stop the Ibos from unilaterally breaking the "Treaty" under which all the peoples of Nigeria agreed to accept independence as a single Federation. In this case, in other words, she is leaving out the question of self-determination, although it is the main plank of her argument on the Gibraltar question.

But in the case of Nigeria and Biafra, the issue is not some minor, technical issue about the legalities or morality of a Treaty. It is an issue of life and death, involving a massacre by one party to that Treaty of more people among another party to the Treaty than all the inhabitants of Gibraltar. After the failure of several serious attempts to secure reassurance for the resultant fears, the People who had been the victims decided to break away to form their own State. If the principle of self-determination is relevant in the case of Gibraltar—as it is then surely it is relevant under these circumstances? But the rest of Nigeria objects, and says: "These Ibos must remain part of Nigeria". Surely we should be saying to Nigeria: "Get their consent". Instead, what we are saying is: "Shoot and starve them into submission".

It may be argued that all those involved in a Treaty should be consulted about any change in it, and that therefore in this case the Nigerians should be consulted as well as the Biafrans. That is not actually my argument, but let us look at it in these two cases. Consult the People of Spain about the incorporation of Gibraltar: I do not know what their verdict would be. Consult the People of Britain: they will vote against Spain—not because of the Treaty of Utrecht but because the Gibraltarians do not want to be part of Spain. They would vote, I hope—indeed I am sure—in support of the self-determination of the people of Gibraltar, as it has been so freely expressed, not for Spain's claims. Then ask the Nigerians about the forcible incorporation of the Ibos. At worst their answer would be equivalent to that of the Spanish Government, and of their own Government now: "Keep them part of Nigeria, even against their will". Ask the people of Britain about this issue, in this case I am not sure what their verdict might be, in spite of the clear determination of the 8 million Biafrans to be left alone. But neither is Wilson sure, so we shall never know. What we do know is that the 29,000 Gibraltarians have been asked their opinion about the dispute in which they are involved, and they have given their answer. The 8 million Biafrans have not been asked, and will not be asked their opinion on their conflict; but they have given their answer nevertheless—with their blood.

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The African Domino Theory.

This is an extremely logical and nice argument. But it must be directed to people other than the Biafrans. They cannot be asked to sacrifice their freedom in order that two Peoples, who are not otherwise willing to attempt the building of a nation together, may carry on a precarious united existence. It is bad enough to force the Biafrans to make immense sacrifices for their own freedom; it would be worse than absurd to expect them to surrender the freedom for which they are dying in order to maintain a precarious unity among other Peoples—whose own commitment to that unity must be very slight if this argument has any validity at all.

In fact, the argument "If you allow the Ibos to go, the others will also go", inevitably provokes the question: "Who are these others, and where will they go?" For properly considered, this argument is an Imperialist argument. I can well imagine Winston Churchill saying: "If I allow India to go, the others will go, and I was not appointed the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." But how can this kind of thing be said of Nigeria—most of all by Nigerians? Who in the Nigerian issue represents Churchill? And who represents the "Others" who would break away if the Ibos are allowed to go? And who is the imperialist metropolitan power in Nigeria?

Those who advance this argument assume the Hausas to be the Churchill and the "Others" to be the Yorubas in particular, and also the smaller groups. They assume that the Hausas would like to complete their conquest of the South, which was interrupted by the British, and are saying that the only way the Hausas will be able to continue to dominate the Yorubas and the smaller ethnic groups is if they also succeed in dominating the Ibos.

If this is the basis of the argument, and if it stated the actual position, I would be amazed at Africa's reaction to an African Imperialism abetted and supported by British Imperialism. Indeed, it would be very shameful if Africa, which is still groaning from the yoke of European Imperialism, was to make a cynical distinction between that and an internal African Imperialism. Such an argument must be rejected by the whole of Africa. Not only would it make nonsense of the principles we have been proclaiming; it is also an insult to the people of Nigeria—the Hausas, the Yorubas, and the others.

Let us reject the Internal Domino Theory in relation to the Nigerian question. For it assumes that the people now in the Federation of Nigeria are, and wish to be, imperialists. I cannot believe that. I still believe that they are capable of recognizing the tragedy which has caused one part of the Federation to break away, and of acknowledging that very different tactics are necessary if the old Nigeria is ever to be re-created. For surely they could decide to leave the Biafrans to go their own way and, by the kind of Nigeria which they create, to show the Biafrans what they are losing by remaining separated from their brethren. For if the other peoples of Nigeria decide to work together, they will continue to be a strong and powerful force in Africa; they really have the opportunity to build a good nation of which every Nigerian—indeed every African—can be proud. Then it may be that at some time in the future the Biafrans will wish to rejoin the peoples from whom they now wish to part; if this happens, it will be for the accession of a free people to a large and free political unit. For if the secession of Biafra is a setback to African Unity—as of course it is—no one is suggesting that we should consequently stop working for African Unity on the basis of willing commitment. Why then are we suggesting that our Nigerian brethren have a different conception of unity, and that they want a unity of conquest only? I am not making such an argument. I am saying that, although our Nigerian brothers want to maintain one Nigeria, including Biafra, on the basis of equality of citizenship, they are wrong in thinking that this can be done now. I refuse to impute bad motives to General Gowon; I believe he is mistaken in his judgment and that Africa must not make the same mistake.

There is another Domino Theory which relates to the rest of Africa. We are told that, if we allow "tribalism" to break up Nigeria, no African country would be safe; for every African nation consists of tribes which find themselves in the same country by an accident of history and by the grace of the Imperialists. I fully accept the danger of tribalism in Africa. When we started TANU in 1954, the first of the objectives of our Party was preparation for independence, and the second was "to fight against tribalism". We have not completely succeeded in eradicating tribalism from our society; indeed I was recently forced to remind our people of this objective, and to warn them about certain tendencies.

But the dangers of tribalism are so well-known that, although I would never wish to minimize them, I do not think it is now necessary to expound them afresh. There is, however, a different fact which can be equally dangerous. Sometimes, indeed very often, the spectre of tribalism is raised by the enemies of Africa against Africa. It is dangerous for Africa to accept the argument of tribalism without examining its relevance in every given case. Indeed to the extent that we need to learn from Nigeria's "tribalism", I have a feeling that Africa is being bamboozled or mesmerized into learning the wrong lesson.


But first, what is a Tribe? And how comparable is Nigeria's position to that which exists elsewhere in Africa? Are the Hausas a tribe? Are the Yorubas a tribe? Are the Ibos a tribe? It may be said that they are not "Nations"; but are they Tribes? There are Scottish clans, but the Scots are not a Tribe simply because of the fact that they are not a Nation. The Welsh: are they a Tribe? Are the Protestants of Northern Ireland a tribe? The Hausas, the Ibos, and the Yorubas, are not Nations in the legal sense; but they are not Tribes either. Each one of them is a "People" which could easily become a very coherent Nation. Each one of these "Peoples" of Nigeria has a better chance of forming a really viable and stable Nation than many of the legal Nations of Africa and other parts of the world.

Indeed, those who glibly compare Nigeria with other African countries show that they did not begin to understand the immense significance for the rest of Africa of the Nigerian experiment. Nigeria was trying (and if they do not allow themselves to be convinced by the internal Nigerian Domino Theory, they may continue trying) to building a Nation which incorporates several Peoples who could have become Nations on their own. Had Nigeria succeeded (and Nigeria can still succeed if she rejects the argument of all or none), Africa would have a great example before it. We would be able to say: "Within Nigeria there are several Peoples, each conscious of itself and conscious of its ability to be a Nation on its own. If they have nevertheless succeeded in submerging their natural unity into a larger artificial unity, for the greater benefit of them all, then the rest of Africa can submerge its smaller artificial units into that greater artificiality (indeed that more natural unit of all Africa) which holds greater promise for all the peoples of Africa." In other words, any success in Nigeria—even if partial—is a demonstration of the practicability of our declared aim of African Unity—even though a Nigerian "failure" would not make this aim impossible of achievement. This, I repeat, is Nigeria's real significance to Africa.

No other political unit in our continent has the same significance for Africa; not even the Sudan, although the two cases are similar in one respect. Both have a basic problem of "Peoples" in the sense that the North of Sudan is different from the South, racially, religiously, culturally, and socially—although the one "People" of the South are divided into several different tribes. The Sudan's problem, therefore, is very serious—just as Nigeria's problem is.

But fortunately for the Sudan, and for Africa, Southern Sudan is not blessed (or cursed) with immense mineral wealth. As a result, foreign economic interests are not involved in this conflict. However agonising the problem may be for the authorities in Khartoum—and for the people of the country—the former Colonial Power is most unlikely to pour arms into the Sudan to help maintain Sudanese unity. It is also unlikely to intervene in support of any attempt at secession. This situation will continue irrespective of the ideological leanings of the Government in Khartoum; and irrespective of what Russia does. In this case Sudanese leaders, and African leaders, have a real chance of solving the problem—provided we do not make the same mistake as we made in Nigeria and act as if there is no genuine problem to be solved.

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These are the vital issues, and those who are saying that O.A.U. can solve this problem are being fooled, or are conveniently fooling themselves. Britain is the vital force in this conflict; more important even than Federal Nigeria. The Biafrans believe they are fighting for their very survival; they are fighting to live in freedom and security. The Nigerian people are not quite sure what they are fighting for. Some of their leaders hate the Ibos; some may have ambitions of being Lincolns; some may even believe that they can force others into a United Nigeria and still have a meaningful nation. But that is all. Without Britain's military and—in particular—her diplomatic support, the Nigerians would have no hope of winning against the Biafrans. The Soviet Union would not have been able to help them secure victory. Indeed, without Britain the Soviet Union would have become a huge diplomatic embarrassment to the Nigerians; (and Nigeria would have become a wee embarrassment to Russia). For if Russia had supported Lagos and Britain did not, most of the Western world would have been anti-Lagos; and since there is so much popular sympathy for Biafra in many Western countries, it is hard to think of a reason which would have prevented Western Governments supporting Biafra. After all, they would be fighting against communism. Under these circumstances it would not have mattered whether African Heads of Government had continued to fear the effect of an example of successful secession; the Western powers, the only ones who have real power in Africa, would be fearing a different example, and one more vital to their own interests.

But if this argument is not convincing, those who believe that there is a direct and valid comparison between Katanga and Biafra must be able to answer some few questions. Which tribe in Katanga is the equivalent of the Ibos? Azikiwe, an Ibo at the Centre, was trying hard, under very difficult circumstances, to co-operate with the dominant North to build a United Nigeria: who was his equivalent in the Congo? The Ibos, because of their education, industry, enterprise (and consequent arrogance?) were almost universally hated in Nigeria. Who in Katanga represented this educated, industrious, enterprising, arrogant and almost universally hated People? Who in the Congo represented the 30,000 massacred Easterners? Who, in Katanga represented the 1.5 or 2 million refugees? What in the Congo represented the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), a party led mainly by Ibos it is true, but one which was nevertheless truly aimed at Nigerian Unity? Who in the Congo was the equivalent of the Sardauna of Sokoto, so powerful that he did not even bother to go to the Centre but governed the Federation through lieutenants while he himself governed the vital North? What in Katanga was the equivalent of the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.)?

Or again, who is Biafra's Tshombe? Who in Biafra represents the Copper Companies? Africa appealed to the United Nations to support Patrice Lumumba; why are we not appealing to the United Nations to support General Gowon, who on this analogy would be Nigeria's support General Gowon, who on this analogy would be Nigeria's support? Perhaps the true answer is that it is not necessary; he already has strong support. But why is it not necessary? Because the Ibos are simply fighting for their own survival and therefore have no strong supporter. That is their strength and weakness: it is the major difference between Katanga and Biafra. In the one case, foreign economic interest was on the side of the secessionists and that made them very strong; in the other case, foreign economic interest is on the side of the Federalists, and makes them too very strong. They can even quote the O.A.U. Charter on non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state. The devil can quote Scripture—when it suits him. In the one case, a despicable African stooge allowed himself to be used as a tool of foreign economic interests; in the other case, a brave African people are fighting against immense odds purely and simply for their own survival and their own self-respect and dignity. How does this analogy stand up to examination?

The break-up of Nigeria is a terrible thing. But it is less terrible than that cruel war. Thousands of people are being shot, bombed, or seeing their homes and livelihood destroyed; millions, including the children of Africa, are starving to death. (It is estimated that possibly more people have died in this war in the last two years than in Vietnam in the last ten years). We are told that nothing can be done about this. It is said that the sufferings of the Biafrans in the war are regrettable, but that starvation is a legitimate war weapon against an enemy. Yet by this statement you have said that these people, the Nigerians and the Biafrans, are enemies, just as Britons and Germans in Hitler's war were enemies. If that is the case, is it rational to imagine that, once a Federal victory is obtained, they can immediately be equal members of one society, working together without fear? Or is the logic of being enemies not a logic which leads to conquest and domination when one side is victorious?


We are told that Ojukwu should end the terrible sufferings of his people by surrender. We are told that he should reason thus: "The Nigerians are stronger than we are and they have stronger friends than we could ever hope to get. If we go on resisting, a combination of bombing, starvation and the inevitable epidemics, would exterminate us." Perhaps he should add, kindly: "Even if the Nigerians never intended to exterminate us." He should then convince the Biafran people about the wisdom of surrendering and then duly send the appropriate notice to the Nigerians. When the Federal Government gets this note, they presumably say: "At last you have come to your senses. As you rightly say, we never intended to exterminate you; but had you gone on resisting we would have continued the bombing and the blockade and the result would have been exactly the same as if we had intended to exterminate you." Perhaps they would add, kindly: "But, of course, the fault would have been yours." Then the Biafrans surrender and all is well.

Historically and logically, however, surrender on such terms as these—with the alternative being extermination—is for the purpose of creating empires. Surrender to an implacable enemy on his own terms, with the only condition being that you should not be killed, cannot lead to any kind of friendship, or even toleration. If it is a battalion which surrenders, the soldiers become prisoners-of-war; if it is a People, they become a colony, or an occupied territory, or something like that. Those who surrender cannot become an integral part of the conqueror's territory because they did not do so of their own free will; they did so as the only alternative to death.

The Internal Domino Theory.

The argument is being advanced that if Biafra is allowed to exist, Nigeria cannot exist. Nigerian leaders themselves have advanced this argument. If the Ibos are allowed to go, so the argument runs, Nigeria will break up completely, for the others will also go. To deal with this argument seriously, let us assume the worst: let us assume that, if the Biafrans leave the Federation, all the others will also secede and set themselves up as separate States. What this argument amounts to is that only two things bind the Hausas and the Yorubas (these being the major elements) together. These two facts are, firstly, the recent historical accident that all (plus the Ibos) were conquered by, and then governed by, the British; and secondly, the more recent historical fact that, when the British left, they left these Peoples as one Nation. If these accidents of history were in fact the only reason for Nigeria, and if there is no feeling of mutual benefit arising from the political unity, then the secession of the Biafrans would certainly and inevitably lead to the break-up of the Federation as the Yorubas—and the Hausas?—secede. In using this argument, therefore, we are in effect saying: "The Yorubas, the Hausas (and the others) cannot remain together without the Ibos; we want the Yorubas and the Hausas to remain together; therefore we must forcibly prevent the Ibos from breaking away—even if this attempt to prevent them, together with their stubborn resistance, may lead to their extermination."

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Britain invokes the principle of self-determination in the case of Gibraltar, because it serves her interests to do so. She must justify her stand on some acceptable principle (international law, plus self-determination) because she still wants the Rock. Nevertheless, the principles she advances are valid. I am not going to say that they are not valid because they are advanced by Britain. In the case of integrity—because it suits her own interests to do so. The choice of principle is the result of a decision taken on the basis of British interests, not because one principle is more valid than another. If British interests had been different, we would have self-determination being advanced as a reason for supporting Biafra.

If the dictatorship of General Franco is an additional reason for supporting the Gibraltarians, one may rightly ask for similar consideration to be given to the people of Biafra. They object to incorporation because before secession 30,000 Easterners were massacred without anyone being punished; and the same regime threatens them with complete extermination through starvation unless they surrender. Are not such actions, and the attitudes they reveal, at least as good a reason as Franco's dictatorship for the Biafrans opposition to being incorporated into Nigeria? Have the Gibraltarians so much reason to fear General Franco?

The American Civil War.

What, then, about the analogy which is sometimes drawn to the American Civil War? Like the Nigerian Civil War, it was about secession. Like that in Nigeria it caused very dreadful suffering. But we do justify wars, or condemn them, because of what they are about. And in America, the South was not trying to break away because Southerners had been rejected in the North, and had been massacred in their thousands with the connivance or the assistance of the forces of law and order. The Southern States were not swarming with millions of refugees who had fled from the North, leaving their property behind, in order to save their skins. Of course it is true that Lincoln fought to save the Union. But he believed, even before the war, that that Union could not last half free, half slave. He was concerned to make it what it had proclaimed itself to be—a society of free and equal men. Had there been a Lincoln in Nigeria, he would have fought the prejudices which led to that inordinate and almost pathological hatred of the Ibos which made secession inevitable and justifiable.

Katanga as a Comparison.

A politically more serious comparison, however, is made between the secession of Biafra and that of Katanga. Tanzania, in particular, is accused of the most blatant inconsistency because it opposed Katanga and recognizes Biafra. I know that there are similarities between Katanga and Biafra. But these similarities can be grouped into those which are superficial and irrelevant and those which are real and crucial. An examination of the real and crucial similarities reveals some apparently unnoticed facts.

First, let me acknowledge the similarities which are advanced by the opponents of Biafra, but which I believe to be superficial and irrelevant to the main issue. Katanga was part of a United Congo; Katanga decided to secede; the Centre objected; a war then broke out between secessionist Katanga and the Centre. (Notice that I am not trying to say "why" Katanga decided to secede; I am merely stating the fact of secession). Similarly, Biafra (or the Eastern Region of Nigeria) was part of a federated Nigeria; Biafra decided to secede; the Centre objected; (this is not quite correct, but I must admit a few similarities); a war broke out between secessionist Biafra and the Centre.

Now for a different and more fundamental group of similarities. Katanga had vast copper resources; the former colonial power was very much interested in this vast amount of wealth; her economic interests were threatened by Lumumba at the Centre; when war broke out between Katanga and the Centre, Belgium supported one side in an effort to safeguard her economic interests; she joined the side supported by the copper companies. No need to go further.

Now for the conflict in Nigeria. Biafra had vital oil resources, the former colonial power was vitally interested in this vast amount of oil; her interests were threatened in the conflict; (the really vital matter was the threat, not whether the threat came from the Centre or the periphery); this is only important in deciding who is going to be ally and who enemy); but in this case, due to relations between the British and the Ibos, the threat came from the secessionists. When war broke out between Biafra and the Centre, Britain, like Belgium, was on the same side as the Foreign Companies—in this case the Oil Companies.

Let those who love the superficial similarities of secession have the courage and honesty to accept this unpleasant fact also. In Katanga, Belgium and the Copper Companies were on one side; in Nigeria, Britain and the Oil Companies are on one side. This is the one, constant and crucial factor in both cases, around which everything else can be variable. In both cases, the former colonial power and the vested economic interests are on one side. Tshombe was a stooge of the Copper Interests. They filled his coffers with their vast financial resources. Ojukwu is not a stooge of these interests; they refuse to pay him a penny from the wealth they derive from Biafran oil. This vital contrast is the corollary to the decision to support the Centre instead of secession. In the one case it was the Centre under Lumumba which was the threat to the economic interest if the Congo remained united; and therefore it was the Centre which had to be starved of Revenue. In the other case it was a separate Ibo state which was the threat, and it was Biafra, therefore, which had to be strangled. Is this really so difficult to see? Only great simplicity—or even extreme naivety—could lead anyone to accept that Britain is defending the unity of Nigeria, or African Unity in general. She is defending her own economic interests. That may be natural and even understandable, but it is as well that it should be understood and not camouflaged by talk of a particular principle.

The Netherlands decision to stop the supply of arms to Nigeria after the capture of Port Harcourt and its oil-rich surrounding areas is a reflection of her assessment that the oil supplies were then assured. But the British wish to be more certain. I am told that Britain expects to get 25 per cent of her oil supply from Nigeria by 1972. With her traditional Middle East suppliers being (in her view) unreliable, this is a very serious matter indeed for industrial Britain.

From Britain's point of view, what is vital is her oil interests; as she decides on her own policy, this is what the war is about. The Biafrans are fighting a most unequal war, and if they go on fighting, God alone knows what their end will be. Completely blockaded as they are, Nigeria no longer needs to shoot them into submission. Starvation and disease can fight for Nigeria, and Britain can go on explaining to the world that this is inevitable and justifiable because it is part of warfare. Those who want peace before the Biafrans are wiped out must convince the British of one of two things. They have to be convinced that, in their present helpless position, the Biafrans are no longer a threat to British interests. And truly, the Biafrans know how weak they are; they are less interested in the oil than in their lives. This is the relatively easier thing to try and convince the British. The more difficult one is to try and convince Britain that her oil interests would be safe in an independent Biafra. But how could they know that Russia would not help Federal Nigeria to win total victory against the Biafrans? And if that happened, where would Britain be?

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The solution, as the present Government in the Sudan has rightly foreseen, lies in a constitution which recognizes both the unity of the Sudan, and the legitimate interests of the South. This is what Eastern Nigeria was asking for before it seceded; this is what the Aburi Agreement was all about. It was the refusal, by Lagos, to accept this necessity that finally led to secession and the present situation.

The fact is that the Peoples of Nigeria have less in common, historically, linguistically, culturally, and as regards religion, than the Peoples of Scandinavia. The only thing that the Peoples of Nigeria have in common is that they are all Africans and all have been under British rule for a few decades, and Britain governed them virtually separately. It would be infinitely easier for the Peoples of Scandinavia to form one nation than for the Peoples of Nigeria. Those who do not see this do not understand Nigeria's significance for Africa.

One final point must be made about this tragedy. In spite of attempts on both sides of the quarrel to bring in religion, the conflict between Nigeria and Biafra is not a religious one. Yet if it were, that would be simply an additional complication; it would not justify the war. In fact, however, there are Christians and Muslims on both sides; religion cuts across the divisions between the Peoples.

The True Lesson for Africa.

I said earlier that Africa is learning the wrong lesson from the Nigerian tragedy. We are saying that if Biafra is allowed to secede, every country in Africa is going to have its own Biafra. But what we are doing is looking at results without looking at the cause of those results, and then saying that the same results will happen elsewhere without there having been any causes. That is nonsense. But there is a very serious lesson to be learned from the present tragedy. We should learn that where in any African state there is a dominant group, whether that group is ethnic, religious or otherwise, it must wield its power and influence on behalf of all the elements which go to form that country. In particular, it should be very solicitous of the interests of the minorities, because they are the ones which need the protection of the State. If a dominant group does not act in this protective manner, then civil strife and consequent Biafras become inevitable. That is the lesson Africa should learn from the Nigerian tragedy.

We African leaders had a golden opportunity at the O.A.U. Summit Conference in Kinshasa, but we missed it because we were confused by the tribal domino theory. At that time the whole of Africa, including those countries which now recognise Biafra, supported the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Yet I believe that all States had some sympathy for the Easterners, who had already experienced a massacre of some 30,000 of their brethren, and who were trying to absorb nearly 2,000,000 refugees in the Eastern Region. Since we were all supporting Nigeria in its main objective of maintaining national unity, we should have used our moral strength to urge Nigeria to listen to those demands. We should have pointed out that under the circumstances of the two coups and the massacres, what they were asking was not only understandable but was also justifiable. Since we were supporting the Nigerian authorities in their efforts to keep Nigeria one, and since by that very support we were rejecting any claim by the East to secede, we were in a very strong position. We did not have to worry about Domino Theories and the Charter of the O.A.U. But we were so obsessed, bewitched and terrified by the Domino theory that we did not dare raise a voice for the Ibos even when we all supported the Federal Authority.

That opportunity was lost. But we must not therefore ever appear to acquiesce in the present situation of war and suffering. The least we can do is now to ask our brethren in both Nigeria and Biafra to stop

fighting and to begin talking about their future relations. It is being said that the situation has changed from what it was two years ago, and that Biafrans need no longer fear for their future. If that is the case, we should ask Nigeria to convince the Biafrans of it at a conference table. You cannot convince people that they are safe while you are shooting and starving them.

The O.A.U. was established by Heads of African States. But it is intended to serve the Peoples of Africa. The O.A.U. is not a trade union of African Heads of States. Therefore, if it is to retain the respect and support of the People of Africa, it must be concerned about the lives of the People of Africa. We must not just concern ourselves with our own survival as Heads of State; we must even be more concerned about peace and justice in Africa than we are about the sanctity of the boundaries we inherited. For the importance of these lies in the fact that their acceptance is the basis for peace and justice in our continent, and we all have a responsibility to the whole people of Africa in this regard.

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Many African Governments, some of them very good governments, have been overthrown through coups. Some countries have had more than one coup; but none of them has broken up. Only the Nigerian Federation is in danger, and this from the effects of failure to meet the legitimate interests of the Easterners, not directly because of the coups. And the fall of African Governments, however regrettable, is not the same thing as the disintegration of African countries. We must not be like the French monarch who said: "L'état c'est Moi"—"I am the State". The O.A.U. must sometimes raise a voice against those regimes in Africa, including independent Africa, who oppress the Peoples of Africa. In some countries in Africa it might be the only voice that can speak on behalf of the people. If we dare not do that, even in private, we shall deserve the scorn of those who accuse us of double standards...

In this connection we could learn a good lesson from our former masters. For European Governments are not often very polite to European regimes which fail to show respect for basic human rights within their own countries. Europeans do care about what happens to Europeans. (Sometimes, as in the case of Stanleyville, we are reminded of that fact rather unpleasantly). I think that is a lesson worth learning.

Thus, for example, European Governments do not invade Greece, for they respect the territorial integrity of fellow European States, but they have not left and will not leave, the Greek regime in any doubt at all about what they think of it. Yet what have the Greek Colonels done? They have carried out a military coup against a constitutionally established government, and are detaining and persecuting the supporters of the constitution—an occurrence so familiar in young Africa that it is hardly considered wrong any more.


If we do not learn to criticise injustice within our continent, we will soon be tolerating fascism in Africa, as long as it is practised by African Governments against African Peoples. Consider what our reaction would have been if the 30,000 Ibos had been massacred by whites in Rhodesia or South Africa. One can imagine the outcry from Africa. Yet these people are still dead; the colour of those who killed them is irrelevant. We must ask Nigeria to stop more killing now, and to deal with the problem by argument, not death.

Justice is indivisible. Africa, and the O.A.U., must act accordingly.

4th September, 1969

JULIUS K. NYERERE

0537





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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION AFI 18

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ORM 03, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10,
PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, E 15, INT 06, RSR 01, /179 W
244695

R 181730Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9063
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL 1 ALI LAGOS 8428

BRÜBECK CALLS ON PERMSECS AYIDA AND ASIODU

1. UNFORTUNATELY, NECESSARY LAST MINUTE CHANGE IN SCHEDULE PERMITTED ONLY 20 TO 30 MINUTES EACH WITH PERMSEC MININD ASIODU AND PERMSEC MINECD AYIDA, THUS GIVING LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE IN DEPTH PROBLEMS I HAD IN MIND. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED WHICH ARE OF INTEREST.
2. BOTH ASIODU AND AYIDA EMPHASIZED LITTLE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO ECONOMY AS A RESULT CIVILI WAR. ASIODU LOOKING AT PROBLEM FROM INDUSTRY SIDE SAW RESTORATION OF POWER IN LIBERATED AREA AS KEY FACTOR TO REHABILITATION WHILE AYIDA, FROM BROAD ECONOMIC PLANNING POINT OF VIEW, EMPHASIZED NEED FOR REPAIR AND REHABILITATION UNDER MAINTAINED INFRASTRUCTURE SUCH AS ROADS, RAILROAD AND PORTS.
3. AYIDA POINTED OUT THERE WAS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM AS RESULT OUTLAYS FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR ARMS BUT APPEARED CONFIDENT ECONOMY BECAUSE OF ITS BASIC RESILIENCY, COULD TIGHTEN FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROL SYSTEM EVEN FURTHER IF NECESSARY TO COPE WITH PROBLEM MILITARY IMPORTS.
4. BOTH AYIDA AND ASIODU EXPRESSED VIEW THAT REBEL

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By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



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MINI-PLANE RAIDS NOT HAVING SIGNIFICANT IMPACT NOR WAS IT LIKELY THAT THEY COULD. RESULTS PHYSICAL DAMAGE SMALL.

ALTHOUGH STEPPED UP HARASSMENT EFFORT COULD IN ITSELF DISCOURAGE WORKERS IN AREA--PRINCIPALLY OIL COMPANY EMPLOYEES ALTHOUGH THESE A PRETTY TOUGH BREED. ASIODU SUGGESTED REASON MORE ATTACKS NOT RPT NOT MADE BY MINI-PLANES WAS LACK OF IBO PILOTS, MANY OF WHOM LOST WHILE OFFICERING GROUND OPERATIONS.

5. ASIODU CRITICIZED US POLICY AS AMBIVALENT; SUGGESTED THAT WE GIVE FMG CLEAR VIEW OF PRECISELY WHAT US OBJECTIVES WERE, AND THAT THIS IMPORTANT IN EFFORTS TO ORIENT MILITARY LEADERS WHO UNSOPHISTICATED IN DIPLOMACY AND UNDERSTOOD ONLY SIMPLE, CLEAR-CUT EXPLANATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, ASIODU SUGGESTED THAT IN ANY CALLS FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS OR CEASEFIRE THAT THESE BE LINKED--IF INDEED THIS WERE TRUE--WITH OUR ANNOUNCED SUPPORT OF ONE NIGERIA. IN SHORT, IN PRESSING FOR PEACE TALKS, WE SHOULD DO SO STATING CLEARLY THAT OBJECTIVE WAS ONE NIGERIA. HE WAS OF OPINION MANY IBO LEADERS LIKE ZIK GIVEN OPPORTUNITY WOULD PART COMPANY WITH OJUKWU PARTICULARLY IF US POLICY OBJECTIVES CLEAR ON SUBJECT OF PEACE ON BASIS OF ONE NIGERIA. WITH RESPECT TO THESE "OTHER IBO LEADERS" HE COMMENTED "WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THEM".

6. I SUGGESTED TO ASIODU THAT SOLUTION TO REBELS USE OF STARVATION AS WEAPON GARNER POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE WAS TO ASSURE ADEQUATE INPUT OF FOOD. ASIODU NON-COMMITTAL BUT THEN SUGGESTED THAT FMG MIGHT VERY WELL FEEL AT SOME POINT THAT PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS WITHOUT FOOD MIGHT BE KINDER AND JUST WHAT WAS NEEDED TO CREATE FEELING OF HOPELESSNESS AND DESPAIR WHICH MIGHT BRING REBELS TO NEGOTIATING TABLE.

7. I SUGGESTED TO AYIDA THAT MAINTENANCE OF ULTI AIRFIELD VITAL TO REBELS AND MAINTENANCE OF OIL FLOW VITAL TO NIGERIA IN PURSUIT OF THEIR WAR EFFORT. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT ABILITY TO WAGE AERIAL WARFARE MIGHT BE KEY FACTOR, AYIDA DISCOUNTED THIS SAYING THAT REBEL MINI-PLANES COULD NOT, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, DESTROY NIGERIA'S CAPACITY PRODUCE AND EXPORT OIL AND ON OTHER HAND HE DID NOT BELIEVE NIGERIA COULD DESTROY ULTI FROM THE AIR. TO DO

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THAT GROUND ACTIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY.

8. AYIDA EMPHASIZED DIFFERENCE IN OUTLOOK BETWEEN AFRICAN STATES AND WESTERN STATES ON NIGERIAN PROBLEM, SAYING WEST VIEWED THE NIGERIAN CONFLICT AS A "PRIMITIVE TRIBAL PROBLEM" AND THEREFORE SIMPLY DEMANDED IT CEASE. TO AFRICAN STATES, THE INTEGRITY OF NIGERIA WAS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE. HE ILLUSTRATED BY DESCRIBING FIVE HOUR MEETING ON NIGERIAN PROBLEM AT ADDIS DURING WHICH ONLY TWO BRIEF REFERENCES WERE MADE ABOUT RELIEF (BY HIM AND GOWON). HAD MEETING BEEN WESTERN MEETING ON NIGERIA, FOUR OF FIVE HOURS WOULD HAVE BEEN ON RELIEF. GP-I OLSON
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SCSE 00, SCA 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, OSS 20, RSR 01, /156 W

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R 181400Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9047
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BATHURST
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
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USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS: LAGOS: 8407

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP SEPTEMBER 18

1. PEACE TALKS: TRYBUNE AND POST REPORT GOWON RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM WCC SECGEN CARSON BLAKE WELCOMING GOWONS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH REBELS IN SEARCH OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO CRISIS. MESSAGE ALSO INDICATED THAT SIMILAR ONE HAD BEEN SENT TO OJUKWU.

2. GAMBIAN PM JAWARA VISIT CONTINUES TO GET GOOD COVERAGE. RETURNING TO LAGOS SEPT 18 FOR TALKS AND STATE DINNER THIS EVENING. DEPARTING SEPT 19.

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3. RELIEF TIMES REPORTS SWEDISH FORMIN STATEMENT IN NEW YORK THAT HE FOUND IT QTE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND UNQUOTE REBEL REJECTION DAYLIGHT FLIGHT AGREEMENT. PILOT CARRIES TEXT OF U.S. STATEMENT ON RELIEF. SEPT 17 NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL STATES REBEL REJECTION OF FLIGHTS NOT SURPRISING SINCE REBELS QTE NEVER HAD ANY INTEREST IN RELIEF SUPPLIES WHICH DID NOT AFFORD COVER FOR ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS UNQUOTE. COMMENTS THAT QTE PREDICTABLY UNQUOTE WESTERN PRESS AND ICRC REACTIONS TO REJECTION MILD, AND ASKS WHAT REACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN IF IT HAD BEEN FMG WHO REJECTED AGREEMENT. SAYS THAT ICRC MUST STICK TO AGREEMENT AND TRY TO PERSUADE REBELS TO ACCEPT DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS BECAUSE IT WOULD BE QTE INTOLERABLE UNQUOTE IF FMG NOW ASKED TO ACCEPT SOME ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT. STATES QTE NO DOUBT THERE WILL BE CHORUS OF APPEALS (TO FMG FOR MORE CONCESSIONS) FROM WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, PRESS AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS. TO ALL THESE FMG SHOULD REMAIN FIRM AND IGNORE THEM UNQUOTE. TIMES EDITORIAL STATES THAT REBEL REJECTION OF DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS SHOULD SHOW ALL ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SO SYMPATHETIC TO OJUKWU QTE HORROR STORIES OF ALLEGED STARVATION UNQUOTE THAT REBELS MORE INTERESTED IN ARMS THAN RELIEF ROR SUFFERING CIVILIANS AND CALLS ON THEM TO WITHDRAW SYMPATHY FOR OJUKWU IMMEDIATELY.

4. EXPRESS ONLY PAPER SO FAR TO PICK UP REPORT THAT SIERRA LEONE PM QUOTED IN BRITISH NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW AS STATING THAT SIERRA LEONE MAY RECOGNIZE BIAFRA.

5. EXPRESS REPORTS THAT COLONEL SHUWA COMMANDER OF FIRST DIVISION WILL BE LEAVING HIS COMMAND FOR NEW POST IN LAGOS QTE WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK UNQUOTE AND COL. BISALLA PREPARING TO GO TO ENUGU TO ASSUME COMMAND. CHANGE COMES OVER THREE MONTHS AFTER IT ORIGINALLY ANNOUNCED WITHOUT DEFINITE DATE FOR CHANGE TO TAKE EFFECT.

6. TIMES CARRIES EUTERS REPORT THAT ZAMBIAN SOURCE HAS STATED AZIKIWE WOULD BE UNWELCOME IN ZAMBIA. OLSON

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, UCF 05, E 15, INT 06, AID 28, IOI 13, COM 08, CIAE 00,

JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20

USIA 12, RSR 01, /175 W

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RI 181113Z SEP 69

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9038
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
DIA
CINCSTRIKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L L A G O S 8397

SUBJECT: AIR STRIKE ON OIL INSTALLATION

1. SHELL-BP OFFICIAL HAS CONFIRMED REPORTS CIRCULATING HERE THAT BIAFRAN AIRCRAFT ROCKETED COMPANY'S QUALITY CONTROL CENTER AT UGHELLI, MIDWESTERN STATE, MONDAY SEPTEMBER 15. SAYS NO ONE HURT, DAMAGE WAS "INCONSEQUENTIAL" AND SMALLER THAN IN JUNE 18 ATTACK ON SAME TARGET, WHEN SEVERAL DENTS AND SMALL HOLES MADE IN OIL STORAGE TANK. STATED THAT SHELL-BP CONTINUES TO OPERATE MIDWESTERN EVACUATION SYSTEM AT "MODEST" RATE. UGHELLI CONTROL CENTER IS PART OF THIS SYSTEM BUT STORAGE TANKS ARE NOT BEING USED BECAUSE OF DANGER. TO FILLED TANKS FROM AIR ATTACKS. SAID REPORTS THAT CONTROL CENTER WAS STRUCK AGAIN SEPTEMBER 16 ARE FALSE AND THAT MONDAY INCIDENT IS ONLY AIR ATTACK ON SHELL-BP FACILITIES SINCE STRIKE AT KOKORI FLOW STATION JULY 28.

2. SOURCE, WHO RETURNED FROM UGHELLI-WARRI-SAPELE AREA SEPTEMBER 17, STATES THAT BIAFRAN RADIO CLAIM (REPORTED FBIS SEPTEMBER 17) OF AIR ATTACK ON SAPELE IS FALSE. ALSO CONFIRMS THAT BIAFRAN RADIO CLAIM (FBIS: SEPT. 14) THAT BIAFRAN FORCES HAD CAPTURED ALL OIL FIELDS EAST OF NIGER RIVER IS FALSE.

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3. COMMENT: THIS IS FOURTH AIR ATTACK ON OIL INDUSTRY,
OF WHICH THREE ON SHELL-BP AND ONE ON GULF, ALL IN
MIDWESTERN STATE. GP-4

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10/15/05

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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*Research
Memorandum*

RAF-19, September 18, 1969

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. h.c.d.
Subject: The OAU Summit Meeting in Addis Ababa: A Repeat Performance

The sixth summit conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) September 6-10, confined itself mainly to reaffirming previous positions. Behind the scenes, however, moderates apparently made further progress in clipping the wings of the free-wheeling African Liberation Committee (ALC). The heads of state also endorsed the temperately phrased Manifesto on Southern Africa, adopted last April by 14 nations at Lusaka. Efforts to promote a Nigerian settlement, despite numerous speeches and special consultations, made no headway. Notwithstanding their limited accomplishments, the heads of state still seem to regard their annual get-together as a useful forum and intra-African meeting ground.

Reaffirmations:

(1) The Middle East. The Israeli raid of September 9 across the Suez Canal brought African leaders at the summit to underline their support for the UAR in stronger terms than hitherto employed, leading them to condemn "this act of aggression" and to appeal "to the conscience of mankind." Earlier at the meeting the heads of state had simply reiterated the resolution of the fifth summit calling for the withdrawal of troops from all Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The UAR, unlike Israel (which is not represented in the OAU), could increase the support it already had by horse trading on other issues. The Israelis were not too upset, knowing that voting at the OAU was no real indicator of the number of their friends in Africa.

(2) Apartheid and Colonialism. The final text of the resolution on decolonization and apartheid (which we have not yet seen) probably follows closely the draft version submitted by the political committee to the plenary session of the Council of Ministers immediately preceding the summit meeting. The draft praises the armed struggle of African rebel

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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XR POL 13 AFR XR POL 27 BIAFRA-
NIGERIA

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ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00, /071 W

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RI 171033Z SEP 69
FM: AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 9029
INFO USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L L A G O S : 8 3 7 7

SUBJECT: CROSS RIVER ROUTE

LIMDIS

FOR: U/C/F

1. UKHC HAS INFORMED US THAT IN MEETING WITH ARIKPO RECENTLY, UKHC COMMERGED FMG IMPROVE ITS REPRESENTATION AT CROSS RIVER TALKS IN GENEVA. ARIKPO AGREED THAT FEDERAL REPRESENTATION INADEQUATE SO FAR "AND SAID THEY WERE THINKING OF STRENGTHENING IT." HOWEVER, ARIKPO "SHOWED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PROJECT." GP-3
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
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Addis Ababa 4/92
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INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCFI 05, UPW 01, SCS 04, SCA 01, SRI 01, ORM 03,
AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, RSR 01, ZT72 W
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RE 171545Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 950
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 4192

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

1. ZAMBIAN AMBASSADOR MAKASA WHO CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING SAID HE MUCH ENCOURAGED BY GOWON'S REQUEST GOOD OFFICES GABON ARRANGE ROUND TABLE BIAFRANS HE NOTED FIRST STEP WOULD NEED CEASE FIRE IF OOUKWU EXPECTED ATTEND.

2. HE THOUGHT ROUND TABLE MIGHT BE SET UP UNDER OBOTE'S OR HIM'S CHAIRMANSHIP EITHER ACCEPTABLE TO BIAFRANS WHEN I QUESTIONED HIM HE SAID BIAFRANS CONSIDERED EMPEROR FAIR AND IMPARTIAL AND COMPLETELY ACCEPTABLE HE CITED HIM'S AVOIDANCE OF EXTREME AND COLORFUL LANGUAGE AND SINCERE EFFORT UNDERSTAND BIAFRAN POSITION AS PRINCIPAL FACTOR THEIR VIEW HE COULD ACT AS MEDIATOR.
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JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20,

USIA 12, RSR 01, /150 W

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R 171640Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3729
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
USUN NEW YORK 75
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria
VR POL 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

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SUBJECT: STEVENS HINTS SLI RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA

REFERENCE: FREETOWN 932 AND 962 (NOTAL)

1. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS, PM SIAKA STEVENS STATED IN LONDON INTERVIEW WITH FINANCIAL TIMES THAT SIERRA LEONE MAY RECOGNIZE BIAFRA IF INITIATIVES TO STOP FIGHTING ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL.

2. IFI PM'S REMARKS REPORTED CORRECTLY, IT MARKS FIRST OFFICIAL DEPARTURE FROM POSITION GOSL HAD HERETOFORE TAKEN -- NAMELY, SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN UNITY. IN FACT, WHEN PM IN LONDON JUST PRIOR OAU SUMMIT, HE STATED "TO US, THERE IS ONLY ONE NIGERIA".

3. IFI OFFICIAL GOSL POSITION HAS INDEED CHANGED, IT IS NOT SURPRISING. THERE IS OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERABLE PRO-BIAFRAN FEELING IN SL, PM'S AND CABINET INCLUDED (SEE REFTELS), AND SLI ABSTENTION ON OAU RESOLUTION SUPPORTING

NIGERIAN UNITY MAY HAVE BEEN INDICATION NEW GOSL TACK.

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4. THERE IS, HOWEVER, LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN SLI'S BECOMING INVOLVED IN CONTROVERSY. IN SPITE OF BIAFRAN SYMPATHY, PRESSURE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN SLI IS BY NO MEANS SO GREAT THAT GOVERNMENT COMPELLED TO ACT. TIMING OF PM'S REPORTED STATEMENT IS ALSO BAFFLING COMING AS IT DOES, AFTER OAU MEETING AND BIAFRAN OBSTACLES RELIEF FLIGHTS. IT IS CONCEIVABLE ALTHOUGH HARDLY CREDIBLE THAT GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THREAT SLI RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA WILL HELP PRESSURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA INTO NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT BOTH PM AND MINISTER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FORAY SPOKE WITHOUT ADVICE CABINET, WHICH, IN SPITE OF SYMPATHY FOR BIAFRA, MIGHT HAVE SERIOUS SECOND THOUGHTS IF AND WHEN TIME COMES TO MAKE CRUCIAL DECISION RE RECOGNITION.
MINER

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Department of State *POL 7 Biafra*
158407
XL POL 27 Biafra Nigeria

TELEGRAM

17 SEP 69 22 51z

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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: All Latin American Diplomatic Posts

STATE:

Subject: Biafran Official in Latin America

Code Room: Please pass Lagos 8379 to all addressees.

End.

ROGERS

DRAFTED BY
AF/SN:BBR:GW
CLEARANCES:

DRAFTING DATE 9/17/69 TEL. EXT. 23406 APPROVED BY
AF/SN - Mr. Sherry

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POL 1 Biafra.
XR POL 27 Biafra Nigeria
Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 08379 171251Z

52
ACTION AFTIB

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, ARA 12, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPMI 04, HI 02, INRI 07, LI 03,
NSAEI 00, NSC 10, P 03, RBC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, IO 13, AID 08,
SR 01, ORM 03, PC 04, EI 15, UCF 05, RSR 01, / 181 W 034411

R 171047Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9030
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

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DEPT PASS ALL LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

SUBJ: OTE BIAFRAN UNGTE OFFICIAL IN LATIN AMERICA

- (2) 1. EMBASSY NOTES FROM FBI'S PUERTO RICO ITEM SEPT 16 THAT
OTE BIAFRAN FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC MINISTER UNGTE PIUS
OKIGBO MADE STATEMENTS IN MONTEVIDEO ABOUT NIGERIAN
CIVIL WAR STRESSING OTE RELIGIOUS ASPECT UNGTE AS
PRINCIPAL REASON FOR CIVIL WAR.
2. POSTS ARE REMINDED THAT EMBASSY IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED
IN ACTIVITIES OTE BIAFRAN UNGTE OFFICIALS AND THE
PUBLICITY GIVEN THEIR VISITS AS WELL AS REACTIONS OF
LOCAL OFFICIALS TO THESE STATEMENTS. DECON 9/17770
OLSON

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T

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POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
xr POL 27-3 Biafra

CONFIDENTIAL 640

PAGE 01 PARIS 14040 161240Z.

58
ACTION SS:70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00, 071 W

026175

R 161218Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7119
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LISBON

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 14040

LIMDIS

SUBJ: ROBERT MOORE JONES: FISHING FOR MERCENARY ROLE BIAFRA

(4) 1. ROBERT MOORE JONES CALLED EMBASSY, IDENTIFYING SELF AS UPI REPORTER, TO ASCERTAIN PRESENT STATUS SITUATION NIGERIA. HE WAS ADVISED EMBASSY HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO PRESS COVERAGE, BUT EMBOFF ACCDED TO HIS REQUEST TO TALK ABOUT PERSONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR VISIT.

2. DISPLAYING A UPI PRESS CARD STAMPED FOR CIRCULATION IN ISRAEL, JONES CAME RIGHT TO THE POINT THAT HIS MAIN INTEREST WAS NOT NEWS COVERAGE, BUT TO MAKE MONEY AS A MERCENARY. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THE USG WOULD THINK ABOUT THAT AND WHICH SIDE THE USG IS ON IN THE CONFLICT. JONES THEN REVIEWED HIS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE USG IN VIETNAM AND INDONESIA, SAYING HE REALLY DOES NOT CARE WHAT THE USG THINKS.

3. JONES HAS TALKED TO MR. DIKE (CHIJI DIKE, BIAFRAN REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS) SEVERAL TIMES. HE HAS OFFERED THE BIAFRANS A MERCENARY GROUP OF THIRTY-ONE MEN WITHOUT EQUIPMENT. THE COMPLEMENT WOULD BE A MIXTURE OF AUSTRALIANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS AND SOME FRENCH OR BELGIANS. HE KNOWS FROM CONGO DAYS. THE BIAFRAN OFFICE IN PARIS SAID THEY ARE INTERESTED AND MADE A TENTATIVE OFFER OF USD 500 PER MONTH IN CASH AND ANOTHER USD 1,000 PER MONTH WHEN THE CONTRACT WOULD BE COMPLETED. JONES NOTED THE VERY TENTATIVE NATURE OF THE DEAL AND HIS SUSPICIONS THAT THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANY MONEY FORTHCOMING WHEN ALL IS SAID.

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PAGE 02 PARIS 14040 161240Z

AND DONE. HOWEVER, HE PLANS TO TRAVEL "SOON" TO LISBON TO INTERVIEW THE BIAFRAN MAN THERE TO WHOM DIKE REFERRED HIM.

4. EVERY EFFORT WAS MADE TO DISCOURAGE JONES FROM PURSUING HIS QUEST FOR RICHES, BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT WILL BE THE PROSPECTS FOR THOSE RICHES WHICH WILL INFLUENCE HIS DECISION, ASSUMING HE CAN MANAGE THE REST OF THE PACKAGE.
GP-1.

SHRIVER

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L I M D I S

TOP SECRET IN C O M I N G Screener *J*

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<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>		<u>MONTHLY COUNT</u>
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for Pol 27-14 Biafra -

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Nigeria

PAGE 01 LONDON 07439 162022Z

83
ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00, 071 W

029376

R 161749Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2882
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 7439

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: BRUBECK TALKS IN LONDON

SUMMARY: BRUBECK, MINISTER AND WALKER HAD LONG AND FRANK TALK WITH FOLEY, TEBBIT AND WILSON ON SEPT. 15. MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST: MBANEFO HAS BEEN URGING BRITISH FOR SOME TIME SEND PRIVATE PEACE PROBE MISSION BIAFRA; BRITISH HAVE CONSIDERED SENDING MACDONALD AND LORD HUNT (ALPINIST, NOT FORMER HICOMER); HAVE EXPLORED SUBJECT WITH GOWON THREE TIMES WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, AND MISSION NOT LIKELY TO OCCUR SOON. BRITISH CONCERNED WITH POTENTIAL ESCALATION AIR WAR AND ITS EFFECT ON GOWON'S POSITION. HAVE JUST COMPLETED EXPERT SURVEY FMG AIR CAPABILITY. UK MUCH CONCERNED WITH FRENCH MOTIVES AND STEWART HOPES FOR HEART TO HEART TALK WITH SCHUMANN AT UN.

(2) 1. BRITISH ARE PLEASED WITH FMG PERFORMANCE ON ICRC FLIGHT AGREEMENT BUT SKEPTICAL THAT ICRC WILL FORCE ISSUE BY FLYING IN FACE BIAFRAN REJECTION. THEY SKEPTICAL BIAFRA SYMPATHIZERS IN GROUP OF 12 WILLING PUT ON THIS PRESSURE. FOLEY SAID NORWEGIAN STATE SECURITY (JOHANNESEN?) WHO RECENTLY TOURED AFRICA BEING SENT BIAFRA TO EXPRESS NORWEGIAN CONCERN EFFECT BIAFRAN REJECTION ON THEIR POSITION IN WORLD OPINION. FOLEY AND BRUBECK AGREED COLLAPSE ICRC PROGRAM WILL POSE DIFFICULT PROBLEM BUT CONTINUED RELIEF NECESSARY. BRUBECK EMPHASIZED US FEELS SOME FORM ADEQUATE RELIEF PROGRAM, PERHAPS EXPANDED JCA, WILL BE NECESSARY. THEY EXCHANGED COMPLIMENTS ON RESPECTIVE

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ROLES IN LAGOS IN PERSUADING FMG AGREE TO FLIGHTS AND BRITISH OBVIOUSLY FEEL LESLIE GLASS HAS MUCH IMPROVED BRITISH PERFORMANCE LAGOS. IF FMG RESENTFUL WHEN ICRC PROGRAM COLLAPSES, FOLEY CONCERNED GLASS'S INFLUENCE WILL BE HURT, HAVING PUT PRESTIGE ON LINE IN ISSUE.

2. AGREED THAT, HAVING USED HIGH LEVEL PRESSURE ON GOWON, NOW DESIRABLE HAVE HIGH LEVEL EXPRESSION APPRECIATION GOWON'S PERFORMANCE. FOLEY IS PROPOSING PMI SEND MESSAGE (AND MAKE PUBLIC) AND BRUBECK AGREED TAKE UP QUESTION WASHINGTON.

3. RE BIAFRAN SECURITY GUARANTEE DEMAND, FOLEY SAID BRITISH ARE CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY SCANDANAVIAN RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE EACH PLANE AS OBSERVER. BRUBECK SAID SIMILAR IDEA HAD BEEN RAISED IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONED CANADIAN AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. FOLEY ARGUED BIAFRANS INSISTENCE ON GOVERNMENTAL SECURITY GUARANTEE IS EVIDENCE POLITICAL MOTIVATION IN BIAFRAN POSITION. BRUBECK GAVE BRIEF REVIEW EFFORTS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS INFLUENCE BIAFRA IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

4. ON SUBJECT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, BRITISH REPORTS OF ADDIS ORI ANYTHING STILL AFOOT POST ADDIS ARE INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSED AS OURS. THEY SEEKING FURTHER INFORMATION FROM DAR ES SALAAM. THEY NOT CLEAR WHAT, IF ANY, RELATION HIM HAS TO NYERERE MANEUVERS. THINK AT LEAST NYERERE MAY HAVE SOMETHING STILL GOING. FOLEY SUGGESTED DYORI AS POSSIBLY USEFUL IN MEDIATOR ROLE WITH FMG.

5. STRESSING SENSITIVITY, FOLEY SAID MBANEFO HAS BEEN URGING BRITISH OVER PERIOD OF MONTHS SEND PRIVATE PEACE PROBE MISSION BIAFRA. (HE MENTIONED NO OTHER SOURCE THIS IDEA.) HE SAID MACDONALD AND LORD HUNT (EMPHATICALLY NOT FORMER HICOMER HUNT) HAD BEEN AGREED AS ACCEPTABLE. GLASS HAS RAISED SUBJECT WITH GOWON THREE TIMES, HAS BEEN VETOED EACH TIME, AND BRITISH FEEL REACTION REFLECTS GOWON SENSITIVITY ABOUT BEING OUT MANEUVERED BY OJUKWU. THEY THINK GOWON FEARFUL OF ANY RELATION BETWEEN UK AND OJUKWU AND OF POTENTIAL FOR WEAKENING BRITISH COMMITMENT FMG. IDEA STILL ALIVE BUT UK UNWILLING PRESS GOWON ON MATTER, AND NO MISSION PRESENTLY IN PROSPECT. BRITISH WOULD LIKE SOMEONE TO "DO A JARRING". BRITISH ARE SKEPTICAL OF PRESENT RASH OF PRESS RELEASES BY BOTH SIDES RE WILLINGNESS NEGOTIATE BUT ARE INTERESTED IN OJUKWU.

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FORMULATION RE PRELIMINARY TALKS THROUGH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS ON BOTH SIDES. BRITISH SKEPTICAL EITHER SIDE REALLY WANTS NEGOTIATE AT THIS TIME. FOLEY ASSERTED THAT WHILE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION NOT NOW A PROBLEM, PRESS IS HOSTILE TO HMG POLICY AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION SUBSTANTIAL (ALTHOUGH NOW LATENT) ON BOTH RELIEF AND ARMS SUPPLY ISSUES. HE ASKED ABOUT US POLITICAL PRESSURES AND BRÜBECK REVIEWED BRIEFLY INTEREST OF CHURCH GROUPS, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, ETC.

6. BRITISH ARE MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT FRENCH ROLES AND MOTIVES. UK EMBASSY PARIS (PALLISER) TALKING TO LEBEL FREQUENTLY TO TRY TO IMPROVE DIALOGUE. BRITISH CONCERNED FRENCH GOAL MAY BE DISSOLUTION NIGERIA AND SUBSTANTIAL WEAKENING UK POSITION WEST AFRICA. WOULD LIKE TO PIN DOWN FRENCH ON WHETHER SOLUTION WITHIN SOME CONTEXT OF ONE NIGERIA ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. STEWART HOPES FOR EXTENSIVE TALK WITH SCHUMANN AT UN THIS MONTH TO FURTHER EXPLORE QUESTION FRENCH POLICY AND PURPOSE. BRÜBECK GAVE BRIEF ACCOUNT FRENCH POSITION ON ICRC NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS AGREED WE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH ON ANY EVIDENCE OF WHAT FRENCH PREPARED TO DO.

7. RE SOVIETS, WHILE BRITISH SEEM REASONABLY CALM ABOUT SOVIET ROLE SO LONG AS BRITISH CONTINUE ARMS SUPPLY, FOLEY SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO RECENT HMG QUERY SOVIETS SAID FLATLY WOULD CONTINUE SUPPLY ARMS REGARDLESS WHAT BRITISH OR OTHERS DID. WHILE UK FEELS CEASEFIRE COUPLED TO ARMS EMBARGO WOULD BE VIABLE FIRST STEP ON PEACE AGENDA, THEY FEEL IT COULD ONLY BE ENFORCED AT THE POINT OF DELIVERY BY IMPARTIAL INSPECTORS, AND CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT ARMS EMBARGO ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE POSED IN IMPRACTICAL FORM.

8. BRITISH SENT TWO EXPERTS LAST MONTH WHO DID THOROUGH STUDY STATE OF FMG AIR FORCE AND APPRAISAL OF FMG AIRDEFENSE CAPABILITIES. THEY AGREED FURNISH US WITH REPORT ON SENSITIVE BASIS. THEY CONCERNED THAT AIR WAR IS POTENTIAL DESTABILIZING ELEMENT ON BOTH SIDES, THAT BIAFRAN AIR FORCE HAS CAPABILITY INFlicting SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC DAMAGE, AND PER EXPERT REPORT CITED ABOVE, NIGERIAN CAPABILITY DEFENDING OIL INSTALLATIONS VERY LIMITED. BRITISH APPRAISAL FMG MILITARY CAPABILITY PESSIMISTIC BUT THEY INCLINED THINK AS MATTERS NOW GOING SOLUTION MAY TURN ON MILITARY VICTORY. BRITISH CONCERNED THAT FOREIGN PRESSURES ON GOWON TO BE

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MODERATE IN FACE HAWK PRESSURES COUPLED WITH CONTINUED MILITARY FRUSTRATIONS MAKE GOWON'S POLITICAL POSITION DIFFICULT. THEY FEEL LOSS OF GOWON WOULD BE SERIOUS BLOW TO HOPE FOR SENSIBLE SOLUTION PROBLEM.

9. BRITISH FEEL HOUPHOUET COULD BE IMPORTANT FACTOR AND URGED BRUBECK VISIT ABIDJAN. THEY ALSO URGED BRUBECK RETURN THROUGH LONDON AT END OF TRIP AND HE AGREED IF POSSIBLE WOULD DO SO.

ANNENBERG

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L I M D I S

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Principals and "S" Area

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
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 00898 161641Z

46
ACTION AF: 18:

INFO OCT 01, EURI 17, UCFI 05, AID 28, UPW 01, IO 13, CIA 04, DODE 00, JPM 04,

H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12,

RSR 01, /151 W

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R 164307 SEP 69
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1318
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL IBADAN

BT
CONFIDENTIAL KADUNA 0898

REFI KADUNA 888

SUBJECT: ZIK'S SPEECHES AT KADUNA

ALONG WITH SEVERAL IMPROMPTU PRESS CONFERENCES, AZIKIWE GAVE TWO FAIRLY FORMAL ADDRESSES WHILE AT KADUNA: ONE AT NORTH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RECEPTION SEPTEMBER 11 IN REPLY TO NC MILGOV KYARI'S WELCOMING REMARKS (FBIS 260 SEPTEMBER 15); AND A LONG INTERVIEW ON KADUNA TV SEPTEMBER 12 (FBIS REF. NOT YET AVAILABLE) AT NO TIME HE USED A PREPARED TEXT.

COMMENT: ZIK FOLLOWED SAME LINE HE HAS USED SINCE RETURNING TO NIGERIA, I.E., HE COERCED INTO HELPING REBELS AND HE NOW DEVOTING ALL EFFORTS TO RECONCILIATION AND ASSURANCES OF SAFETY AND WELCOME FOR IBOS THROUGHOUT NIGERIA. INTERESTING TO KYARI NOWHERE MENTIONED NORTH WOULD WELCOME IBOS BUT IN REPLY ZIK PUT WORDS IN KYARI'S MOUTH: "YOUR EXCELLENCY HAS PLACED IT ON RECORD THAT AS FAR AS NORTH CENTRAL STATE CONCERNED YOU SUPPORT THE CAUSE OF PEACE; YOU SUPPORT THE RETURN OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN MISLED TO DECLARE A WAR ON THEIR FATHERLAND..."

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PAGE 02 KADUNA 00898 161641Z

YOU ALSO GAVE AN ASSURANCE IMPLICITLY THAT WHEN THEY RETURN THEY WILL BE TREATED AS EQUALS WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION WHATSOEVER." KYARI NEITHER SAID OR IMPLIED ANY SUCH THING.

IN TV INTERVIEW ZIKI ATTEMPTED ELABORATE, DETAILED DEFENSE OF HIS ACTIONS DURING PAST THREE YEARS. HE SPOKE, FOR INSTANCE, OF BEING HANDLED PREPARED TEXTS EVERY TIME HE MADE AN ADDRESS AND OF BEING LITERALLY LED LIKE MARIONETTE AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES HE ATTENDED WITH OJUKWU. HIS DEFENSE SINGULARLY UNCONVINCING, AND THOUGH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN GUARDED IN THEIR COMMENTS, WE GET IMPRESSION ZIKI DID NOT GO OVER TOO WELL WITH NORTHERNERS MOST OF WHOM CONSIDER HIM UNTRUSTWORTHY POLITICIAN RENDERING USEFUL TEMPORARY SERVICE TOWARD ENDING REBELLION.

STEPHAN

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43
Pal 15-1 US/Mr. Nixon
MR MN 3 CA
Pal 27 Biafra-Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 767

PAGE 01 USUN N 03050 170010Z

89
ACTION ID: 15

INFO OCT 01 RSR 01 AFI 12 UCF 05 SS 20 JPMI 04 NSCI 00 CIAE 00 INR 07

NSAEI 00 RSE 01 SSO 00 0076 W

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P 162243Z SEP 69

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8627

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 3050

SUBJ: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN GA

1. AMB AKE (IVORY COAST) APPROACHED MISOFF TO MAKE REQUEST THAT PRESIDENT NIXON, IN HIS GENERAL DEBATE STATEMENT IN GA SEPT 18, APPEAL FOR CEASEFIRE IN NIGERIA AND URGE BOTH SIDES TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

2. AKE ALSO WONDERED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR YOST TO SEE TWO MEMBERS OF A BIAFRAN DELEGATION WHO ARE CURRENTLY IN NEW YORK AND PRESUMABLY WILL BE LOBBYING IN UN. AKE WAS UNABLE GIVE NAMES BUT SAID ONE OF MEMBERS WAS RECTOR OF UNIVERSITY AND THE OTHER WAS THE COMMISSIONER FOR EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE, MISSION PLANS CONTINUE CONTACTS WITH BIAFRANS AT PRESENT LEVEL. WE WILL HOLD OUT NO HOPE THAT CEASE-FIRE WILL BE MENTIONED IN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.

3. SUBSEQUENT TO DRAFTING ABOVE, OTUE (BIAFRAN REP IN US) CALLED MISOFF TO INQUIRE WHETHER YOST COULD SEE BIAFRAN OFFICIALS MENTIONED ABOVE (SEPT 17). OTUE SAID BIAFRAN REPS WERE DR ENI NJOKU (PRES OF BIAFRAN UNIVERSITY) AND DR EKE (MIN OF INFO). OTUE SAID BOTH MEN HAD PARTICIPATED IN VARIOUS NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE ON NIGERIAN SITUATION GP4.

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POL 27-14 Biafra - Nigeria

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 345!

PAGE 01 IBADAN 00280 160826Z

22
ACTION: AFI 18:

INFO: OCT 01, UCFI 05, CTAEL 00, DDDEI 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NSAEI 00,
NSC 10, PI 03, RSCI 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AIDI 28, SR 01, ORM 03,
SCS 04, SCA 01, UPW 01, IDI 13, EURI 17, RSRI 01, /156 W
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R 151620Z SEP 69

FM: AMCDNSUL I BADAN

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 901

INFO: AMEMBASSY LABOS

AMCONSUL KADUNA.

CIO/NIFI/DIE/NIT I A/LIBADAN 280

NOFORN

SUBJECT: WESTERN NIGERIA OFFICIAL CRITICAL OF NIGERIAN HAWKS

REFID: IBADAN 279

1. THERE CONTINUES TO BE CONSIDERABLE SENTIMENT IN WESTERN NIGERIA IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATED PEACE SETTLEMENT THOUGH OFFICIAL PUBLIC LINE AND MOST OF PUBLIC MEDIA CONTINUE HAWKISH. THIS HAS EVEN BEEN TRUE AG-OWNED NIGERIAN TRIBUNE, WHICH IS WHY EDITORIAL SUMMARIZED REFTEL SEEMED WORTH REPORTING.

2. AG SYMPATHIZERS HAVE TENDED SWING BACK AND FORTH ON THIS ISSUE BUT ANOTHER INDICATION THEY MAY BE SWINGING TOWARDS FAVORING PEACE TALKS WAS ATTITUDE OF TOP CIVIL SERVANT PETER ODUMOSU DURING COURTESY CALL TO INTRODUCE GAY TODAY WHILE ODUMOSU IS NON-POLITICAL CIVIL SERVANT HIS SYMPATHIES GENERALLY AG.

3. ODUMOSU (PROTECT) STRONGLY FAVERED PEACE TALKS WITHDUT PRE-CONDITIONS AS AGREED BY GDWN AND STRONGLY CRITICAL OF EMG OFFICIALS WHO APPEAR TO BE DEPARTING FROM LINE LAID DOWN BY CHIEF OF STATE ACCUSED ENAHORO OF PLAYING POLITICS BY HAWKISH STATEMENTS AND EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT STATEMENT BY ARIKPO DNI TV PROGRAM WHICH APPEARED TO MAINTAIN AS PRECONDITION FOR TALKS "BIAFRAN" ACCEPTANCE OF NIGERIAN UNITY. ODUMOSU SAID HE (ODUMOSU) ND LESS

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ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY
Amconsul ENUGU "
Amconsul KADUNA "
Amconsul IBADAN "

STATE _____

Following is text of Dept spokesman noon briefing, Wednesday, Sept. 13:

Q: Would you comment on the reports a Sov Foreign Affairs commentator has charged that American Negroes in the military are helping the rebels in Nigeria?

A: I've looked into this report and to the best of our knowledge there is no truth in it. FOR BACKGROUND, I would say obviously we can't be one hundred percent certain. However, if any basis for it were found, we would undertake every step to discourage such activity.

Q: He also mentioned US aid --

A: I would tend to discount it almost entirely.

Q: How about aid in the form of any supplies or anything going to the rebels from the US?

A: We have no military aid program in Nigeria.

Q: What was the question -- that the American Negroes in the military service are helping the rebels in Nigeria?

Drafted by AF:AF/P:RLPerkins:esw 9/13/67 Tel. Ext. 2166 Telegraphic transmission end classification approved by AF - Ambassador Trimble

Clearences:

AF/P - Mr. Stansbury ES

AFW - Mr. Melbourne km

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY

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A: Yes.

Q: What American military forces do we have in Nigeria?

A: In Nigeria, none, except I think the Military Attaché at our Embassy in Lagos.

Q: Is he a Negro?

A: Offhand, I don't know.

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taxxizthinkzxonzxmixingzthezlongzandzNigerianx

QxxRoxhaxpx

Q: If we have no military forces and simply a Military Attaché, why would you tend to discount this but say you can't be absolutely certain ON BACKGROUND?

A: The allegation is that military specialists -- I think is the phrase used -- are assisting the forces in the eastern region. I'm simply allowing for a little protection here that if an American citizen were in the area the possibility that he may somehow be engaged. We have no reason to believe this, but I don't want to have you come back to me in a few days and say that they have identified some American citizen. But so far as American military is concerned, that's nonsense.

END


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CONTINUATION SHEET

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

(1) CONFIDENTIAL 884

PAGE 01 KADUNA 00888 130948Z

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17 ACTION AFT 18

INFO OCT 01 EUR 17 CLAEI 00 DODE 00 JPMI 04 H 02 INR 07 PL 03 NSE 00,
NSC 10 P 03 RSC 01 PRS 01 SS 20 USIA 12 AID 28 IO 13 UCF 05,

UPW 01 SR 01 ORM 03 RSR 01 /151 W

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R 130845Z SEP 69

FMI AMCONSUL KADUNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1313

INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMCONSUL IBADAN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

COUNFI DNE NI I ALI KADUNA 0888

SUBJECT: ZIK'S VISIT TO NORTHERN STATES

1. FOLLOWING BRIEF VISIT SOKOTO MORNING SEPTEMBER 11 DR. NNAMDI AZIKWE ARRIVED KADUNA BY EXECUTIVE PLANE AT NOON; DROVE TO ZARIA FOR LUNCH WITH VICE CHANCELLOR AUDU OF AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY AND MEETING WITH EMIR OF ZARIA; AND RETURNED TO KADUNA FOR NORTH CENTRAL STATE DINNER AT HAMDALA HOTEL WHICH ATTENDED BY SOME 100 STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND LOCAL LUMINARIES.
2. OFFICIAL GREETERS AT KADUNA AIRPORT WERE FIRST DIVISION REAR COMMANDER COL. T. Y. DANUUMA AND STATE WORKS COMMISSIONER MUHAMMADU BAMBALLY. DANUUMA TOLD ME THAT IN ADDITION TO HANDFUL OFFICIALS (SOME 250) WELL WISHERS AND ONLOOKERS HAD GATHERED TO MEET ZIKI AT AIRPORT. OTHER OFFICIAL GREETERS WERE ACTING POLICE COMMISSIONER DIMKA, OTHER COMMISSIONERS AND MILITARY OFFICERS.
3. ZIKI TOLD ME HE WOULD FLY TO JOS AND MAIDUGURI SEPTEMBER 12 AND TORON AND ILORIN SEPTEMBER 13, THUS COMPLETING HIS "TOUR OF 12 STATES".
4. AT KADUNA AIRPORT ZIKI DENIED TO NEWSMEN REPORT THAT HE AUTHORED REBEL NATIONAL ANTHEM. HE SAID ONUKWU HAD ADAPTED

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FOR BIAFRA. ANTHEMI AN EMOTIONAL POEM ZIKI WROTE AFTER FALL OF HIS HOMETOWN, ONITSHA.

5. ZIKI SAID PURPOSE TOUR OF NORTH WAS OBTAIN FACTS FOR CAMPAIGN AGAINST REBEL PROPAGANDA AND HEAR SUGGESTIONS FOR RECONCILIATION OF IBOS WITH FELLOW NIGERIANS. IN THIS REGARD, SULTAN OF SOKOTO AND MILI GOV. NORTH WESTERN STATE HAD ASSURED HIM, ACCORDING TO NEW NIGERIAN, OF WARM WELCOME FOR IBOS WHENEVER THEY RETURNED. IN SOKOTO HE SAW ACCOUNTS OF MONEY COLLECTED ON ABANDONED HOUSES WHICH HE SAID WOULD GO LONG WAY TO ASSURE IBOS OF THEIR SAFETY.

6. BOTH AT AIRPORT AND DINNER ADDRESS SEPTEMBER 11 ZIKI CHARACTERIZED OOUKWI AS RUTHLESS LEADER IMPERVIOUS TO REASON. IT THEREFORE NECESSARY DEMORALIZE MASSES FOLLOWING OOUKWI AND AT SAME TIME CARRY MILITARY OPERATION TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION, HE SAID.

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ABOUT HIS RECEPTION IN NORTH UP TO THIS POINT, ZIKI, LOOKING AROUND HAMDALA DINING HALL, MUMBLED TO ME, "WELL, IT HAS BEEN BETTER THAN THIS."

8. SECRETARY TO NC MILI GOVERNMENT, GARBA JA ABDULLADI, COMPLAINED OVER FACT NORTHERN MILI GOVS. GIVEN SUCH SHORT NOTICE ZIKI VISIT. HE SHOWED ME A MICROGRAPHED "APPROVED PROGRAMME" RECEIVED FROM FMG SEPTEMBER 6 FOR ZIKI'S NC STATE TOUR; AND TELEGRAPHIC APOLOGY FROM LAGOS FOR SHORTNESS NOTICE DATED SEPTEMBER 11. GARBA JA CONFIRMED THAT NC STATE GOVERNMENT KEPT VISIT LOW KEY ON PURPOSE BUT THAT WELCOMING CROWDS WERE TURNED OUT IN ZARIA WHERE, ACCORDING TO ARDENT ZIKI SUPPORTER NUHUI BAMALLIKI, WELCOME WAS "TUMULTOUS".

9. GARBA JA OPINED ZIKI RECEIVED AS QUIETLY IN NORTH WESTERN STATE AS HERE.

10. IN RESPONSE MY QUERY ABOUT MEN LIKE EX-VICE CHANCELLOR IBADANI U. DIKE AND POSSIBILITY THEIR RETURNING TO FOLD FOLLOWING ZIKI'S EXAMPLE, HE REPLIED THIS SEEMED IMPOSSIBILITY. HE OPINED THOSE LIKE DIKE AND SIR LOUIS MBANEFO VIRTUALLY UNRECONCILABLE.

11. COMMENT ON KYARI AND ZIKI SPEECHES INCLUDING

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TV APPEARANCE TAPED MORNING SEPTEMBER 12 WILL FOLLOW.

COMMENT: INITIAL IMPRESSION IS THAT ZIK RECEIVED HERE WITH MILD WARMTH; CYNICISM FROM SOME QUARTERS; AND GENERAL HOPEFUL EXPECTATION OVER HIS POSSIBLE ROLE IN EFFECTING END OF REBELLION. AT DINNER (SEPTEMBER 11), APPLAUSE FOR ZIK AT PRE-DINNER RECEPTION, OFFICIALS AND OTHERS GREETED ZIK WITH RESTRAINT BUT DEFERENCE. SOME CYNICAL MUMBLINGS OF DISAPPROVAL WERE HEARD AT ZIK'S DEMAGOGIC REFERENCE TO SACRIFICED MOTHERS, CHILDREN, AND MEN DURING DINNER ADDRESS.

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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ACTION AFT 18.

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07,
LI 03, NSC 10, PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04,
SCA 01, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28, RSR 01, /158 W

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R 121605Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8953
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 8238

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP SEPTEMBER 12

1. ZIKI ZIKI REPORTEDLY RECEIVED QTE ROUSING WELCOME UNQTE
IN KADUNA SEPT 11 AND WILL TOUR NORTHERN CAPITALS BEFORE
RETURNING TO LAGOS. HE WILL REPORTEDLY VISIT IBADAN,
LAST OF TWELVE STATES ON HIS TOUR, SEPTEMBER 15. STATED THAT
BEFORE LEAVING LONDON HE HAD ASSURED QTE IBO LEADERS UNQTE
THAT THEY WOULD BE TREATED EQUALLY WITH ALL OTHER NIGERIANS DURING
PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION AND PURPOSE OF PRESENT TRIP WAS
TO SHOW THEM THAT IBOS WERE SAFE IN ANY PART OF NIGERIA.
ALSO DENIED THAT HE HAD EVER BEEN QTE FUNCTIONARY UNQTE
OF REBEL REGIME AND THAT HE HAD WRITTEN BIAFRAN
NATIONAL ANTHEM. ALSO STATED THAT IF REBELS FAILED
TO QTE SEE REASON AND NEGOTIATE PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO

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CRISIS FMG WILL HAVE TO CARRY MILITARY ACTION TO LOGICAL CONCLUSION UNQUOTE. PILOT HEADLINES THAT ZIKS RETURN AND HIS VISIT TO ENUGU IN PARTICULAR ENCOURAGING LARGE NUMBERS OF IBOS TO COME OUT OF HIDING IN BUSH. EXPRESS REPORTS ONE THOUSAND PEOPLE FROM REBEL AREAS HAVE QTEL ESCAPED UNQUOTE INTO FEDERAL TERRITORY IN RESPONSE TO ZIKS STATEMENTS AND CALL. PILOT EDITORIAL TAKES MIL GOV RIVERS STATE TO TASK FOR HIS STATEMENTS THAT PORT HARCOURT NOT FOR IBOS. STATES THAT WHETHER PH BELONGS TO IBOS OR NOT IMMATERIAL AND MIL GOV HAS FORGOTTEN HOW MUCH IBOS DID TO IMPROVE PH. STATES THAT PH NOT INDIGENOUS TOWN BUT ONE FOUNDED BY QTE COLONIAL MASTER UNQUOTE IN 1912 AND OPEN FOR OCCUPATION TO ALL NIGERIANS AND NON-NIGERIANS. EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WHEN PEACE RESTORED IBOS WILL BE ENTITLED TO RETURN TO LIVE AND CARRY OUT BUSINESSES AS BEFORE. OBSERVER EDITORIAL CALLS AZIKIWES RETURN QTE TURNING POINT IN NIGERIAN CRISIS--SILVER LINING IN DARK CLOUD UNQUOTE AND PRAISES HIM IN MOST GLOWING TERMS FOR HIS EFFORTS QTE TO BRING LOST SHEEP--OUR MERRING BROTHERS--TO FOLD HOFL ONE NIGERIA UNQUOTE.

2. POST AND EXPRESS PICK UP IN MOST LAUDATORY TERMS, WAHINGTON POST AND NY TIMES RECENT EDITORIALS FIXING BLAME FOR DELAY IN RELIEF FLIGHTS ON REBELS.

3. POST EDITORIAL QTE GOWON AND ADDIS ABABA UNQUOTE PRAISES GOWON HIGHLY POINTING TO HIS RECENT VISITS TO VARIOUS AFRICAN CAPITALS CULMINATING IN ADDIS SUMMIT ATTENDANCE, AND APPARENT IMPRESSION HE MADE ON NYERERE. OPINES THAT PEOPLE RIGHT TO WELCOME HIM BACK WITH GREAT ACCLAIM AND THAT HE AND NIGERIAN DELEGATION TO ADDIS HAVE GOOD REASON TO CONGRATULATE THEMSELVES ON EXCELLENT SHOWING DURING PAST SEVEN WEEKS.

4. SKETCHING HEADLINES STORY THAT VON ROSEN HAS RETURNED TO BIAFRA WITH MORE PLANES AND TWO DANISH EXPERTS IN EXPLOSIVES. SARCASTICALLY REFERS TO QTE PURPORTED SWEDISH LAW UNQUOTE BANNING SALE OF MINICON PLANES AND ASKS WILL GOS QTE ONE OF THOSE PRETENDING TO BE NEUTRAL IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS UNQUOTE, PLEASE INNOCENT TO KNOWLEDGE OF PLANES PROCUREMENT OR CLAIM THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW THAT VON ROSEN WOULD BE GOING BACK TO AID REBELS WHEN HE LEFT AGAIN.

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5. PILOT EDITORIAL TAKES SIERRA LEONE GOVERNMENT TO TASK FOR RECENT DEBATE ON NIGERIAN CRISIS IN ITS PARLIAMENT AND FOR ABSTENTION ON OAU RESOLUTION, ASKING IF SIERRA LEONE QTE AGAINST NIGERIA. UNQTE. CALLS ON GOSL TO QTE COME OUT PLAIN UNQTE AND LET FMG KNOW IF THEY ARE GOING TO RECOGNIZE REBEL REGIME BECAUSE IF THEY NOT FOR NIGERIA THEN THEY AGAINST NIGERIA. UNQTE
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By MNARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 00874 101426Z 11

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ACTION AF T8

INFO OCT 01, UCFL 05, CIAEI 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, PR 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, ISS 20, USIA 12, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28,

UPW 01, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /151 W

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R 101355Z SEP 69
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1305
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL IBADAN

UNCLAS KADUNA 0874

SUBJECT: NEW NIGERIAN ON AZIKIWE VISIT TO NORTH

SEPTEMBER 10 NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL PRAISES AZIKIWE'S DECISION TO VISIT NORTH. NOTING THAT NIGERIA HAS UNDERGONE "CATASTROPHIC CHAIN REACTION" OF EVENTS SINCE ZIK'S LAST VISIT, NEW NIGERIAN FEELS THAT ZIK "THE GREAT MAN (WHO) HAS MOST SENSITIVE ANTENNAE AMONG NIGERIAN LEADERS", WILL BE ABLE

PROPERLY ASSESS EVENTS SINCE 1966. EDITORIAL STATES HE WILL SEE THAT PROPERTIES OF IBOS BEING HELD FOR THEM; THAT SOME IBOS HAVE RETURNED AND LIVE HAPPILY; THAT THERE IS "GENUINE SPIRIT OF GOODWILL AND RECONCILIATION TOWARDS IBOS"; AND THAT PEOPLE ARE "CONTRITE ABOUT SOME OF EXCESSES OF 1966" AND HAVE "SYMPATHY FOR IBOS' SUFFERING NOW AND IN PAST". EDITORIAL CONCLUDES THAT "NIGERIANS LOOK TO HIM AS LIKELIEST DELIVERER OF IBOS FROM TYRANNY" OF OJUKWU, AND THEREFORE WELCOME HIM TO NORTH.

PROTOCOL OFFICE KADUNA STATES ZIK WILL ARRIVE KADUNA MORNING SEPTEMBER 11 AND WILL VISIT ZARIA SEPTEMBER 12. I WILL ATTEND DINNER PARTY IN HONOR ZIK SEPTEMBER 11.
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By	MNARA Date 10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

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NEA	CU	INR
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
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OSO	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Nigerian
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TO : Department of State

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HANDLING INDICATOR

INFO : LAGOS, US MISSION GENEVA, USUN NEW YORK

SEP 12 1969

NEW YORK

FROM : Amembassy THE HAGUE

DATE: September 10, 1969

SUBJECT: Second Chamber MPs Showing Increasing Frustration over
Nigeria/Biafra

REF :

ANALYSIS BRANCH

Dutch Concern Over Nigeria/Biafra

As we reported earlier (Hague 2894), Dutch public opinion has focused almost exclusively on the humanitarian aspects of the conflict in Nigeria. However, the protracted nature of the civil war appeared to have taken its toll and Dutch interest in the issue seemed to flag this summer. Now, reports out of Nigeria concerning the impact of the interrupted relief flights, the apparent inability of the relief groups to resolve the situation, and the allegedly increasing death toll from starvation have awakened renewed public concern here.

Parliamentary Interest

Dutch interest in the matter has been particularly manifest in the Second Chamber of Parliament, whose members in recent weeks have addressed numerous questions on Nigeria to the Foreign Ministry. Generally, the MPs want the Dutch Government to take a more active role in relief operations in cooperation with like-minded countries. In this connection, the Parliamentarians feel that the GON should

Enclosure: Questions in Second Chamber on Nigeria

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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 In Out

Drafted by:

POL:HGMoen/Marjan Fleischer:vch


Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

9/4/69

POL:TJU/mnigan

POL:AEBreisky



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act with or without Nigeria/Biafra's permission. Other questions drew from the GON categorical assurances that its arms embargo remains in force.


GON Position

In its replies to the MPs, the Foreign Ministry takes the line that Dutch hands are tied if the combatants refuse to agree on a relief plan. However, the GON continues to reassure the MPs of the Government's support for cooperative efforts to bring relief to the war victims and its readiness to seize every opportunity to further the cause of peace in Nigeria.

Comment: Parliament's frustration with the ongoing war and continued human suffering permeates the entire batch of questions. In fact, the tone suggests that a number of MPs, contrary to their better political sense, are recommending action which neither of the antagonists nor their neighbors would accept. The parliamentary flurry accounts most likely for the Foreign Ministry's decision to move to a more active role, if possible, in the relief operations, as well as its interest in any political discussions on Nigeria (Hague 3218).

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Questions in Second Chamber on Nigeria

Questions of Mr. Nederhorst (PvdA) - July 29, 1969

Is it true that the Foreign Minister, during a short stay in Lagos, was asked whether the possibility existed that the Netherlands would lift the weapon embargo to the combattants in Nigeria? And, he answered that no recent requests for weapon deliveries had been submitted, but "we will see what happens".

If this report is correct, does this mean that the question of arms deliveries to Nigeria is an open question and that, pending the outcome of the conflict, the arms embargo, depending on the circumstances, may be lifted any moment?

Answer of Minister Bakker (Minister of Foreign Affairs, a. i.) - August 21, 1969

During his short stay in Lagos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared, when asked by a journalist, that the Government's decision to suspend arms deliveries to Nigeria was still in force. When asked whether Nigerian requests for arms export licenses had been submitted, he answered that this had not been the case. The journalist in question then asked whether the embargo on arms exports would also apply to possible future requests. Because this embargo was adopted in connection with the existing civil war in Nigeria, the Minister answered that a decision on this matter could only be taken in the light of the then existing situation, referring, of course, to a possible termination of the civil war.

In view of the answer to question number one, it follows that the answer to the second question is negative.


Question of Mr. Franssen (PvdA) - August 4, 1969

Is it true that the warships SS "Nigeria" and SS "Ogoja" which Nigeria uses in its operations against Biafra, are Dutch ships originally sold to the Nigerian Government?

Is the Minister aware that it is assumed that Dutch citizens serve on these ships as technicians and advisors, due to the lack of adequately trained personnel?

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Can the Minister state that this assumption is incorrect?

Can the Minister declare that the Netherlands does not provide equipment or ammunition to keep these ships operational?

Answer of Mr. Bakker (Minister of Foreign Affairs, a.i.) - August 21, 1969

The S.S. "Nigeria" was built in the Netherlands to the order of the Nigerian Government and it became operational in the Nigerian Navy in September 1965. The S.S. "Ogoja" originally is an American ship on loan to the Netherlands and transferred to the Nigerian Government in August 1966, with the permission of the American authorities. It had been loaned previously to the Nigerian authorities.

The Government is unaware of any Netherlands technicians and advisors in service on these ships.

Since May 1968, when it was decided to suspend arms deliveries to Nigeria, not one single delivery has taken place, neither of ammunition nor equipment for the above-mentioned vessels.

Question of Mr. Walburg (ARP) - August 13, 1969

Are the Ministers prepared to investigate with the greatest possible speed whether it may be possible, together with such other countries as Belgium, Switzerland or Scandinavia, to bring food convoys into the heart of the hunger-stricken area in Biafra by means of lorries, preferably with the aid and guidance of the International Red Cross?

Answer of Mr. De Jong (Minister of Foreign Affairs, a.i.) - August 21, 1969


Several possibilities towards the resumption of relief aid are being examined on an international level. A plan to supply relief goods by road has not been taken into consideration in view of the many problems involved and also because both parties in the Nigerian conflict, particularly the Biafrans, very explicitly oppose such a plan.

Questions of Mr. Den Uyl and Franssen (PvdA) - August 14, 1969

Is the Government prepared to seek together with Scandinavian countries, Canada, and possibly some Asian and African nations, the establishment

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of a supervisory body for daytime food flights to Biafra from neutral territory, as proposed by the Joint Church Aid?

Is the Government prepared, in case Lagos would reject such supervised day flights, to exert the greatest possible pressure on the Federal Military Government and to cooperate in food flights without the Federal Government's permission?

Answer of Mr. Bakker (Minister of Foreign Affairs, a.i.) - August 21, 1969


Following the rejection of the ICRC's recent proposal, various other plans are being considered. The Government is constantly consulting with the ICRC and friendly Governments to see which of these plans merits support and has the best chance of success. It might be very harmful if different parties involved would insist on the acceptance of different plans, as this would only endanger the realization of a feasible relief plan. The Government is happy to note that closer cooperation between the Joint Church Aid and the ICRC has developed.

In view of the fact that neither the Federal Government nor the Biafran authorities have vetoed to date the proposed plan, it is impossible to say at this moment where pressure would be the most desirable to obtain acceptance of the new plans.

TRANSLATOR: Marjan Fleischer

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL III

37 To: The Secretary of State

13769

Date: September 10, 1969

ACTION REQUESTED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Draft reply for:	NOTE
President's signature.	
Undersigned's signature.	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Member of the White House Staff	
Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Direct reply.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Furnish information copy.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Furnish copy of reply, if any.	
<input type="checkbox"/> For your information.	
<input type="checkbox"/> For comment.	


REMARKS:

*Prompt action is essential.**If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.**Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.*

POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
 RE
 POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Description:

Letter, Telegram, Others:
 To: The President
 From: Carl H. Barker, 6799 Worsham Drive, Whittier, Cal.
 Date: 9/7/69
 Subject: Nigerian-Biafran Relief.

338 C-11 N-11 S-4
By direction of the President:

 Noble M. Melencamp
 Staff Assistant
 to the President

(Copy to remain with correspondence)

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By	NARA Date



POL 7 NIGERIA
Xe POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, UCFI 05, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPMU 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03,
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SR 01, ORM 03, UPW 01, SCA 01, SCS 04, RSRU 01, /156/W
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R 090910Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAMI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
SECSTATE WASHDC 4587

CIO NFI D E N T I A L KAMPALA 1779

SUBJECT: GOWON VISIT
REF: KAMPALA 1734

POL 7 NIGERIA
Xe POL 30AU

1. AS EXPECTED, GOWON TRANSITED ENTEBBE AIRPORT SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, WHERE HE WAS MET BY PRESIDENT OBOTE AND GIVEN FULL RED CARPET TREATMENT INCLUDING LUNCH AT STATE HOUSE, INSPECTION GUARD OF HONOR, ETC. OBOTE THEN DEPARTED ON GOWON'S CHARTERED ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES FOR ADDIS SAME AFTERNOON.

2. DURING GOVERNMENT RECEPTION FOLLOWING REPUBLIC DAY CEREMONIES MONDAY (SEPTEMBER 8), NIGERIAN ACTING HICOM TOLD CHARGE HE DELIGHTED WITH GOV Reception GOWON AND STATED TWO LEADERS HAD GOTTEN ALONG FAMOUSLY. ASKED IF THIS SUDDEN COMRADESHIP DID NOT REPRESENT REALIGNMENT GOV POLICY AND SENTIMENT. NIGERIAN DIPLOMAT SAID THIS CULMINATION OF TRAIN OF EVENTS STARTING WITH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON BIAFRAN QUESTION IN JULY. NIGERIAN ADDED HIS OPINION WHICH HE DOES NOT ENTIRELY SHARE THAT OBOTE HAS ALWAYS FAVERED FMB BUT HAS BEEN UNWILLING SO STATE AS REPORTED IN PAST. OUR ASSESSMENT PRESIDENT OBOTE HAS CONSIDERABLE ADMIRATION

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By MNARA Date 01/07/05



POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 MONROV 04036 081230Z

43
ACTION AFT 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, SCA 01, SCS 04, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, UCF 05,
UPW 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
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----- 103540

R 081028Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7566
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEWYORK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONROVIA 4036

SUBJ: NIGERIA- MARKPRESS RELEASE
REF: GENEVA 3184 XR POL 30 Biafra

POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

1. FOR THE RECORD: BRIT AMBASSADOR DID NOT RPT NOT FLY BACK TO LONDON WITH AZIKIWE.
2. TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE BRIT AMBASSADOR HAD NOT RPT NO PERSONAL SUBSTANTIVE CONTACT WITH AZIKIWE PARTY.

HOWISON
BT

(1)

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14
POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 IBADAN 00269 080930Z

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ACTION AF 18:

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INRI 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 00, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, OPR 02, SSO 00, AID 28, RSR 00
SCSE 00, SCA 01, SY 03, 117 W

102639

P/R 080853Z SEP 69

FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 894
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL KADUNA

UNCLAS IBADAN 269

SUBJECT: ROCKET ATTACK ON AMERICAN MISSION SCHOOL IN NIGERIAN MIDWEST

REV. MERRITT, ACTING HEAD OF BAPTIST MISSION'S NIGERIAN HEADQUARTERS IN IBADAN, TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HAD TELEPHONE REPORT THAT ROCKET ATTACK SUNDAY SEP 7 BY UNIDENTIFIED PLANE ON BAPTIST GIRL'S SECONDARY SCHOOL IN AGBOR (REPORTED IN MID-WEST OBSERVER SEP 8) DAMAGED DORMITORY BUILDING BUT RESULTED IN NO INJURIES TO AMERICANS OR NIGERIANS. ALL WERE ATTENDING CHURCH. HE DID NOT HAVE DETAILED INFORMATION ON ATTACK OR DAMAGES.

STRONG

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TELEGRAM

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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy ABIDJAN
" PARIS
USMission GENEVA

Subj: Brubeck Appointment with Houphouet
Ref: (A) State 151173 (B) Abidjan 2502

1. Ref A being repeated separately to Abidjan concerning Brubeck trip. Ref B (NOTAL) says Houphouet expected Abidjan mid-September but might remain Paris or Geneva for few days after Sept. 15.
2. Brubeck could plan see Houphouet in Abidjan around Sept. 19, flying over from Lagos, or alternatively in Europe over weekend of 19 to 21 or early following week. Embassy Abidjan suggests (Ref B) direct approach to Houphouet to request appointment.
3. Accordingly Paris or Geneva, requested to ask for Brubeck appointment with Houphouet for purposes set forth Ref A. Abidjan may wish to inform as courtesy appropriate GOIC officials there of appointment request.

RICHARDSON

DRAFTED BY:

AF/SN:RLPerkins:ba
CLEARANCES:

DRAFTING DATE:

9/8/69

TEL. EXT.:

23406

APPROVED BY:

AF/SN - William H. Brubeck WBS

AF/W Mr. Reed RLC
EUR/FBX- Mr. Maresca RBS

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FORM FS-413
4-68

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63 OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action: Amembassy LUSAKA PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy LAGOS
" LONDON
Amconsul ENUGU
" IBADAN
" KADUNA

STATE

REF: Lusaka 326 (NOTAL) State 27206; Lagos 2310

1. USG position on Nigeria as reflected ref deptel has not changed. We continue to recognize only FMG and do not recognize so-called Biafra regime. USG also continues view Nigerian problem as basically African one. We therefore would not wish make suggestions re possible GRZ role in Nigerian crisis.
2. Although MFA Permsec Chona's view that there little hope for ~~XXXXXX~~ lasting stability in Nigeria if Biafra subdued by force is also subject of ~~XXX~~ concern here, chances of returning situation to conference table do not now appear promising. Despite negative FMG reactions to outside attempts to promote peaceful settlement, USG would not wish discourage such efforts, whether by GRZ or by other AF states. Our hope for earliest possible peaceful settlement, however, does not mean that USG supporting Biafra either overtly or covertly.

END

RUSH

Drafted by: AF/AFW:RPSmith:ncs:9/7/67 Tel. Ext. 6402 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AFW - Roy M. Melbourne
Clearances: AFSE - Mr. McElhiney (draft) AF - Amb. Trimble (subs)
RPM

FORM DS-322
8-65

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S. J. HANSON

SERIES 2

DATE: September 6, 1969

FROM : Amembassy LIBREVILLE
SUBJECT : BIAFRA - French Military Attaché's comments on Military
Situation and Relief Programs

REF : Libreville 892

French Ambassador DELAUNEY has consented to keep this Embassy briefed on developments in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict, through the intermediary of his Military Attaché, Col. Jean MERLE, who also serves as local director of the French Red Cross relief effort for Biafra. Col. Merle gave us a preliminary briefing on August 28, the main points of which were reported in the telegram under reference. Enclosed is a memorandum of our conversation which will provide some additional details, as well as a rough map on which Merle has sketched the current perimeter of the Biafran redoubt.

Col Merle also left with us a summary of French Red Cross activities here through 31 July. He added that activity had increased considerably during the past few weeks, to the degree that relief traffic out of Libreville had "reached the saturation point". His figures do not, of course, coincide exactly with our own observations, partly due to our own difficulty in distinguishing bona fide relief flights from the arms flights which the Colonel's figures ignore. They may be useful, however, as an indicator of French relief activity, both here and in Ivory Coast, and a translation of the summary is enclosed.

FUNKHouser

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of Conversation
2. Map

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4-62Contents and Classification Approved by:
AMB:RFunkhouser

Drafted by:

TFCrigler/raa

Clearances:

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
LIBREVILLE A-97

RELIEF ACTIVITY THROUGH 31 JULY 1969

	<u>July 1-31</u>	<u>Since Beginning of Operation</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Missions flown by French Red Cross airplane	23	272*	*two of which failed to land at Uli
Tonnage of food and medicines landed in Biafra	154 T.	1,535 T.	
Tonnage of medicines, etc. placed at disposition of civilian reception centers in Gabon	-	150 T.	
Number of children evacuated to Gabon	120	3,765*	*of whom 1,132 prior to 25 Sept. 1968
Number of children treated at French Military Hospital, Libreville.	62	1,800	
Deceased among children evacuated	8	138	

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BIAFRAN REFUGEE CHILDREN IN GABON AS OF 31 JULY 1969


French Military Field Hospital	173
German Caritas	1,501
International Caritas:	
Ste Marie Center	360 (of whom 17 with families)
St. Andre Center	156
Oyem	44
Franceville	30
Fougamou	11
Bitam	51
Okoundja	13
Lambarene	17
Schweitzer Hospital	40
Terre des Hommes (Baraka and Guegue Centers)	480/490 approx.
Diocese de Mouila	48
TOTAL	2,934 approx.

REFUGEE CHILDREN IN IVORY COAST

Bouake	350
Cocody	326
Grand Bassam	183
TOTAL	859

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M E M O R A N D U M O F C O N V E R S A T I O N

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Funkhouser, Colonel Merle - Embassy of France,
T. Frank Crigler

PLACE & DATE: Ambassador Funkhouser's Office, 28 August 1969

SUBJECT : Biafra

Col. Merle outlined the perimeter of the terrain presently held by the Biafran forces (see attached map). This area included a significant enclave on the west bank of the Niger river which is an important oil-producing area (AGIP plus others), as well as two other centers of oil industry. But the area markedly failed to include any major cities, the FMG forces apparently having directed their thrusts against the cities in particular. In some cases, FMG enclaves focussing on cities went deep into otherwise Biafran-held territory. The clear impression was that the FMG held the cities while the Biafrans controlled the countryside.


Concerning Biafran supply problems, Merle noted that the Biafrans, even without a full-fledged refinery, are able to meet their POL requirements handily by means of home "stills": Crude is placed in a 200 ltr. barrel and a pipe run from the top of the barrel down through wet earth and finally to smaller containers; the crude is heated, hi-test gasoline is distilled off first, then lower grade, then kerosene, and finally fuel oil, until only a useless residue remains and is discarded. Everywhere crude is being refined in this fashion, and gradually more sophisticated installations based on the same process are being built. However, the Biafrans have no capacity for producing high-octane aircraft fuels.

Indeed, Merle pointed out that the Biafrans have precious few vehicles to keep running with their home-made gasoline. The army has practically no armored weapons (one is a captured British "saladin") and very few trucks or other personnel or equipment carriers.

Two airports, the one quite close to the other, Uli and Uga, are located within the Biafran perimeter. Both are converted portions of highway, quite long but exceedingly narrow. The Ambassador asked why the FMG bombers did not knock out the two airports which constitute Biafra's lifeline, since it would appear that this could be done so easily. Merle confirmed that the war could be ended immediately by this means; the Biafrans could not possibly continue

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since they had no stockpiles of either food or ammunition. However, he saw two reasons why the FMG did not: (1) it would look inhumane in the eyes of world opinion to close the only door remaining open to relief supplies; and (2) the FMG sees it to its own advantage to prolong the war, since each day it continues costs a few more Ibo lives, and true "victory" could only be achieved by breaking the back of the Ibos' ability to resist.

In the face of this, the Ambassador asked, why were the Ibos so stubborn with regard to such relief plans as daytime relief flights and the Cross-River route from Fernando Po via Calabar? Merle replied that the Biafrans were exceedingly suspicious, even of the ICRC, and feared that the FMG would manage somehow to poison the foodstuffs or even commandeer the relief planes or ships to sneak forces of FMG troops into Biafra. Merle added that he thought that the only way suspicions on both sides could be overcome and the relief operation got moving would be if U.S. instrumentalities and personnel were to take them over since only the United States was considered neutral.

The Ambassador commented that some Gabonese had told him that Ojukwu and Gowon had become irreconcilable enemies and that if these two were replaced by more reasonable persons, a negotiated peace could be worked out. Col. Merle said he thought this was wrong. Neither Ojukwu nor Gowon was a hysterical hard-liner; both were under great pressure from lesser leaders to take an even more rigid stance and reject the temptation to negotiate. Merle was not at all sure that their elimination from the scene would not make a negotiated peace even more difficult to achieve (he mentioned Chief Enahoro as one of the real hawks on the FMG side). Merle was quite sure that Ojukwu would consider a political settlement, but it would have to be one agreed upon by the Great Powers, including the U.S., and guaranteed by them. The OAU and other African efforts were foredoomed to failure, since they lacked the muscle to enforce the solution.


Col. Merle suggested, as had French Ambassador Delauney previously, that the United Nations would provide a better forum for solution of the problem. The Ambassador expressed his personal view that the UN would provide a sure route to impasse, unfortunate publicity and hardened positions. Negotiations in camera by interested parties, such as the Tashkent Agreement, might get results faster.

Other points made by Col. Merle included:

- a) Now that the rain had ended in Nigeria, the war would intensify.
- b) The Nigerians were much better equipped (tanks, arms, aircraft) and would seek to cut off Biafran salient west of the Niger.

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
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Page 3

- c) The Biafrans would hope to reach Port Harcourt but were undermanned and had few guerrillas in that region.
- d) Traffic at Libreville airport had reached the saturation point (Comment: flights have increased in the past few nights).

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

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SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA

CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION



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ACTION: Amembassy LISBON

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LAGOS
— Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amconsul ENUGU

STATE

1. During course of talk with Portugese Charge September 5, Dep. Asst Sec. Trimble referred to USG policy of not supplying arms to either side in Nigerian conflict. He expressed concern re reports of arms shipments reaching Biafra via Lisbon and Sao Tome and noted such aid could only escalate conflict, increase dangers to Amcits and Europeans in Nigeria and encourage FMG to become more dependent on USSR. Trimble also told Charge USG had heard that American airline had been approached at Paris to fly 60 tons of arms per week from Europe for Biafrans in Hercules aircraft. American company refused but USG concerned that other arms shipments to Biafrans might ease way for Russian penetration.
2. Charge promised report Trimble conversation.

END

RUSK

5/21/67 DEPT OF STATE

Drafted by:
AF?AFOM:RTHaverkamp;mr:bec:nsc:9/6/67 2590
Clearances:
EUR/SPP - Mr. Landau *hth*
AF/AFW - Mr. Melbourne *num*

Tel. Ext. 2590
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF - Ambassador Trimble

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ACTION AF 18

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AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6833
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
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C O M M I D E N T I A L PARIS 13493

SUBJECT: NIGERIA/BIAFRA: FIGARO ARTICLE SEES BIAFRA SLIPPING

- (2)
1. ARTICLE IN SEPTEMBER 6 FIGARO BY THIERRY DESJARDINS, DATED LINED LAGOS, SEES BIAFRA VERY MUCH ON DEFENSIVE AT ADDIS OAUI MEETINGS. WHILE HOPES FOR SETTLEMENT REMAIN SLIM, ARTICLE NOTES THREE NEW ELEMENTS SINCE LAST SESSION: (A) GROWING WAR-WEARINESS ON BOTH SIDES; (B) NIGERIAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, EXAMPLE OF WHICH CITED AS POSSIBLE COCOA-FOR-GUNS EXCHANGE WITH USSR WHICH WOULD BE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR FMG; AND (C) AZIKIWE DEFECTION FROM BIAFRANS, THOUGH STILL TOO EARLY SAY WHAT EFFECT WILL BE WITHIN NIGERIA/BIAFRA. IN OAUI CONTEXT, HOWEVER, HE FEELS AZIKIE SWITCH, COMING AS IT DOES ON HEEL'S SUCCESSFUL FMG DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE THROUGHOUT AFRICA WILL KEEP OAUI HEADS OF STATE FROM STRAYING OFF PREVIOUSLY-CHOSEN PATH FAVORABLE FMG POSITION. INDEED, DESJARDINS NOTES ZAMBIA ALREADY HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT ITS PRO-BIAFRAN POLICY.
 2. COMMENT: FIGARO ARTICLE COMES ONLY ONE WEEK AFTER GOI DENIAL (ATTRIBUTED TO WELL-INFORMED SOURCES) ANY CHANGE IN ITS POLICY

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PAGE 02 PARIS 13493 061519Z

VIS-A-VIS BIAFRA HAD TAKEN PLACE OR WAS CONTEMPLATED. DESPITE DENIAL, FIGARO PIECE WILL TEND FRESH FUEL TO RUMORS WHICH HAVE CIRCULATED SINCE DEGAULLE'S DEPARTURE THAT GOI SEEKING DISCREETLY PULLI

BACK FROM ITS INVOLVEMENT WITH BIAFRANI CAUSE.

BLAKE

GP-4

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 00862 051424Z

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R 051323Z SEP 69
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1299
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL IBADAN

CONFIDENTIAL KADUNA 0862

SUBJECT: FIRST DIVISION REAR COMMANDER VIEWS ON CIVIL WAR

1. DURING DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES FOR TERMINATION CIVIL WAR, LT. COLONEL T. Y. DANJUMA, COMMANDER FIRST DIVISION REAR, EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT WAR WOULD GRADUALLY END IN MILITARY OCCUPATION FOLLOWING FLIGHT OF OJUKWU TO SET UP GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. HE IMPRESSED BY CURRENT LACK GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AND SAW LITTLE OR NO POSSIBILITY OF PROLONGED GUERRILLA WARFARE IN FUTURE SINCE CIVILIANS HAVE NO STOMACH FOR GIVING ESSENTIAL SUPPORT SUCH OPERATIONS. IN MEANTIME, HOWEVER, THERE SCANT HOPE OF DEFLECTION FROM REBEL ARMY NOR IS THERE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY COUP TO UNSEAT OJUKWU SINCE TWO MILITARY LEADERS WHO COULD ENGINEER COUP ARE WANTED BY FMG FOR CRIMINAL ACTION DURING 1966 COUP. DANJUMA ALSO STATED REAL POLITICAL POWER BEHIND OJUKWU IS CHRISTOPHER C. OMOUKWUI WHO APPARENTLY SETS POLICY IN BIAFRA AND WITHOUT WHOM "OJUKWU WOULD BE LOST". OTHER LEADERS SUCH AS KENNETH DIKE HAVE PUT OUT FEELERS AS TO WHETHER THEY WOULD BE GIVEN BACK FORMER GOVERNMENT POSITIONS IN FUTURE NIGERIA.

2. ALTHOUGH CIVILIANS IN REBEL AREAS GRADUALLY LOSING INTEREST IN CONTINUATION OF WAR, FIGHTING CONTINUES UNABATED. FMG REMAINS RELUCTANT PUSH OFFENSIVE TOO.

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PAGE 02 KADUNA 00862 051424Z

ASSIDUOSLY.

3. ALTHOUGH IT DIFFICULT POLITICAL DECISION, DANJUMA ASSUMES PORT HARCOURT WILL BE PART OF EAST CENTRAL STATE IN VIEW OF PRE-WAR PREDOMINANCE IBOS IN CITY'S POPULATION. HE AVERRED THAT AZIKWE HAD BEEN GIVEN ASSURANCE BY FMG TO THAT EFFECT.

COMMENT: COLONEL DANJUMA IS THOUGHTFUL AND SCRUPULOUSLY HONEST OFFICER WHO SPENT SEVENTEEN MONTHS AT FRONT AS DEPUTY COMMANDER FIRST DIVISION UNTIL HIS TRANSFER TO KADUNA IN MARCH 1969. HE WILL RETURN TO HIS FORMER JOB AT FRONT IN DECEMBER TO REPLACE COLONEL MARTIN ADATA WHO HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO STAFF COLLEGE IN BRITAIN COMMENCING JANUARY 1970.
STEPHAN

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ACTION AF 18

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FM US MISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8479
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
US MISSION GENEVA 4022
AMEMBASSY LONDON

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SUBJ: NIGERIA: SYGS COMMENTS

1. FOLLOWING IS EXCERPT RE NIGERIA FROM SYG STATEMENT
BEFORE OAU HEADS OF STATE (FULL TEXT SYG STATEMENT
POUCHED UNP).

WHEN I ADDRESSED THE LAST SESSION OF THIS ASSEMBLY IN
SEPTEMBER 1968, I STATED THAT IF I WAS UNABLE TO CONCEAL
MY CONCERN ABOUT THE PERSISTENCE OF COLONIAL AND RACIAL
POLICIES IN AFRICA, EVEN LESS COULD I REFRAIN FROM
EXPRESSING MY DISTRESS AND DISMAY AT THE MOUNTING TOLL
OF DESTRUCTION, STARVATION AND LOSS OF LIFE RESULTING
FROM THE TRAGIC FRATRICIDAL STRIFE IN NIGERIA. SINCE THAT
TIME, I HAVE MORE THAN ONCE EXPRESSED MY BELIEF THAT
THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
AT KINSHASA IN 1967 AND AT ALGIERS IN 1968 PROVIDE THE
FRAMEWORK FOR

(2) A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE CIVIL WAR BY PEACEFUL MEANS.
IT IS A MATTER OF UNIVERSAL DISTRESS THAT THIS OBJECTIVE
HAS NOT YET BEEN ATTAINED. IF ANYTHING, EVENTS HAVE
SERVED ONLY TO INTENSIFY THE GENERAL FEELING OF CONCERN
AT THE CONTINUANCE OF THE CONFLICT. THE DREADED CYCLE

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OF STARVATION, DISEASE AND DEATH ENGULFING THE POPULATION IN THE AREAS OF THE CONFLICT HAS YET TO BE BROKEN.

IN THIS SITUATION, THE EXCLUSIVELY HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS FAMILY, PARTICULARLY THROUGH UNICEF AND THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME AND IN CO-ORDINATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, HAVE CONSTITUTED A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFORT TO PROVIDE AND DISTRIBUTE RELIEF TO THE CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF THE HOSTILITIES. WITHIN THE SAME CONTEXT, THE REPRESENTATIVE WHOM I HAD APPOINTED FOR THE PURPOSE IN AUGUST 1968 HAS CONTINUED HIS WORK OF ASSISTING IN THESE RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES, OF ASSESSING RELIEF NEEDS AND OF RECOMMENDING WAYS AND MEANS OF EXPEDITING THE DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES. EVEN SO, IT IS TO BE DEEPLY REGRETTED THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN WITHOUT INTERRUPTION THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES TO THE WAR-STRICKEN AREAS. I SHOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN IN THE NAME OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES THAT WHILE THERE IS STILL A GREAT NEED FOR LARGER SHIPMENTS OF RELIEF SUPPLIES, THE URGENT PROBLEM IS TO ELICIT THE FULLY AND WHOLE-HEARTED CO-OPERATION OF THOSE BEARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AFFLICTED AREAS AS REGARDS FACILITIES FOR THE MOVEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES.

AT THE SAME TIME IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT IN THE LONG RUN ONLY THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OAU RECOMMENDATIONS, WHICH SHOULD LEAD TO THE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT, WOULD PUT AN END TO THE PRESENT PLIGHT OF THE WAR-STRICKEN POPULATION. FOR THAT REASON, I MUST ONCE AGAIN EXPRESS THE EARNEST HOPE THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE PASSIONS AND THE BITTERNESS ENGENDERED BY THE HOSTILITIES, FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS PURSUANT TO THE INITIATIVES WHICH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WILL BE CARRIED OUT, WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING THE STRIFE TO AN END AND TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY.

FULL SYG STATEMENT ISSUED AS PRESS RELEASE BY UN WITH EMBARGO ON PUBLICATION UNTIL SEPT. 7. DECONTROL ON RECEIPT.
BUFFUM

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POL 27 BIAFRA -
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ACTION AFIT 8

INFO OCT 01, IO 13, EUR 17, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAEI 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, AID 28,
RSR 01, /146 W

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R 051045Z SEPT 69
FM: AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1295
INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL IBADAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KADUNA 0856

SUBJECT: REPORTED EFFECT OF AZIKIWE STATEMENT IN REBEL HELD AREAS

1. DURING SEPTEMBER 4 NCCX, NIGERIAN MILITARY WINNING COLLEGE (NMTC) COMMANDANT, COLONEL E. F. SOTOMI, HE MENTIONED HIS RECENT VISIT TO WAR FRONT # TO ILLUSTRATE A POINT RE: WILLINGNESS WAR-WEARY REBEL SOLDIERS TO LAY DOWN ARMS: ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING AZIKIWE STATEMENTS, HE MENTIONED THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO FEDERAL TRENCHES FEDERAL SOLDIERS SHOUTED TO REBELS WHO IN SIGHT ACROSS RIVER NOT TO SHOOT BECAUSE "BIG OFFICER" IN AREA. ACCORDING TO SOTOMI, FIRING CEASED AND FRIENDLY GREETINGS EXCHANGED WITH REBELS.

2. SOTOMI TOLD ALSO OF FMG TROOPS WHO SHOUTED "BEER" AS THEY CARRIED CASES OF BREW TO CENTER OF BRIDGE ALONG BATTLE LINE. SHOUTS EFFECTED CESSION OF FIRE BY REBELS WHO THEN GRATEFULLY CAME TO BRIDGE TO COLLECT BEER.

COMMENT: SOTOMI IS MERGETIC TALKER WHOSE APPARENTLY MEDIOCRE RECORD HAS LANDED HIM IN BACKWATER NMTC SPOT. MORE RELIABLE ONE: DIVISION REAR COMMANDER, LT. COL. YAKUBU DANJUMA, HOWEVER, ASSERTED AT LUNCH LATER SAME DAY THAT AZIKIWE STATEMENT BROADCAST TO REBEL AREAS ALREADY WAS PRODUCING LARGE NUMBER OF DEFECTORS FROM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE: 02 KADUNA 00856 051204Z

REBEL HELD AREAS
STEPHAN
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NOTE: SENTENCE AS RECEIVED,
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, TO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04,
H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12,
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13470

R 051835Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6814
INFO AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN

UNCLAS PARIS 13470

SUBJ: NIGERIA/BIAFRA. SENGHOR STATEMENT IN PARIS
ACCORDING SEPTEMBER 3 AFP REPORT, PRESIDENT SENGHOR SPOKE TO
PRESS FROM PORCH OF ELYSEE IN PRESENCE FRENCH PRESIDENT
POMPIDOU FOLLOWING LUNCH HOSTED BY LATTER. ASKED ABOUT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT GOWON WOULD PARTICIPATE IN OAU CHIEFS OF STATE MEETING AT ADDIS ABABA. SENGHOR SAID QTE IT IS A GOOD THING. OUR VIEW IS CLOSE TO THAT OF DR. ASIKIWE. WE ARE FOR THE INTEGRITY OF NIGERIA, BUT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE AND FLEXIBLE FEDERATION UNQUOTE.
SHRIVER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01,

AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSE 00, NSC 10,

P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, E 15, RSR 01, /171 W

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R 051420Z SEP 69
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2832
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USUN NEW YORK 3652

GENEVA - 3184
9-569

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE GENEVA 3184

SUBJ: NIGERIA

1. FOLLOWING IS MARKPRESS RELEASE RECEIVED TODAY:

QUOTE: SECRETS OF MONROVIA TALKS REVEALED. LONDON, SEPTEMBER 3, 1969. A BIAFRAN GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS ANNOUNCED THAT, THROUGH AN UNIMPEACHABLE SOURCE IN LAGOS, INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED REGARDING WHAT WENT ON IN MONROVIA, LIBERIA, LEADING UP TO THE DEFLECTION OF DR. NNAMDI AZIKIWE.

THE FIRST PART OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH NIGERIA'S GENERAL GOWON WERE DEVOTED TO ASSURING DR. AZIKIWE THAT HIS ASSETS IN LAGOS WOULD BE RETURNED TO HIM INTACT.

IT WAS THEN DECIDED THAT HE SHOULD ACCOMPANY GENERAL GOWON ON A TOUR OF NORTHERN NIGERIA. THIS HE AGREED TO, PROVIDED THAT LIBERIA'S PRESIDENT TUBMAN ACCCOMPANIED HIM. PRESIDENT TUBMAN ALSO AGREED, ON THE CONDITION THAT, TO SHOW IMPARTIALITY, HE AND DR. AZIKIWE SHOULD ALSO VISIT BIAFRA.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 03184 051848Z

HOWEVER, DR. AZIKIWE REFUSED, EXPRESSING FEARS FOR HIS SAFETY, AND USING AS AN ARGUMENT THE STORY THAT BIAFRA'S CHIEF JUSTICE, SIR LOUIS MBANEOFOR HAD BEEN ARRESTED, AND THAT HE FEARED A SIMILAR FATE. (SIR LOUIS IS CURRENTLY IN BRITAIN TO ATTEND A LEGAL CONFERENCE.)

FOLLOWING DR. AZIKIWE'S RENUNCIATION OF BIAFRA LAST WEEK, CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION NOW EXISTS IN LAGOS AS TO WHAT FURTHER PUBLICITY USE CAN BE MADE OF DR. AZIKIWE IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF HIS ASSETS. CERTAINLY THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILL BE PARADED AT THE O.A.U. (ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY) SUMMIT NOW TAKING PLACE IN ADDIS ABABA.

AMONG INFLUENTIAL SOURCES IN LAGOS, HOWEVER, DR. AZIKIWE'S "RETURN TO THE FOLD" IS VIEWED WITH MIXED FEELINGS. HIS IMMEDIATE PROPAGANDA USEFULNESS IS APPRECIATED, BUT HIS MOTIVES FOR SWITCHING SIDES ARE CAUSING SOME EMBARRASSMENT. IT IS ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE NOW AGING DOCTOR MIGHT NOT ALWAYS BE GUARANTEED TO TOE THE FEDERAL LINE IN PUBLIC.

CERTAINLY AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT DR. AZIKIWE'S NEW-FOUND FAITH IN "ONE NIGERIA" IS CHIEF ANTHONY ENAHORO, THE COUNTRY'S COMMISSIONER FOR INFORMATION. IT WAS WHEN "ZIK," AS THE DOCTOR IS KNOWN, WAS ACTIVE IN NIGERIAN POLITICS DURING THE LATTER DAYS OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE THAT HE ENCOURAGED HIS PARTY'S YOUNG "ZIKISTS" INTO ANTI-BRITISH DEMONSTRATIONS, THEN WITHDREW SUPPORT FOR THEIR ACTIONS. CHIEF ENAHORO CAME TO SERVE HIS FIRST PRISON SENTENCE AS A RESULT, AND AFTERWARDS CONDEMNED HIS OLD LEADER IN "AZIKIWE - SAINT OR SINNER?"

NIGERIA'S VICE PRESIDENT, CHIEF AWOLOWO, AN OLD POLITICAL ENEMY, IS ALSO SAID TO HAVE BEEN DISTURBED BY THE REASONS BEHIND THE DOCTOR'S SUDDEN CHANGE OF HEART.

AMONG ASPECTS OF DR. AZIKIWE'S DEFLECTION WHICH HAVE CAUSED COMMENT IN LAGOS HAS BEEN THE MATTER OF HIS TRAVELING COMPANIONS. A CONTINGENT OF SHELL-BP EXECUTIVES (THE COMPANY IS THE MAJOR OIL CONCERN INVESTING IN NIGERIA) WAS ON THE PLANE TO MONROVIA WITH HIM, AND AFTER THE LIBERIA MEETING THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE COUNTRY FLEW BACK TO LONDON ON THE SAME FLIGHT.
END QUOTE DECON UPON RECEIPT.

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7R POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State

TELEGRAM

Addis Ababa 3926
9-4-69

CONFIDENTIAL 233:

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ACTION: AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00,
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RSR 01, /144 W

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P 041203Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 746
INFO USEMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 271
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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CONFIDENTIAL ADDIS ABABA 3926

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3917

1. FOLLOWING ON HEELS OF ARRIVAL ADDIS BIAFRAN DELEGATION
YESTERDAY (REFTEL), DELEGATE TALK LAST EVENING AT RECEPTION
HOSTED BY NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR. SEEMS FORECAST DECIDED STEP-UP
IN PACE NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENTS HERE.
2. MALAWI AMBASSADOR SAID IT RUMORED SECOND, MORE SENIOR GROUP
OF BIAFRANS EXPECTED ARRIVE ADDIS TODAY OR TOMORROW. NIGERIANS
PRESENT AT PARTY RESPONDED TO MENTION OF THIS REPORT WITH APPARENT
KNOWLEDGE OF IT AND TACIT CONFIRMATION OF EXPECTATION. GENERAL
MOOD OF NIGERIANS ONE OF EXCEPTIONAL CONFIDENCE AND HIGH
SPIRITS. NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR'S WIFE IN DISCUSSION HER HOUSE.
KEEPING PROBLEMS REVEALED GENERAL GOWON TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY
SOME 30 ASSOCIATES AND STAFFERS AND PLANNED STAY ADDIS AT LEAST
TWO DAYS, POSSIBLY LONGER IF TALKS HERE ON NIGERIA WARRANT.
- (2)

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AIRGRAM**DEPARTMENT OF STATE****PET 6 NIGERIA****XRP-PAL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA.**

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FROM - LAGOS

SUBJECT - Revised Forecasts of Economic Impact of
the Petroleum Industry

REFERENCE - TESTED A-264 (Covering Airgram to Pearson Report)

PET 6 NIGERIA

XRP PET 17-1 NIGERIA *XRP-PAL 27 Biafra-Nigeria*
 The falloff in oil production since April, when the prewar peak was surpassed, necessitates some revision of S. Pearson's last (April 1969) projections of the impact of this industry on the Nigerian economy. The future course of events is even more difficult to predict now than it was then, because of the added element of insecurity provided by the new rebel air force and deterioration of the security situation in some areas of the Mid-Western and Rivers States.

The expansion of production now depends heavily on the extent of damages to oil facilities which may be caused by further "Biafran" air and land attacks and on the companies' assessments of whether risks to personnel and facilities may be too great to continue operations in vulnerable areas. On the basis of the assumptions explained below, the April projections should probably be revised as follows:

(12)

	<u>In 1969, down</u>	<u>In 1970, down</u>
Production (000 bpd)	155-180 (-24%)	60-70 (-33%)
Payments to Government (\$ million)	6-8 (-20 to 25%)	8-9 (-17%)
Net Foreign Exchange Impact (\$ million)	6-8 (-10 to 12%)	8-10 (-6 to 7%)

Exempt from automatic decontrol.

PAGE
1 OF 3

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TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

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INFO: LONDON, LAGOS, MOSCOW

SEP 5 10 55 AM 1969

FROM : AmEmbassy ADDIS ABABA

RS/AN

ANALYSIS DATE: September 3, 1969

SUBJECT : Nigeria

REF :

HIM asked the Ambassador August 28 if the US had picked up rumors of a possible approach by the USSR to Biafra and FMG for peace discussions. After the Ambassador said he had seen nothing along these lines, the Emperor said the reports he had received were probably only rumors floated by the Soviets. However, he continued to be concerned about the Soviet role in Nigeria and Biafra and would appreciate any information we were able to share with him.

HALL

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
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(6)

POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR POL 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

SECRET 155

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03148 021906Z

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INFO: OCT 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /031 W

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P 021829Z SEP 69
FM: USMISSION: GENEVA
TO: SECSTATE: WASHDC PRIORITY 2799

S: E C R E T GENEVA 3148

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SUBJ: NIGERIA - RELIEF: GENERAL

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General 3/4/S
6/9/69

1. FERGUSON ALONE CALLED ON KOLO SEPTEMBER 2 P.M. FOR OFF-RECORD TOUR: DHORIZON.

2. FERGUSON OPENED BY EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN CROSS RIVER TALKS. INDICATED FERGUSON OF GROWING OPINION FMG PLAYING GAMES, FERGUSON MAY BE UNORTHODOX BUT NOT STUPID AND FERGUSON WANTED STRAIGHT STORY FMG POSITION. KOLO COUNTERED HE ALWAYS ABOVE BOARD, FERGUSON KNEW HIS PERSONAL VIEWS BUT HE GOOD AMBASSADOR ALWAYS FOLLOW HIS INSTRUCTION. SAID OVERRIDING QUESTION POLITICS SE STATE, SAID USG ALWAYS ADVISING AFRICANS BE DEMOCRATIC = PAY ATTENTION VOICE OF PEOPLE. NOW VOICE OF PEOPLE IN SEI REAL PROBLEM FOR FMG. ON TALKS SAID FMG HAD TWO BASIC PROBLEMS: SPONSORSHIP AND INSPECTION. FERGUSON REPLIED THAT APPARENT FIRST SESSION = WHY NOT PUT CARDS ON TABLE AND DEAL WITH ISSUE. KOLO SAID HE WILLING DEAL WITH ISSUE BUT ONLY IN CONTEXT FERGUSON-KOLO TALKS. THEN FERGUSON COULD TALK WITH REBELS AND REACH AGREEMENT THAT MODE. HE NOT SIT DOWN WITH REBELS IN SESSION SPONSORED BY USG EVEN THOUGH USG REP "BROTHER."

3. FERGUSON TOLD KOLO HE (FERGUSON) CALLING PLENARY SESSION WEDNESDAY 3:00 TO DISCUSS NAVIGATION VOYAGE AND A "ONE-SHOT" STOCKFISH OPERATION BEFORE FALL OF RIVER, AND EXPECTED FMG SHOW UP READY TO PLAY BALL, I.E. NEGOTIATE. KOLO REPLIED "WE'LL BE THERE AND READY TO PLAY FOOTBALL."

(2)

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4. KOLO SUGGESTED FERGUSON-KOLO GET TOGETHER LATE WEDNESDAY REACH UNDERSTANDING STATE OF PLAY SINCE HE RETURNING LAGOS 7 SEPTEMBER AND CAN PUT MATTER DIRECTLY TO GENERAL GOWON. FERGUSON AGREED BUT STRESSED THAT TALKS MUST NOT BREAK DOWN, IF DID FERGUSON DISPOSED "BLOW WHISTLE" ON FMG. KOLO RESPONDED FMG GOOD FAITH BUT GENUINE THINKING LAGOS BIAFRANS NOT IN GOOD FAITH AND SIMPLY LOOKING FOR WAY TO GET PROPAGANDA VICTORY OVER FMG. FERGUSON REPLIED BIAFRANS CAME GENEVA "READY TO PLAY." KOLO REJOINED: "SINCE TALKING FOOTBALL - I TELL YOU THEY PUT PANTS ON SAME WAY WE DO. HOLLIST WILL BE AT MEETING TOMORROW."

5. KOLO REVEALED GOING LAGOS FOR UN BRIEFING WILL BE MEMBER FMG DELEGATION WITH RESPONSIBILITY BLOCK IVORY COAST MOVE TO PUT NIGERIAN WAR ON AGENDA.

6. COMMENTS: FERGUSON ENCOURAGED KOLO ON LINES HE OVERWORKED - UNDERSTAFFED. US HAS FOUR AMBASSADORS DOING WHAT HE DOES - DISARMAMENT, BERN, REGULAR I.O. IN GENEVA AND HUMAN RIGHTS. HE NEEDS MORE STAFF FROM LAGOS TO HELP ON CROSS RIVER. KOLO RECEPTIVE. FERGUSON INTENDS LAY OUT FULL DEMAND IN LATE WEDNESDAY MEETING.
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
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POL 27 BIRERA - NIGERIA
TR POL 93-9 LIBYA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 854

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ACTION AFIT 8

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R 021615Z SEPT 69
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 720
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
USMISSION GENEVA
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AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
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USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 3891

SUBJECT: HIM INVITATION TO OUUKWU LIBYAN COUP

1. MIN STATE FORN AFFAIRS TESFAYE TOLD ME TODAY THAT LAST WEEK HIM AS PRESIDENT CON COM HAD SENT INVITATION TO OUUKWU THROUGH HOUPHOUET BOIGNY TO COME ADDIS ABABA FOR DISCUSSION WITH GOWON ON OR ABOUT SEPT 5. INVITATION ALSO TRANSMITTED THROUGH GOVERNMENTS OF ZAMBIA, TANZANIA AND GABON. IEG DOES NOT EXPECT REPLY IN VIEW OF OUUKWU'S displeasure WITH CON COM BECAUSE OF AZIKWE-GOWON MEETING IN MONROVIA. IEG ALSO DOUBTS OUUKWU FEELS SUFFICIENTLY SECURE AT HOME TO LEAVE ENCLAVE AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, ETHIOPIANS BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE OUUKWU MAY SEND SECOND LEVEL DELEGATION TO ADDIS, IN WHICH CASE THEY BELIEVE GOWON WOULD DESIGNATE FMG DELEGATION OF EQUIVALENT LEVEL FOR TALKS.

2. IN RESPONSE MY QUERY RE IEG REACTION TO LIBYAN COUP, TESFAYE OPINED IT SPILT "BAD NEWS" FOR BOTH ETHIOPIA AND US. IN HIS VIEW PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARIES WOULD BE EGYPTIANS. IEG INTERPRETS EARLY RECOGNITION OF NEW REGIME BY UAR AS TIP-OFF.

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THAT COUP WAS PROBABLY ENGINEERED BY EGYPTIAN AGENTS. TESFAYE
ADDED THAT LIBYA'S OIL WEALTH, WHICH WAS ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO
BE REAL BENEFIT TO LIBYA PEOPLE, WOULD IN FUTURE LARGELY FLOW
INTO EGYPTIAN COFFERS.
HALLI

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ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, SRI 01, ORM 03, SCA 01, SCS 04, UPW 01,
UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAEC 00, NSCI 10,

PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, 156 W

R 021245Z SEP 69
FM: USMISSION GENEVA
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 2790
INFO: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 3139

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

1. FOLLOWING IS MARKPRESS RELEASE JUST RECEIVED:

QUOTE: DR. NNAMDI AZIKIWE, BIAFRAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

OWERRI, BIAFRA, AUGUST 29, 1969. THE GOVERNMENT OF BIAFRA HAS ISSUED STATEMENT DISASSOCIATING ITSELF FROM RECENT UTTERANCES AND ACTIVITIES OF DR. NNAMDI AZIKIWE. TEXT OF STATEMENT READS:

"THE CABINET OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA HAS NOW CAREFULLY AND FULLY EXAMINED MATTER OF DR. NNAMDI AZIKIWE'S VISIT TO LAGOS AND MONROVIA. THE GOVERNMENT REPEATS ITS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT IT KNEW NOTHING WHATEVER OF DR. AZIKIWE'S VISIT."

"DR. AZIKIWE FLED NIGERIA AND SETTLED IN BIAFRA LIKE OTHER EASTERN NIGERIANS (NOW BIAFRANS). FOLLOWING THE POGROM OF 1966, HE WAS ELECTED A MEMBER OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY FOR

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ON ITSHA DIVISION LATER THAT YEAR. HE TOOK HIS SEAT IN THE ASSEMBLY AND PARTICIPATED IN ITS DELIBERATIONS.

"BEFORE AND AFTER THE PROCLAMATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA ON 30TH MAY 1967, DR. AZIKIWE WAS ONE OF THE ENVOYS WHO REGULARLY WENT ABROAD TO EXPLAIN OUR CASE AND POSITION. IN JULY/AUGUST 1968, HE ACCOMPANIED THE HEAD OF STATE TO NIAMEY AND TO ADDIS ABABA AS HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISOR. AFTER ADDIS ABABA DR. AZIKIWE PROCEEDED ON FURTHER MISSIONS.

"DR. AZIKIWE WAS IN EUROPE WHEN THE ENEMY ENTERED ABA, OWERRI AND OKIGWI. LIKE MANY OTHERS OUTSIDE BIAFRA AT THE TIME, DR. AZIKIWE THOUGHT THAT ALL WAS OVER WITH BIAFRA. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BIAFRA RECALLED ALL ITS ENVOYS ABROAD FOR BRIEFING EXCEPT DR. AZIKIWE AND HIS TEAM WHO WERE TO PROCEED TO THE UNITED STATES.

"INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING TO THE UNITED STATES ON THE BRIEF HE ALREADY HAD, HIS COURAGE FAILED HIM, AND IN LIGHT OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY SITUATION, HE SENT A FRANTIC MESSAGE SUGGESTING A SURRENDER TO NIGERIA IN ORDER "TO SAVE WHAT COULD BE SAVED." THE HEAD OF STATE OF BIAFRA PROMPTLY REPLIED REASSURING DR. AZIKIWE THAT ALL WAS NOT LOST, AND INVITING HIM TO RETURN HOME TO BRING HIMSELF UP TO DATE, BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THE UNITED STATES AS PLANNED. DR. AZIKIWE REPLIED THAT HE HAD, FOR HIS AGE, ALREADY TRAVELED TOO MUCH WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD. THE JOURNEYS HAD CAUSED HIM PHYSICAL AILMENTS, INCLUDING DELAYED SHELL SHOCK, CALLING FOR ATTENTION BY HIS PERSONAL PHYSICIAN WHO HAPPENED ALSO TO BE THE PERSONAL PHYSICIAN OF HER MAJESTY, THE QUEEN OF ENGLAND. HE ALSO WANTED TO HAVE HIS WISDOM TOOTH REMOVED. THE BIAFRAN GOVERNMENT WAS SYMPATHETIC AND UNDERSTANDING, AND OUT OF ITS MEAGRE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESOURCES, MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM MONEY FOR HIS PERSONAL EXPENSES. LATER, THE GOVERNMENT UNDERTOOK TO SEND DR. AZIKIWE'S WIFE AND FAMILY, AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, TO TAKE CARE OF HIM IN LONDON.

"WHILE IN LONDON DR. AZIKIWE ESTABLISHED CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND BRITISH BUSINESS INTERESTS AND HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM ABOUT BIAFRA WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO OR BRIEFING BY THE BIAFRAN GOVERNMENT. SUBSEQUENTLY, HE FORMULATED HIS 14-POINT PROPOSALS FOR PEACE WHICH HE INTENDED TO PROPOUND AT LECTURE AT OXFORD. IT WAS THROUGH THE BBC

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(BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION) THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BIAFRA LEARNED OF HIS INTENTION. TRUSTING DR. AZIKIWE'S GOOD FAITH, THE GOVERNMENT OF BIAFRA PROMPTLY CAUSED CONTACTS TO BE MADE WITH DR. AZIKIWE FOR AT LEAST THE COURTESY OF LETTING THE BIAFRAN GOVERNMENT HAVE AN ADVANCE IDEA OF WHAT HE WAS GOING TO PROPOSE.

"THE CONTACTS WERE ABORTIVE. MANY DAYS AFTER HE HAD DELIVERED HIS SPEECH, DR. AZIKIWE SENT A LETTER TO THE BIAFRAN HEAD OF STATE IN WHICH HE SAID, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT HE WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL OR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BIAFRAN GOVERNMENT, AND AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY HE HAD FREEDOM TO EXPRESS HIS PRIVATE VIEWS, AND WAS NOT PREPARED TO BE PUSHED ABOUT BY THOSE IN POSITIONS OF "TEMPORARY POWER". FROM THE ABOVE IT WILL BE SEEN THAT FOR ONE YEAR NOW DR. AZIKIWE HAS CEASED TO ACT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF BIAFRA.
TUBBY"

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ACTION: AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, SRI 01, ORM 03, SCA 01, SCS 04, UPW 01,

UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, 156 W
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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2791

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY COTONOU

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

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SUBJECT NIGERIA

"DR. AZIKIWE'S PRESENT ROLE SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT HE ALWAYS ENDS A CRISIS BY SACRIFICING THE PEOPLE'S INTERESTS. ONCE HE HAS FOUND A PERSONAL ACCOMMODATION.

"IN COLONIAL NIGERIA, HE INDUCED YOUNG MEN TO FORM THE ZIKIST MOVEMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIGHTING IMPERIALISM, BUT EACH TIME ZIKISTS WERE IN TROUBLE, HE BACKED OUT TO SAVE HIS NECK. THIS WAS HOW CHIEF ANTHONY ENAHORO CAME TO SERVE HIS FIRST PRISON SENTENCE AND LATER WROTE HIS PAMPHLET 'AZIKIWE: SAINT OR SINNER?' LEAVING NOBODY IN DOUBT WHICH ONE DR. AZIKIWE WAS.

"IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT AFTER THE 1959 GENERAL ELECTIONS HE PREVENTED HIS PARTY, THE NCNC, FROM ENTERING INTO A FRUITFUL ALLIANCE WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN PROGRESSIVE LEADERSHIP TO NIGERIA, BECAUSE AS HE PUT IT 'MY OWN PERSONAL POSITION HAS BEEN ASSURED.' IT TURNED OUT THAT HIS ASSURED POSITION

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WAS THAT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL UNDER A BRITISH IMPERIALIST REGIME. THE CRISIS THROUGH WHICH NIGERIA PASSED SINCE HER INDEPENDENCE AND THE CURRENT SUFFERING IN BIAFRA AND NIGERIA STEM FROM HIS SELFISH DECISION ON THAT OCCASION.

"IT WILL ALSO BE RECALLED THAT IN 1964 WHEN DR. AZIKIWE, AS THE PRESIDENT AND HEAD OF STATE OF NIGERIA, SAW BLATANT IRREGULARITIES AND RIGGING IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NIGERIAN ELECTIONS, HE INDUCED THE EASTERN, MID-WESTERN AND WESTERN NIGERIAN REPRESENTATIVES ON THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO RESIGN THEIR MEMBERSHIP. HE ALSO INDUCED THE UPGA, AN ALLIANCE OF THE N.C.N.C. AND THE ACTION GROUP, TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING HIS HAND IN DISMISSING THE PRIME MINISTER. HE, IN FACT, THEREAFTER WROTE A SPEECH DISMISSING THE PRIME MINISTER BUT AT THE LAST MOMENT, FOR SELFISH CONSIDERATION OF SAVING HIS POSITION, HE BACKED DOWN.

"DR. AZIKIWE'S RECENT VISIT TO LAGOS AND MONROVIA WAS ENGINEERED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL GOWON WAS CAREFULLY PLANNED AND PRE-ARRANGED. IT IS NOW KNOWN THAT DR. AZIKIWE HAS BEEN PROMISED A KEY POSITION IN THE LAGOS REGIME BY GENERAL GOWON AND THAT HIS PROPERTY, INCLUDING HIS BANK ACCOUNT, HAS BEEN RELEASED TO HIM. THUS, FOR PURELY SELFISH REASONS DR. AZIKIWE HAS MADE HIMSELF A WILLING TOOL AT THE HANDS OF BIAFRA'S ENEMIES AND HAS AGAIN SACRIFICED THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF BIAFRA, REGARDLESS OF ALL THE BIAFRA HAS PASSED THROUGH AND STANDS FOR. THIS IS A TRAGIC STORY OF A MAN WHO WROTE FOR THE BIAFRAN NATIONAL ANTHEM THE FOLLOWING WORDS: 'LAND! OF THE RISING SUN WE LOVE AND CHERISH, BELOVED HOMELAND OF BRAVE HEROES.'

"THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF BIAFRA DEPLORE AND CONDEMN DR. AZIKIWE'S CONTEMPT FOR HIS PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT BY TRYING TO EXPLOIT FOR HIS SELFISH ENDS AND PERSONAL POSITION THE PASSIONATE DESIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF BIAFRA FOR PEACE. THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF BIAFRA, WHO HAVE BORNE SUFFERINGS AND LOSSES AS A RESULT OF THIS FUTILE AND GENOCIDAL WAR, ARE MORE ANXIOUS THAN ANYONE ELSE FOR PEACE. BUT IT MUST BE PEACE WHICH WILL GUARANTEE FOR THEM EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY. PEACE THAT WILL NEVER AGAIN EXPOSE THE PEOPLE OF BIAFRA TO THE TYPE OF TRAGIC EXPERIENCES THROUGH WHICH THEY HAVE PASSED; PEACE THAT WILL LEAD TO A HARMONIOUS ASSOCIATION

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AND RELATIONSHIP WITH NIGERIA AND OTHER NEIGHBORS. WE REMAIN PREPARED, AND HEREBY REPEAT OUR SOLEMN CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE END TO HOSTILITIES BY BOTH SIDES TO THE CONFLICT AND SO AN END TO THE SUFFERINGS AND WANTON LOSSES OF LIFE AND PROPERTY TO WHICH OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED. WE REMAIN PREPARED, AND HEREBY CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. TO THIS END, WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND A DELEGATION OR DELEGATIONS TO MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER SIDE, AT A PLACE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, FOR NEGOTIATIONS." END QUOTE". TUBBY

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS IMMEDIATE

Info: INFO: Amembassy ACCRA PRIORITY
Amconsul ENUGU "
Amconsul IBADAN "
Amconsul KADUNA "
Amembassy LONDON "
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA " 14675

STATE *AM 12-5 pm 14675
TRD 12-5 pm 7-1*

1. In discussion with Amb Martins, based on aide-memoire transmitted separately replying to Nigerian aide-memoire of Aug 23, Assistant Secretary Palmer elaborated points therein. Aug 21 statement was recitation of factors which influenced our original decision to deny sale of arms in Nigeria and regret Soviets had done so. It not directed at FMG but it hoped Soviets would not attempt to introduce ideological factor.
2. USG had maintained constant cable flow trying to assure all feasible steps would be taken by our allies overseas to prevent illegal traffic in military equipment over which we had any possible control. Some agreements had been made years ago and lost sight of by ~~REXXNATOxXxXxX~~ and this accounted for introduction into international arms market of some US-origin equipment through resale ~~by~~ third countries. To illustrate kind

Drafted by: *Rm*
AF: AFW: RMMelbourne: esw 8/31/67 Tel. Ext. 2619
Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and

Notification approved by: AF - Mr. Palmer *Pb/Rm*

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of effort USG has been making to prevent illegal traffic, Martins was given substance of State tel 14675 of July 1 (Notal). Despite our best efforts some US-origin equipment and aircraft had reached Eastern hands since we have no control over international arms market.

3. Payments by Eastern regime for arms in many cases were being made in US dollars which had excited Nigerian suspicions of USG assistance to "Biafra". Since dollar was international vehicle of exchange we had no control over this. Amb Matthews had seen Awolowo, had explained this, and Awolowo had understood.

4. Palmer continued there should be no misunderstanding of our intentions toward Nigeria. We recognize FMG as sovereign and legal government of Nigeria. We have no intent to recognize "Biafra" or to aid it directly or indirectly.


5. Martins thanked Palmer for frank exchange and effort to eliminate misunderstanding. ~~Maxx~~ Nigeria passing through travail other countries have experienced. Nigerians understand US institutions permit expression of all viewpoints on Nigeria, but they content so long as USG still supports FMG.

6. To Martins' query if it possible for US to render any help to FMG which would "strike people in Nigeria", Palmer replied that continuous operation of aid programs in FMG controlled areas was clearest witness of this. To Martins' inquiry if communications

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equipment could not be sold, he was reminded that some licenses for communication equipment have been extended. However, military aspect of any help is/difficulty.

7. Palmer said he still concerned at continuing anti-US tone of Nigerian press. He said Amb Matthews in seeing Awolowo had been told that this would now abate. Martins said ~~the~~ that he had cabled Gowon asking that anti-US commentary cease since it would be a tragedy if anything should happen to Americans still living and working in Nigeria.

8. In handling of US aide-memoire, Martins inquired if there would be objection to publicity on its text. Palmer ~~said~~ replied that we had no objection to conveying substance of aide-memoire but he did ~~think it in~~ ~~interests either country for~~ ~~not~~ diplomatic correspondence to be automatically considered as in public domain. He added that we considering ourselves some public means of expression of views set forth in our aide-memoire. This seemed satisfy Martins.

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